| People v Grant |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 08864 [178 AD3d 850] |
| December 11, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Madi Grant, Appellant. |
[Recalled and vacated, see 2020 NY Slip Op 03674.]
Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, NY (Arza Feldman of counsel), for appellant.
Madeline Singas, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Yael V. Levy and Kevin C. King ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robert A.McDonald, J.), rendered August 11, 2017, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree,vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, leaving the scene of an incident without reporting,operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, operating a motor vehicle whileability impaired by a combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs,aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, arson in the third degree,and conspiracy in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, including adirection that the defendant make restitution in the sum of $39,374.75.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, (1) by vacating the provision thereofdirecting the defendant to make restitution in the sum of $39,374.75 and substituting therefor aprovision directing the defendant to make restitution in the sum of $15,000, and (2) by vacatingthe provision thereof directing payment of the mandatory surcharge by civil judgment andsubstituting therefor a provision directing payment of the mandatory surcharge pursuant to PenalLaw § 60.35 (5); as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt isunpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484,492 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution(see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient toestablish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independentreview pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against theweight of the evidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633, 643-644 [2006]).
The defendant's contention that his historical cell site location information should have beensuppressed because it was purportedly obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rightsunder Carpenter v United States (585 US &mdash, 138 S Ct 2206 [2018]) is unpreservedfor appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, the court order authorizing theacquisition of the records made an express finding of probable cause, which was supported by thePeople's evidentiary showing (see People v Freitag, 148 AD2d 544, 545 [1989]).Accordingly, the order '' 'was effectively a warrant' which complied with the requirement ofCarpenter" (People v Clark,171 AD3d 942, 943 [2019], quoting People v Sorrentino, 93 AD3d 450, 451 [2012]; see People v Cutts, 62 Misc 3d411, 415 [Sup Ct, NY County 2018]).
However, the amount of restitution improperly exceeds $15,000 and violates the statutorycap in Penal Law § 60.27 (5). Penal Law § 60.27 (5) (a) provides that,except with the consent of the defendant or in instances where restitution is ordered as acondition of probation or conditional discharge, "the amount of restitution or reparation requiredby the court shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for a felony"(see People v Horne, 97 NY2d 404, 414 [2002]). This provision is qualified by PenalLaw § 60.27 (5) (b), which allows a court to order restitution in excess of thisamount as long as the sum is "limited to the return of the victim's property, including money, orthe equivalent value thereof" (see People v Horne, 97 NY2d 404, 414 [2002]). Under thecircumstances of this case, the amount in excess of $15,000 did not meet the dictates of PenalLaw § 60.27 (5), since the amount of the defendant's restitution set by the SupremeCourt was not intended to reimburse the victim for the value of the property destroyed.
In addition, the Supreme Court, at sentencing, should not have directed payment of themandatory surcharge by civil judgment (see Penal Law § 60.35 [5]; People v Jones, 26 NY3d 730, 732[2016]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Cohen, Barros andConnolly, JJ., concur.