| People v Womack |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 04232 [172 AD3d 1819] |
| May 30, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1](May 30, 2019)
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Keanna Womack, Appellant. |
Jacob A. Vredenburgh, Wynantskill, for appellant.
Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Peter H. Willis of counsel), forrespondent.
Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Murphy III,J.), rendered January 11, 2016, convicting defendant upon her plea of guilty of the crimes ofassault in the second degree and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in thethird degree.
Following a traffic stop, defendant was arrested and transported to the police station and,while attempting to conceal a bag of heroin, she exposed one of the arresting officers to itscontents, necessitating that he receive medical care. Defendant was charged in a nine-countindictment with assault in the second degree, tampering with physical evidence and variousdrug-related crimes. In satisfaction of all charges, defendant pleaded guilty to assault in thesecond degree and to the reduced charge of attempted criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the third degree, pursuant to a plea agreement that included a waiver of appeal.Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, County Court sentenced defendant, as a secondfelony offender, to concurrent prison terms, the maximum of which is three years to be followedby five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.
We affirm. Contrary to defendant's contention, we find that her waiver of appeal was valid.County Court advised defendant during the plea allocution that an appeal waiver was a conditionof the plea agreement and, after explaining the trial-related rights that she was forfeiting bypleading guilty, separately explained to her that she ordinarily retained the right to appeal but thata waiver of that right was a condition of the plea agreement, which defendant confirmed sheunderstood (see People v Dickerson,168 AD3d 1194, 1194 [2019]; People v Hall, 167 AD3d 1165, 1165-1166 [2018], lvdenied 32 NY3d 1204 [2019]). Defendant then signed a written waiver of appeal, whichexplained her appellate rights and the consequences of the waiver and confirmed that she haddiscussed her rights and the waiver with defense counsel, who confirmed to the court that she hadreviewed the written waiver with defendant (see People v Moore, 167 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2018], lvdenied 33 NY3d 951 [2019]). Although the court did not utilize the precise phrase "separateand distinct" (People v Lopez, 6NY3d 248, 256 [2006]), it is well settled that "the court is not obliged to engage in anyparticular litany or catechism in satisfying itself that a defendant has entered a knowing,intelligent and voluntary appeal waiver" (People v Walker, 166 AD3d 1393, 1393-1394 [2018] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Sanders, 25 NY3d 337, 341 [2015]; People vLopez, 6 NY3d at 256). We are satisfied that the language employed here adequatelyconveyed to defendant that the right to appeal was separate and distinct from the trial-relatedrights forfeited by her guilty plea and did not impermissibly lump these distinct rights together(see People v Sanders, 25 NY3d at 341; People v Lopez, 6 NY3d at 257; People v Franklin, 164 AD3d1547, 1548 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1171 [2019]). Accordingly, we find thatdefendant's combined oral and written waiver of appeal was knowing, voluntary and intelligent(see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d at 256; People v Hall, 167 AD3d at 1165-1166; People v Martinez, 166 AD3d1376, 1377 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1207 [2019]). Given defendant's valid appealwaiver, her challenge to the sufficiency of the plea allocution is precluded (see People v Maddaloni, 166 AD3d1235, 1235 [2018]; People vWood, 161 AD3d 1447, 1448-1449 [2018]).
Egan Jr., J.P., Mulvey, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.