| People v Edwards |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 04537 [173 AD3d 1615] |
| June 7, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Charquan Edwards, Appellant. |
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Kristen McDermott of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Nicole K. Intschert of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.),rendered October 20, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of attemptedmurder in the first degree, robbery in the first degree (two counts), assault in the first degree,criminal use of a firearm in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the lawand a new trial is granted on counts one through five, seven and eight of the indictment.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of,inter alia, attempted murder in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.27[1] [a] [vii]; [b]) and assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [1]). Viewing the evidencein light of the elements of those crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 349 [2007]), we reject defendant's contention that his conviction of attempted murder inthe first degree and assault in the first degree is against the weight of the evidence with respect tothe element of intent (see People vTorres, 136 AD3d 1329, 1330 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 937 [2016],cert denied 580 US &mdash, 137 S Ct 661 [2017]; People v Lopez, 96 AD3d 1621, 1622 [4th Dept 2012], lvdenied 19 NY3d 998 [2012]; see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]).
We agree with defendant, however, that he is entitled to a new trial because Supreme Courtviolated his right to counsel. Although "[t]he right of an indigent criminal defendant to theservices of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successivelawyers at defendant's option[,] . . . the right to be represented by counsel of one'sown choosing is a valued one, and a defendant may be entitled to new assigned counsel uponshowing 'good cause for a substitution' " (People v Sides, 75 NY2d 822, 824[1990]). Thus, trial courts are required to conduct at least a " 'minimal inquiry' "when a defendant voices " 'seemingly serious' " complaints about his or herassigned defense counsel (People vPorto, 16 NY3d 93, 100 [2010], quoting Sides, 75 NY2d at 824-825).
Here, we conclude that defendant "articulated complaints about his assigned counsel thatwere sufficiently serious to trigger the court's duty to engage in an inquiry regarding thosecomplaints" (People v Beard, 100AD3d 1508, 1510 [4th Dept 2012]). At a pretrial appearance, defendant requested that thecourt assign him new counsel because, among other things, defense counsel had failed to filediscovery demands and omnibus motions. After defendant's request, defense counsel erroneouslystated, "[t]hose were filed already," and the court stated, "I have them here. I'm holding them inmy hand." However, the People concede that, although certain discovery demands were servedon the People, defense counsel never filed any omnibus motions.
Upon being told that omnibus motions had been filed, defendant informed the court that hehad never received them. The court replied, "Well, that's a different issue, okay? So you've got toget a copy of your paperwork, all right? What else?" The court never conducted an inquiry intodefendant's serious complaint that defense counsel failed to file any omnibus motions and,instead, proceeded under the mistaken belief that they had been filed. Although "[t]he courtmight well have found upon limited inquiry that defendant's request was without genuine basis,. . . it could not so summarily dismiss th[at] request" based on a mistaken belief thatomnibus motions had been filed (Sides, 75 NY2d at 825). Thus, we conclude that thecourt violated defendant's right to counsel by failing to make a minimal inquiry concerning hisserious complaint, and we therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial on counts onethrough five, seven and eight of the indictment (see Beard, 100 AD3d at 1511-1512).
In light of our determination, we do not address defendant's remaining contentions.Present—Carni, J.P., Lindley, NeMoyer, Curran and Troutman, JJ.