People v Mink
2019 NY Slip Op 06541 [175 AD3d 1612]
September 12, 2019
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, October 30, 2019


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Michael Mink, Appellant.

Teresa C. Mulliken, Harpersfield, for appellant.

D. Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), forrespondent.

Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Mott, J.), rendered May 16, 2016in Ulster County, (1) upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of driving whileintoxicated and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree, and (2)upon his plea of guilty of the crime of circumvention of interlock device.

On the evening of February 20, 2014, a 911 caller reported that defendant and hisfiancée were leaving an Ulster County residence in a gray Chrysler following analtercation and that a drunken defendant was driving. A responding sheriff's deputy, Kyle Frano,passed a gray Chrysler on the route that defendant was reported to have taken. Frano turned tofollow the vehicle, which promptly pulled into a gas station and stopped. As Frano was pullingup behind the car, he observed defendant getting out of the driver's side door. Frano calleddefendant over and observed that he had the smell of alcohol on his breath, glassy watery eyesand slurred speech, and similar signs of impairment were noted by two State Troopers whosubsequently arrived. Frano first handcuffed defendant due to the report of an assault but, afterlearning that no one at the residence was injured or wanted to file a complaint, released defendantand administered field sobriety tests. Defendant failed those tests and was placed under arrest,and he thereafter refused to submit to chemical testing.

Defendant was charged in an indictment with various offenses as a result of his driving drunkand disregarding restrictions arising from a prior conviction for aggravated driving whileintoxicated. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated as afelony and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree. He then enteredan Alford plea to the remaining count of the indictment, circumvention of interlockdevice. Supreme Court sentenced defendant to one year in jail and a conditional discharge ofthree years on the driving while intoxicated conviction, and concurrent jail terms of equal orlesser length on the remaining convictions. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

Defendant contends upon appeal that the jury verdict was not supported by legally sufficientevidence and was against the weight of the evidence, challenging in particular the proof that hewas driving the vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 511 [3] [a] [i];1192 [3]; 1193 [1] [c] [i]). In that regard, Michael Smith testified that he was the individual whocalled 911 and that, on the evening in question, he, defendant and others were at the home ofdefendant's fiancée's mother. Smith confirmed that defendant was drinking and that it wasdefendant who got behind the wheel of the Chrysler and drove off with his fiancée. Franotestified that he encountered the vehicle a few minutes later and that, as he followed the vehicleinto the gas station, he saw defendant exit the driver's side of the vehicle. The camera mountedon Frano's patrol cruiser was not angled to record that observation; it did, however, capture thesubsequent field sobriety testing and the eventual admission of defendant's fiancée toFrano that she had not been driving. Viewing the foregoing in the light most favorable to thePeople (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), and mindful that a person need only be "behind the wheel with theengine running" to operate a vehicle for purposes of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (People v Colburn, 123 AD3d1292, 1293 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 950 [2015]), there was legally sufficientproof for a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant had operated the vehicle whileintoxicated (see People v Dunster,146 AD3d 1029, 1030 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 997 [2017]; People vColburn, 123 AD3d at 1293; Peoplev Ingram, 3 AD3d 791, 792 [2004]).

Turning to defendant's weight of the evidence argument, a different verdict was perhapsreasonable given that the accounts of Smith and Frano were attacked at trial and that defendant,his fiancée and her mother all testified that it was the fiancée who was behind thewheel. The jury nevertheless credited the proof that defendant had operated the vehicle whileintoxicated and, "[a]fter reviewing the record and weighing the conflicting evidence, we discernno reason to reject the jury's assessment of the witnesses' credibility or to conclude that the jury'failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded' " (People v Ingram,3 AD3d at 792-793, quoting People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; see People v Farnsworth, 134 AD3d1302, 1304 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1068 [2016]; People v Colburn, 123AD3d at 1293; People v Westcott,84 AD3d 1510, 1512 [2011]).

Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.