| People v Ferguson |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 08016 [177 AD3d 1247] |
| November 8, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1](November 8, 2019)
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Sarah Ferguson, Appellant. |
Peter J. Digiorgio, Jr., Utica, for defendant-appellant.
Scott D. McNamara, District Attorney, Utica (Steven G. Cox of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Michael L. Dwyer, J.),rendered September 1, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant upon a nonjury verdictof manslaughter in the first degree, assault in the first degree (two counts) and gangassault in the first degree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter isremitted to Oneida County Court for further proceedings in accordance with thefollowing memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon anonjury verdict of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20[1]), two counts of assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [1]), and two countsof gang assault in the first degree (§ 120.07). The conviction stems from theprolonged beatings of two teenage victims that occurred at the Word of Life ChristianChurch (Word of Life) in New Hartford, New York. Defendant, a member of the Wordof Life at the relevant time, is the half sister of the victims, i.e., decedent Lucas Leonardand his brother, Christopher Leonard. Following a service that concluded atapproximately 9:00 p.m. on the night in question, the pastor of the church along withother Word of Life members confronted Lucas and Christopher about accusations thatthey had sexually abused defendant's children. Defendant and other Word of Lifemembers then began beating Lucas and Christopher with a number of items, including apower cord, periodically over a span of nearly 14 hours. Medical treatment was notsought for Lucas until around noon the following day and, by the time Lucas was takento a hospital, he was dead. Christopher survived, but sustained swelling and bruises onhis face, arms, chest, genitals, and thighs as a result of blunt force trauma to those areas.Christopher also suffered a 50% loss of kidney function, which required treatment at anintensive care unit over a period of two days.
Defendant contends that her conviction of each offense is based on legallyinsufficient evidence of intent to cause serious physical injury. Defendant's contention isnot preserved for our review inasmuch as her motion for a trial order of dismissal wasnot " 'specifically directed' at the alleged error" asserted on appeal (People vGray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). In any event, defendant's challenge lacks meritbecause "there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead arational person to the same conclusion as the [factfinder]" (People v Sapp, 163AD2d 835, 835 [4th Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 990 [1990]). "It is wellsettled that [a] defendant may be presumed to intend the natural and probableconsequences of his [or her] actions . . . , and [i]ntent may be inferred fromthe totality of conduct of the accused" (People v Meacham, 151 AD3d 1666, 1668 [4th Dept2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 981 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Mahoney, 6AD3d 1104, 1104 [4th Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 660 [2004]). Here,defendant's intent was "inferable from the nature and fatal outcome of the beating that[s]he inflicted on [Lucas]" (People v Novak, 179 AD2d 1053, 1054 [4th Dept1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 922 [1992]), as well as "the surroundingcircumstances . . . and the medical evidence" relating to both victims (People v Wise, 46 AD3d1397, 1399 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 872 [2008] [internalquotation marks omitted]; see People v White, 216 AD2d 872, 873 [4th Dept1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 805 [1995]). Notably, the evidence established thatdefendant, and only defendant, struck Lucas and Christopher in their groins, and that shestruck them more times overall than anyone else who was involved. Although defendantrepeatedly claimed that she did not put "much thought" into what she was doing and thatshe did not have a "thought process," she also acknowledged that she purposefully struckLucas and Christopher in their groins specifically because she believed that they hadsexually abused her children. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable tothe People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude thatthe evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction (see People v Williams, 158AD3d 1170, 1170-1171 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1018 [2018];People v Nafi, 132 AD3d1301, 1302 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1147 [2016]). Contrary todefendant's related contention, "the possibility that [her] conduct also might have beendeemed consistent with a reckless state of mind" does not establish that her conviction ofmanslaughter in the first degree is based on legally insufficient evidence because "[t]hereis no contradiction in saying that a defendant intended serious physical injury, and wasreckless as to whether or not death occurred" (People v Ramos, 19 NY3d 133, 136 [2012]; see Peoplev Trappier, 87 NY2d 55, 57 [1995]). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in light ofthe elements of the crimes in this nonjury trial (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), weconclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generallyPeople v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
We also reject defendant's contention that she was denied effective assistance ofcounsel. Inasmuch as we have concluded that defendant's contentions regarding the legalsufficiency of the evidence lack merit, it cannot be said that defense counsel's failure topreserve those contentions for review constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v Washington, 60AD3d 1454, 1455 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 922 [2009]; seegenerally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).
We similarly reject the contention of defendant that the grand jury proceeding wasdefective. It is well settled that "[a] grand jury need not be instructed with the samedegree of precision that is required when a petit jury is instructed on the law," and"[d]ismissal of an indictment under CPL 210.35 (5) is an exceptional remedy that should. . . be limited to those instances where prosecutorial wrongdoing,fraudulent conduct or errors potentially prejudice the ultimate decision reached by the[g]rand [j]ury" (People vRoblee, 126 AD3d 1429, 1429 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d1005 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Upon our review of the experttestimony presented and the limiting instructions issued during the grand juryproceeding, we conclude that defendant failed to meet her burden of establishing "theexistence of defects impairing the integrity of the . . . proceeding and givingrise to a possibility of prejudice" (People v Wood, 291 AD2d 824, 824 [4th Dept2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 657 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Defendant further contends that this matter should be remitted for a conference orsummary hearing to determine what information should be redacted from the presentencereport. We agree, and we note that the People do not oppose remittal for that purpose.The record establishes that defendant sent a letter to County Court objecting to certainportions of the report, including references to her failure to cooperate with lawenforcement and to her invocation of her right to counsel. At sentencing, the courtacknowledged the objections and indicated that it agreed with some, but not all, of them.The court, however, failed to articulate which portions should be redacted. Accordingly,because "defendant was not properly afforded an opportunity to challenge the contents ofthe presentence report" (Peoplev James, 114 AD3d 1312, 1312 [4th Dept 2014]), we hold the case and remit thematter to County Court for further proceedings in accordance with our decision.
To the extent that defendant contends that she is entitled to be resentenced based onthe alleged errors in the presentence report, we reject that contention inasmuch as there isno indication that the court relied on the alleged improper information contained in thereport in sentencing her (seePeople v Gibbons, 101 AD3d 1615, 1616 [4th Dept 2012]; People v Paragallo, 82 AD3d1508, 1509-1510 [3d Dept 2011]). Contrary to defendant's further contention, thesentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Finally, defendant's contention that the sentenceconstitutes cruel and unusual punishment is unpreserved for appellate review, and wedecline to address it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see People v Pena, 28 NY3d727, 730 [2017]). Present—Whalen, P.J., Centra, Peradotto, Lindley andDeJoseph, JJ.