| People v Crupi |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 03614 [172 AD3d 898] |
| May 8, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jonathan Crupi, Appellant. |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Jenin Younes of counsel), for appellant.
Michael E. McMahon, District Attorney, Staten Island, NY (Morrie I. Kleinbart and AnneGrady of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (MarioF. Mattei, J.), rendered September 23, 2015, convicting him of murder in the second degree,upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, without ahearing (Leonard P. Rienzi, J.), of those branches of the defendant's motion which were tocontrovert two search warrants.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of the murder of his wife.
We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of those branches of the defendant's motion whichwere to controvert the search warrant dated July 5, 2012, authorizing a search of "computers,laptops, computer tablets, or cellular phones," and the search warrant dated July 12, 2012,authorizing a search of four specific laptops, a cell phone, and a detachable hard drive, made onthe ground that these warrants were not supported by probable cause and were overbroad. "Toestablish probable cause, a search warrant application must provide sufficient information 'tosupport a reasonable belief that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place' " (People v Murray, 136 AD3d 714,714 [2016], quoting People v McCulloch, 226 AD2d 848, 849 [1996]; see People v Augustus, 163 AD3d981, 982 [2018]). Great deference should be accorded to the court's determination to issue asearch warrant (see People v Griminger, 71 NY2d 635, 640 [1988]; People vJohnson, 66 NY2d 398, 406 [1985]; People v Kane, 175 AD2d 881, 883[1991]).
Here, each of the challenged warrants was supported by an affidavit of a police witnessproviding the requisite probable cause to believe that evidence relating to the victim's murderwould be found on the identified devices (see People v Smith, 163 AD3d 1005 [2018]; see also People vHanlon, 36 NY2d 549, 559 [1975]). Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, thedescription of the objects to be seized in each of the challenged warrants was not broader thanwas justified by the probable cause upon which the warrants were based (see United States vUlbricht, 858 F3d 71, 102 [2d Cir 2017]; United States v Galpin, 720 F3d 436,445-446 [2d Cir 2013]). Thus, the warrants were not overbroad (see People v Armstrong,267 AD2d 120, 121 [1999]; People v Durante, 131 AD2d 499 [1987]; cf. People vCouser, 303 AD2d 981 [2003]; People v Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 85 [2001]). Thedefendant's contention that the search of these devices was improper absent probable cause tobelieve that he, in particular, was involved in the victim's murder, is unpreserved for appellatereview (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Toellner, 299 AD2d 567 [2002]). In anyevent, the contention is without merit.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]). Moreover, infulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence(see CPL 470.15 [5]; People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not againstthe weight of the evidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in prohibiting the defendant fromcross-examining a police witness with respect to the allegations of false arrest and/or policebrutality in four federal lawsuits filed against that witness. "Where a lawsuit has not resulted inan adverse finding against a police officer . . . defendants should not be permitted toask a witness if he or she has been sued, if the case was settled (unless there was an admission ofwrongdoing) or if the criminal charges related to the plaintiffs in those actions were dismissed.However, subject to the trial court's discretion, defendants should be permitted to ask questionsbased on the specific allegations of the lawsuit if the allegations are relevant to the credibility ofthe witness" (People v Smith, 27NY3d 652, 662 [2016]). "In cross-examining a law enforcement witness, the same standardfor good faith basis and specific allegations relevant to credibility applies, as does the same broadlatitude to preclude or limit cross-examination" (People v Enoe, 144 AD3d 1052, 1053 [2016]). "First, counsel mustpresent a good faith basis for inquiring, namely, the lawsuit relied upon; second, specificallegations that are relevant to the credibility of the law enforcement witness must be identified;and third, the trial judge exercises discretion in assessing whether inquiry into such allegationswould confuse or mislead the jury, or create a substantial risk of undue prejudice to the parties"(People v Smith, 27 NY3d at 662). Here, the complaints in each of the identified actionscontain only allegations of unlawful police conduct by large groups of officers, and did not setforth specific acts of misconduct against the police witness individually. Thus, cross-examinationof this witness regarding the federal lawsuits was properly denied (see People v Watson, 163 AD3d855, 859-861 [2018]).
We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to permit the introduction of evidence ofthe defendant's 2011 internet search history, concerning methods of killing and crime scene cleanup. This evidence was relevant to demonstrate the defendant's intent to commit murder, and hisdevelopment of a plan or scheme to do so, and its probative value outweighed any potentialundue prejudice to the defendant (seePeople v Frumusa, 29 NY3d 364 [2017]; People v Jin Cheng Lin, 26 NY3d 701 [2016]).
We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to admit evidence that the defendantpatronized prostitutes during his marriage and subsequent to the murder of his wife. Theevidence was relevant to establish the victim's state of mind regarding the parties' marriage, toprovide the jury with background information regarding the defendant's relationship with thevictim and to show that there was marital strife, and to complete the narrative of the defendant'spost-murder behavior (see People vGomez, 153 AD3d 724, 725 [2017]; People v Curran, 139 AD3d 1085, 1086 [2016]; People v Wisdom, 120 AD3d 724[2014]). Moreover, the court providently exercised its discretion in determining that theprobative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant (seePeople v Gomez, 153 AD3d at 725; People v Curran, 139 AD3d at 1086; People v Wisdom, 120 AD3d 724[2014]). Further, the court gave a sufficient limiting instruction regarding the use the jury couldmake of the evidence, which the jury is presumed to have followed (see People v Gomez,153 AD3d at 725; People v Curran, 139 AD3d at 1087).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P., LaSalle, Barros andChristopher, JJ., concur.