| Galway Co-Op.Com, LLC v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 02602 [171 AD3d 1283] |
| April 4, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| Galway Co-Op.com, LLC, Appellant, v NiagaraMohawk Power Corp., Doing Business as National Grid,Respondent. |
John W. Sutton, Galway, for appellant.
Barclay Damon, Albany (David M. Cost of counsel), for respondent.
Aarons, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Crowell, J.), entered May 10, 2018 inSaratoga County, which, among other things, granted defendant's motion to dismiss thecomplaint.
In 1936, Emily Fink and New York Power and Light Corporation (hereinafter NYPLC),defendant's predecessor in interest, entered into an easement agreement, which, among otherthings, permitted NYPLC and its successors to erect and maintain electrical transmission linesand poles on certain real property owned by Fink. After a series of transfers, plaintiff, in 2011,ultimately acquired title to the subject property previously owned by Fink. Plaintiff commencedthis action in 2017 under RPAPL article 15 alleging that defendant did not have the right tomaintain a guy wire on the subject property and seeking, among other things, a declaration that itowned the property exclusive of any easement or other interest held by defendant. As relevanthere, defendant, in a pre-answer motion, moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a)(1). In a May 2018 order, Supreme Court, among other things, granted defendant's motion.Plaintiff thereafter moved for reargument of the May 2018 order. In a July 2018 order, SupremeCourt noted that it had "reviewed [plaintiff's] arguments and contentions and [found] theminsufficient to justify any departure from the [c]ourt's previous determination" and, accordingly,"denied" plaintiff's reargument motion. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff does not dispute the chain of title from Fink's ownership of the subject property toits ownership. Rather, this appeal centers on the easement agreement entered into between Finkand NYPLC. "It is well settled that the extent and nature of an easement must be determined bythe language contained in the grant, aided where necessary by any circumstances tending tomanifest the intent of the parties" (Rosen v Mosby, 148 AD3d 1228, 1230 [2017] [internal quotationsmarks and citations omitted], lv dismissed 30 NY3d 1037 [2017]; see Dowd vAhr, 78 NY2d 469, 473 [1991]). According to the easement agreement, Fink grantedNYPLC, "its successors and assigns, the right to erect, maintain, repair and operate lines for thetransmission of electricity, and messages, consisting of . . . guys, guy stubs,. . . wires and appurtenances, upon, over, under, along or across the lands of [Fink]as shown on the annexed sketch, and/or the highway or highways adjacent to the land." In ourview, the language of this easement agreement permits the placement of guy wires on all of theland that Fink owned at the time the easement was granted. Plaintiff's contention that theeasement was limited to a certain area is not supported by either the sketch referenced in theeasement agreement or the deeds describing the subject property. Based on the foregoing,defendant established that the documentary evidence utterly refuted plaintiff's factual allegations(see CPLR 3211 [a] [1]; Crepinv Fogarty, 59 AD3d 837, 839 [2009]; see generally Kolchins v Evolution Mkts., Inc., 31 NY3d 100, 106[2018]) and, therefore, Supreme Court correctly granted defendant's pre-answer motion todismiss.
To the extent that plaintiff claims that the July 2018 order was erroneous, we initially notethat, as a general matter, no appeal as of right lies from an order denying reargument (see Flisch v Walters, 42 AD3d682, 683 [2007]). Because the court addressed the arguments raised in plaintiff's reargumentmotion, however, we view the July 2018 order as granting reargument and, upon reargument,adhering to its prior determination, notwithstanding the language therein stating that "[p]laintiff'smotion for leave to reargue is denied." As such, the July 2018 order may be appealed from as ofright (see Rodriguez v Jacoby &Meyers, LLP, 126 AD3d 1183, 1184 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 912 [2015]).Although the notice of appeal specifies only the May 2018 order as the order from which plaintiffappeals and the record does not contain a separate notice of appeal with respect to the July 2018order, we are nonetheless authorized to review the July 2018 order (see CPLR 5517 [b]).That said, based on our determination herein, we find that Supreme Court properly adhered to itsoriginal determination.
Clark, J.P., Mulvey, Rumsey and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,with costs.