| Matter of Angel S. (Sadetiana J.) |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 05135 [173 AD3d 1188] |
| June 26, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Angel S. Administration for Children'sServices, Respondent; Sadetiana J., Appellant, et al., Respondent. |
Brooklyn Defender Services, Family Defense Practice, Brooklyn, NY (Lauren Shapiro, AmyMulzer, NYU School of Law Family Defense Clinic [Christine Gottlieb], and Proskauer RoseLLP [William D. Dalsen and Laura Stafford], of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Claude S. Platton and MacKenzieFillow of counsel), for petitioner-respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, New York, NY (Dawne A. Mitchell and Claire V. Merkine of counsel),attorney for the child.
Mayer Brown LLP, New York, NY (Allison Stillman and Josh Gupta-Kagan of counsel), foramici curiae Lawyers For Children, Inc., and another.
In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the mother appeals from an order ofthe Family Court, Kings County (Elizabeth Barnett, J.), dated March 16, 2018. The order deniedthat branch of the mother's motion which was for the temporary release of the subject child to hercare.
Ordered that the appeal is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements.
The Administration for Children's Services commenced this neglect proceeding against themother and the father of the subject child. The Family Court later dismissed the petition insofaras asserted against the mother. The mother moved, inter alia, for the temporary release of thesubject child to her care (see Family Ct Act § 1017 [2] [a] [ii]). The courtdenied that branch of the mother's motion. The court determined, over the mother's objection,that it was necessary to comply with the procedures set forth in the Interstate Compact forPlacement of Children (hereinafter the ICPC), codified at Social Services Law§ 374-a, before the court could award the mother temporary custody of the child.The mother appeals. Approximately two months after the court issued the order appealed from,"[b]ased upon [a] home study and approval of the ICPC by the State of North Carolina," the courtreleased the child to the mother's care, "with supervision by the local North Carolina Departmentof Social Services." Supervision of the child by North Carolina ended on April 10, 2019.
"It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the lawonly arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actuallycontroverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal" (Matter of Lucinda R. [Tabitha L.], 85 AD3d 78, 83 [2011] [internalquotation marks omitted]). "Under the mootness doctrine, a court is ordinarily precluded fromconsidering questions which, although once live, have become moot by passage of time orchange in circumstances" (id. at 83 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "In general, anappeal will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by thedetermination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of thejudgment" (id. at 83-84 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Kasja YY., 64 AD3d907, 908-909 [2009]).
Here, the mother's appeal is academic, as the ICPC evaluation process has been completedand the mother has received her requested relief of having the child released to her care (seeMatter of Lucinda R. [Tabitha L.], 85 AD3d at 83-84; Matter of Kasja YY., 64 AD3dat 908). Thus, the mother's rights would not "be directly affected by the determination of theappeal" from the order denying that branch of her motion which was for the temporary release ofthe child to her (Matter of Lucinda R. [Tabitha L.], 85 AD3d at 84). The exception to themootness doctrine does not apply in this case (cf. Matter of Elizabeth C. [Omar C.], 156 AD3d 193, 201-202[2017]; Matter of Lucinda R. [Tabitha L.], 85 AD3d at 84-85). Accordingly, we dismissthe appeal as academic. Rivera, J.P., Hinds-Radix, LaSalle and Iannacci, JJ., concur.