| People v Rose |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 09299 [178 AD3d 1091] |
| December 24, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Alberto A. Rose, Appellant. |
Janet E. Sabel, New York, NY (Harold V. Ferguson, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Keith Dolan, and DanielBerman of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (RaymondGuzman, J.), rendered June 24, 2016, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in thesecond degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review thedenial, without a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was tosuppress physical evidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On May 10, 2015, at approximately 2:00 a.m., after calling 911, the complainant arrived at aNew York City Police Department station to report that the defendant had used a liquor bottle tobreak her car's rear windshield and driver's side window. The complainant identified thedefendant by name and gave the police a description of the clothes he was wearing.
Subsequently, four police officers, one in uniform and three in plainclothes with their badgesdisplayed, traveled with the complainant in an unmarked police vehicle to the defendant's home.When they drove past the defendant's home, the complainant identified the defendant, who wasstanding outside under a street light. The police stopped their vehicle and, upon exiting, theyobserved the defendant remove a gun from his waistband and place it behind a nearby tree. Thedefendant was arrested and charged with attempted assault in the second degree, attemptedassault in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (two counts),menacing in the second degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree (two counts), criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a firearm, andcriminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
In an order dated September 1, 2015, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion todismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 190.50 on the ground that he was deprived of his right totestify before the grand jury. Thereafter, in an order dated April 11, 2016, the court denied,without a hearing, that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the gunon the basis that the defendant failed to assert a possessory interest in the gun or allege a factualscenario which, if uncontradicted, would require suppression of the gun or entitle him to ahearing. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in thesecond degree.
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly denied his motion to dismissthe indictment on the ground that he was not given notice of his scheduled time to testify beforethe grand jury is without merit. In opposition to the defendant's motion, the People demonstratedthat the defendant was provided with notice, via telephone and email to his counsel, of the grandjury proceeding and the date and time during which he was scheduled to testify (see CPL190.50 [5] [a]; People v Williams,139 AD3d 766, 766 [2016]; People v Quinones, 280 AD2d 559, 560 [2001]).
We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny, without a hearing, that branch ofthe defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the gun. In his motion papers, thedefendant argued that the gun should be suppressed as the product of an unlawful arrest becausethe arresting officers approached the defendant without first observing him commit a crime orwithout probable cause to believe that he had committed one. A court may deny a motion tosuppress evidence without conducting a hearing if the "defendant does not allege a proper legalbasis for suppression, or (with two exceptions) if the 'sworn allegations of fact do not as a matterof law support the ground alleged' " (People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 421[1993], quoting CPL 710.60 [3] [b]). "[T]he sufficiency of defendant's factual allegations shouldbe evaluated by (1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of themotion, and (3) [evaluated by] defendant's access [of] information" (People v Mendoza,82 NY2d at 426; see People vGaray, 25 NY3d 62, 72 [2015]; People v Guzman, 153 AD3d 1273, 1276 [2017]).
The defendant's unsworn allegations, when considered in the context of the informationprovided by the People, failed to raise a factual dispute requiring a hearing (see People v Holloway, 45 AD3d477, 477 [2007]). The defendant's motion papers did not contain sworn allegations of fact.Moreover, the information provided to the defendant, which included the grand jury testimony,demonstrated that the police approached the defendant based on the statements provided to themby the complainant. Consequently, the approach by the police was lawful and the defendant'sclaim of innocent conduct at the time of their approach was insufficient to warrant entitlement toa hearing (see People v Garay, 25 NY3d at 72; People v France, 12 NY3d 790, 791 [2009]; People vGuzman, 153 AD3d at 1276).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Mastro, J.P., Austin, Roman and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.