People v Gentry
2019 NY Slip Op 03698 [172 AD3d 1526]
May 9, 2019
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 3, 2019


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Ramel Gentry, Appellant.

Todd G. Monahan, Schenectady, for appellant.

Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), forrespondent.

Mulvey, J. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County(Murphy III, J.), rendered March 28, 2016, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of thecrime of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and (2) bypermission, from an order of said court (Sypniewski, J.), entered June 13, 2018, which denieddefendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 to set aside the sentence, without a hearing.

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the thirddegree in full satisfaction of a seven-count indictment and waived the right to appeal, with theunderstanding that he would be sentenced to five years in prison, followed by three years ofpostrelease supervision. During the plea colloquy, County Court (Murphy III, J.) adviseddefendant that if he failed to appear at sentencing, he could be sentenced to up to eight years inprison plus postrelease supervision, and defendant affirmed his understanding thereof.[FN*]

After defendant failed to appear at sentencing, a bench warrant was issued. Defendant wasarrested on the warrant and the People requested that County Court enhance defendant's sentencebased upon his failure to appear at sentencing and the fact that, following his plea, defendant hadbeen arrested and charged with several crimes, including a felony. Following an Outleyhearing, County Court determined that defendant had violated the conditions of the pleaagreement and sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to eight years in prison, followed bythree years of postrelease supervision. Defendant's subsequent motion to vacate the sentencepursuant to CPL 440.20 was denied by County Court (Sypniewski, J.) without a hearing.Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction and, by permission, from the order denyinghis CPL 440.20 motion.

We affirm. As for the direct appeal, we find unpersuasive defendant's challenge to thesufficiency of the proof that he violated a condition of his plea agreement. The record reflectsthat, during the plea colloquy, County Court (Murphy III, J.) warned defendant of theramifications for failing to appear at sentencing, including the potentially longer sentence. At theoriginally-scheduled sentencing hearing, defense counsel informed the court that he had receiveda telephone call that morning from defendant's girlfriend advising counsel that defendant had afamily medical emergency and was unable to attend the hearing at the scheduled time, but that hewould be available that afternoon. County Court adjourned sentencing to the afternoon, butdefendant failed to appear without any further communication with counsel or the court, resultingin a bench warrant. Following his arrest three months later, defendant failed to provide anyfurther explanation for his failure to appear at sentencing. Additionally, the People offered proofthat defendant was not in any jail, prison or local hospital at the time he was supposed to be incourt. Inasmuch as defendant's failure to appear for sentencing, standing alone, provided a basisfor enhancing the sentence, we find that County Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing anenhanced sentence (see People vBrown, 163 AD3d 1269, 1270-1271 [2018]; People v Smith, 160 AD3d 664, 665 [2018]).

Because defendant was advised of the potential consequences of failing to appear forsentencing, including the maximum sentence that could be imposed, his challenge to the severityof the enhanced sentence is precluded by his unchallenged waiver of the right to appeal (seePeople v Brown, 163 AD3d at 1270-1271; People v Crowder, 110 AD3d 1384, 1386 [2013], affd 24NY3d 1134 [2015]; People vBrown, 101 AD3d 1267, 1268-1269 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 1014 [2013],cert denied 571 US 1143 [2014]). "Notably, defendant's breach of the plea agreement andthe subsequent imposition of the enhanced sentence did not render defendant's waiver of the rightto appeal unenforceable" (People v Segrue, 274 AD2d 671, 672 [2000] [citation omitted],lv denied 95 NY2d 908 [2000]).

Defendant contends—both as part of his direct appeal and on his appeal from thedenial of his CPL 440.20 motion—that County Court's finding that he violated the termsof the plea agreement and the resultant enhanced sentence were the product of ineffectiveassistance of counsel. On direct appeal, defendant attacks counsel's statements to the court on theoriginally-scheduled sentencing date, wherein he relayed the information supplied by defendant'sgirlfriend regarding defendant's absence. By indicating that defendant could not attend due to afamily medical emergency, counsel did not take a position that was adverse to that of defendant(see People v Cain, 235 AD2d 429, 430 [1997]; compare People v Prater, 127 AD3d 1249, 1250 [2015]). Counselacted reasonably in accepting a short adjournment for defendant to appear, because defendant'sgirlfriend had informed counsel that defendant could be in court by the early afternoon. Althoughcounsel did not request another adjournment when defendant failed to appear that afternoon, wewill not second-guess that choice; such a request likely would have been futile considering thatcounsel had no further information or basis therefor.

As for the ineffective assistance arguments raised in relation to defendant's postjudgmentmotion, the record indicates that County Court (Sypniewski, J.) did not err in resolving themwithout a hearing (see CPL 440.30 [4]). Defendant's claim that he was not made aware ofthe Outley hearing is belied by the record. Defendant was present when the courtscheduled that hearing for the next appearance and, when defendant raised this issue at thehearing, counsel affirmed to the court that he had advised defendant that the hearing would takeplace that day. Defendant complains that counsel never went to see him in jail to prepare for thehearing, resulting in no witnesses being called on his behalf. Although his motion papers mentionwitnesses (plural), at the hearing he stated that he had a witness (singular); neither in his papersnor at the hearing did he provide the name of any witness or describe the subject matter of anywitness's potential testimony. Considering that the People sought an enhanced sentence on twogrounds—defendant's failure to appear and being charged with new crimes—andthe court found that they had established both, defendant could only have prevailed if heeffectively countered each ground. His motion papers fail to demonstrate that he could have doneso. Moreover, defendant does not explain why neither he nor his girlfriend reached out to counselto provide him with the names of potential witnesses for the hearing.

Additionally, although defendant contends that counsel had not prepared him to evaluate apotential plea agreement, which could have resulted in defendant receiving an aggregate sentenceof seven years in prison for both the instant conviction and a conviction on the new charges, therecord shows that County Court (Murphy III, J.) conducted a lengthy colloquy with defendantregarding the potential plea agreement and its ramifications. Counsel confirmed that he haddiscussed the plea agreement with defendant, and the court provided defendant with additionalopportunities to discuss it with counsel. Defendant affirmed his understanding of the pleaagreement and ultimately rejected it when his request that the aggregate sentence be lowered tosix years in prison was denied.

Finally, the remaining claims made by defendant in the context of his CPL 440.20 motion arenot the proper subject of such a motion because they are reviewable upon defendant's directappeal from the judgment of conviction (see People v DePerno, 148 AD3d 1463, 1464 [2017], lvdenied 29 NY3d 1030 [2017]; People v Boyce, 12 AD3d 728, 730 [2004], lv denied 4NY3d 741 [2004]). Thus, defendant's motion to set aside the sentence was properly deniedwithout a hearing (see People vMuriel, 75 AD3d 908, 911 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 922 [2010]; People v Brown, 23 AD3d 702,702-703 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 774 [2006]).

Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and order areaffirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote *:At his arraignment, defendanthad signed a Parker admonishment in which he acknowledged that, in the event that heentered into a plea agreement and he failed to appear at sentencing or violated the law prior tobeing sentenced, the sentencing court was free to impose any lawful sentence.


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