| People v Robertucci |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 04057 [172 AD3d 1782] |
| May 23, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Andrew M. Robertucci, Appellant. |
Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Kristin A. Bluvas of counsel), for appellant.
Gary M. Pasqua, District Attorney, Canton (Matthew L. Peabody of counsel), forrespondent.
Lynch, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County(Champagne, J.), rendered September 26, 2016, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty ofthe crime of rape in the first degree.
In full satisfaction of a multicount indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rapein the first degree with the understanding that he would be sentenced to a prison term of fiveyears followed by five years of postrelease supervision. The plea agreement, which included awaiver of the right to appeal and satisfied other pending charges resulting from defendant'sviolation of certain pretrial release conditions, arose out of an offense that defendant committedwhen he was 17 years old. Following defendant's plea, the matter was adjourned for sentencing.Despite some discussion at sentencing regarding defendant's age at the time of the underlyingoffense, County Court did not determine defendant's eligibility for youthful offender status andimposed the agreed-upon term of imprisonment. This appeal ensued.
Defendant argues, the People concede and we agree that County Court failed to determinedefendant's eligibility for youthful offender status in the first instance. CPL 720.10 establishesthe framework for determining youthful offender eligibility. Insofar as is relevant here, a "youth"is defined as "a person charged with a crime alleged to have been committed when he [or she]was at least [16] years old and less than [19] years old" (CPL 720.10 [1]), and an "eligible youth"is "a youth who is eligible to be found a youthful offender" (CPL 720.10 [2]). "Every youth is soeligible" (CPL 720.10 [2])—subject to certain statutory exceptions including, as pertinenthere, a conviction for "rape in the first degree . . . , except as provided in[CPL 720.10 (3)]" (CPL 720.10 [2] [a] [iii] [emphasis added]). To that end, CPL 720.10 (3)provides, in relevant part, that "a youth who has been convicted of . . . rape in thefirst degree . . . is an eligible youth if the court determines that one or more[statutory] factors exist," including "mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the mannerin which the crime was committed" (CPL 720.10 [3] [i]).
Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the underlying offense and, despite his convictionof rape in the first degree, he was not statutorily precluded from being found to be an eligibleyouth (see CPL 720.10 [3]). Where, as here, a defendant has been convicted of anenumerated sex offense (see CPL 720.10 [2] [a] [iii]), the sentencing court, "in order tofulfill its responsibility under CPL 720.20 (1) to make a youthful offender determination forevery eligible youth, . . . must make the threshold determination as to whether thedefendant is an eligible youth by considering the factors set forth in CPL 720.10 (3)" (People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3d516, 525 [2015])—" 'even where the defendant has failed to ask to be treatedas a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request' pursuantto a plea bargain" (id. at 527, quoting People v Rudolph, 21 NY3d 497, 499 [2013] [brackets omitted]; see People v Martz, 158 AD3d991, 992 [2018]; People v MarquisA., 145 AD3d 61, 67-68 [2016]; People v Jahquel L., 112 AD3d 1155, 1156 n [2013]). As CountyCourt failed to initially determine whether defendant was an eligible youth within the meaning ofthe statute, defendant's sentence is vacated and this matter is remitted for a determination as todefendant's eligibility for youthful offender status (see People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3dat 527-528; People v Martz, 158 AD3d at 992-993; People v Daniels, 139 AD3d 1256, 1257-1258 [2016], lvdenied 28 NY3d 1183 [2017]).
Mulvey, Devine, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified, onthe law, by vacating the sentence imposed; matter remitted to the County Court of St. LawrenceCounty for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified,affirmed.