| People v Breland |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 08686 [178 AD3d 716] |
| December 4, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Daquan Breland, Appellant. |
Janet E. Sabel, New York, NY (Rachel L. Pecker and Alan Axelrod of counsel), forappellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Camille O'Hara Gillespie,and Marie John-Drigo of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Neil JonFiretog, J.), rendered November 6, 2015, convicting him of murder in the second degree andcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The relevant facts of this case are set forth in the decision and order on the appeal of thecodefendant Deshawn Wright (seePeople v Wright, 166 AD3d 1022 [2018]).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the People committed a Bradyviolation (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]) by failing to disclose that a witnesshad collected a $2,000 reward from Crime Stoppers prior to trial. The People have a duty todisclose to the defense evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused (see id.;People v Steadman, 82 NY2d 1, 7 [1993]). The disclosure of evidence affectingcredibility falls within this general rule (see Giglio v United States, 405 US 150, 154[1972]; People v Steadman, 82 NY2d at 7; People v Novoa, 70 NY2d 490, 496[1987]).
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that the evidence is favorableto the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature, the evidence wassuppressed by the prosecution, and prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material(see People v Fuentes, 12 NY3d259, 263 [2009]; see also People vGarrett, 23 NY3d 878, 885 [2014]). Absent a specific request by the defendant for theevidence, materiality can only be demonstrated by a showing that there is a "reasonableprobability" that it would have changed the outcome of the proceedings (People vFuentes, 12 NY3d at 263 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Hunter, 11 NY3d 1, 5[2008]; People v Bryce, 88 NY2d 124, 128 [1996]). Here, the defendant made only ageneral request for exculpatory material (see People v Vilardi, 76 NY2d 67, 70-72[1990]).
There is no evidence that the prosecution was aware of the $2,000 reward at the time of thedefendant's trial, as the identity of individuals providing information to, and collecting rewardsfrom, Crime Stoppers is kept confidential. Moreover, it is clear that the witness receivedsubstantial benefits of approximately $12,000 in exchange for his cooperation in the case againstthe defendant and that this information was disclosed to the defendant. The defendant engaged inextensive cross-examination of the witness regarding this issue, as well as that witness'sextensive criminal history, current pending charges, and inconsistent statements regarding theshooting. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that additionalcross-examination of that witness concerning the $2,000 reward would have yielded a differentresult and, therefore, reversal is not required on this ground (see People v Fuentes, 12NY3d at 263; People vPortilloaguilar, 164 AD3d 1376 [2018]).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in admitting excerpts of a swornaudiotaped statement made by a witness to law enforcement officials under the past recollectionrecorded exception to the hearsay rule is without merit (see People v Taylor, 80 NY2d 1,8 [1992]; People v Wright, 166 AD3d at 1024). The defendants's alternative contentionthat the statement excerpts were improperly admitted as an attempt by the People to impeachtheir own witness is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]) and, in anyevent, without merit. Balkin, J.P., Cohen, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur.