| People v Herrod |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 05450 [174 AD3d 1322] |
| July 5, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Antone Herrod, Also Known as Tone,Appellant. |
The Kindlon Law Firm, PLLC, Albany (Lee C. Kindlon of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
John J. Flynn, District Attorney, Buffalo (David A. Heraty of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (David W. Foley, A.J.), rendered June 27,2016. The appeal was held by this Court by order entered July 6, 2018, decision was reserved andthe matter was remitted to Erie County Court for further proceedings (163 AD3d 1462 [2018]).The proceedings were held and completed.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict ofmurder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). We previously held the case,reserved decision, and remitted the matter to County Court to allow the People, in response todefendant's Batson application, to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for striking anAfrican-American juror and for the court to determine whether the proffered reason waspretextual (People v Herrod, 163 AD3d 1462 [4th Dept 2018]). Upon remittal, the courtdetermined that the People offered a non-pretextual, race-neutral reason for excluding theprospective juror at issue. We now affirm.
We conclude that the People met their burden at step two of the Batson analysis toarticulate a "race-neutral reason" for striking the prospective juror (People v Hecker, 15 NY3d 625,655 [2010], cert denied 563 US 947 [2011]; see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79,98 [1986]). At the remittal hearing, the prosecutor testified that he struck the prospective jurorbecause he was a crime victim who expressed some dissatisfaction with the manner in which thecrime against him had been prosecuted and because he made statements suggesting that he mightbe receptive to defendant's potential justification defense. We conclude that this was sufficient tosatisfy the People's "quite minimal" burden of providing a race-neutral reason for striking thejuror (People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172, 183 [1996]; see People v Grant, 128 AD3d 1088, 1090 [2d Dept 2015]; People v Ramos, 124 AD3d 1286,1287 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1076 [2015], denied reconsideration 26NY3d 933 [2015]).
We further conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that theprosecutor's explanation for the peremptory challenge was not pretextual (see People v Farrare, 118 AD3d1477, 1477-1478 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1061 [2014]). It is immaterialthat the prospective juror stated that he would not hold against the People any dissatisfaction hehad with the manner in which the crime against him was handled. "[A]ssurances from achallenged prospective juror that he or she could assess the evidence in a fair manner eventhough he or she was a crime victim are irrelevant to the determination of whether the basis of aperemptory challenge is pretextual" (Grant, 128 AD3d at 1090). Moreover, the court didnot err in crediting the prosecutor's proffered explanation given his testimony that he did not usea peremptory challenge against an African-American juror who, despite being a crime victim,was satisfied with the resolution of her case and that he did use peremptory challenges to strikeseveral Caucasian prospective jurors for reasons similar to those offered in support of hisdecision to strike the prospective juror at issue here (see Ramos, 124 AD3d at 1287). Thecourt was in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of the prospective juror, the prosecutor,and defense counsel, and we conclude that its determination that the prosecutor's profferedreasons for striking the prospective juror were not pretextual is entitled to great deference (seePeople v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350, 356 [1990], affd 500 US 352 [1991]; People v Dandridge, 26 AD3d779, 780 [4th Dept 2006]).
We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that none warrantsreversal or modification of the judgment. Present—Peradotto, J.P., Lindley, NeMoyer,Curran and Troutman, JJ.