| People v Haynes |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 53941 [177 AD3d 1194] |
| November 27, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jody C. Haynes, Appellant. |
Mark Schneider, Plattsburgh, for appellant.
Karen A. Heggen, District Attorney, Ballston Spa (Mary T. Northrup of counsel), forrespondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County(Murphy III, J.), rendered June 19, 2017, upon a verdict convicting defendant of thecrimes of burglary in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourthdegree.
In November 2016, defendant was charged by indictment with burglary in the firstdegree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree based on allegations thathe forced his way into the house of his coworker (hereinafter the victim) and threatenedher with a knife. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged. He wasthereafter sentenced to a prison term of 20 years, to be followed by five years ofpostrelease supervision, for his conviction of burglary in the first degree and a concurrentone-year jail term for his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourthdegree. Defendant appeals.
Defendant contends that his conviction for burglary in the first degree is notsupported by legally sufficient evidence as there was insufficient proof establishing thathe possessed the requisite intent to commit a crime upon his entry into the victim'sresidence. We disagree. "In reviewing a legal sufficiency claim, we view the evidence inthe light most favorable to the People and evaluate whether there is any valid line ofreasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to theconclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of lawsatisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged" (People v Wilson, 164 AD3d1012, 1013-1014 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; seePeople v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). "A person is guilty of burglary in thefirst degree when he [or she] knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling withintent to commit a crime therein, and when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling orin immediate flight therefrom, he [or she] or another participant in the crime. . . [u]ses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument" (PenalLaw § 140.30 [3]). In turn, "[a] person 'enters or remains unlawfully' in orupon premises when he [or she] is not licensed or privileged to do so" (Penal Law§ 140.00 [5]). As relevant here, "a defendant's intent to commit a crime maybe properly inferred from, among other things, the circumstances of the entry, his or herunexplained presence in the building and his or her actions and statements while on thepremises" (People v Saylor,173 AD3d 1489, 1491 [2019] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citationsomitted]; see People vLewis, 5 NY3d 546, 552 [2005]; People v Spencer, 152 AD3d 863, 864 [2017], lvdenied 30 NY3d 983 [2017]).
The evidence introduced at trial established that defendant and the victim werecoworkers and had known each other for approximately two years prior to the subjectincident. Over that time, the victim had rebuffed numerous requests by defendant to goon a date, but they nevertheless remained friends on Facebook, with defendant oftensending the victim messages via Facebook Messenger.[FN1] Approximately five days prior to thesubject incident, the victim responded to one of defendant's messages by telling him, forthe first time, that she had a boyfriend. Undeterred, defendant continued to message thevictim attempting to ascertain, among other things, the identify of her boyfriend, whilealso making inquiry into whether any members of the victim's family were generallyhome during the day when she was not working. On the morning of June 7, 2016, lessthan an hour after defendant and the victim had finished working an overnight shift (7:00p.m. to 7:00 a.m.), defendant started messaging the victim. His messages becameincreasingly more agitated when the victim did not respond to all of his questions, and heultimately told the victim that she was "fake," that she should "unfriend" and "block" himon Facebook and that he "want[s] nothing to d[o] with [the victim] anymore."
Following receipt of these messages, the victim went and dropped her son off atschool before returning home to get ready to meet a friend to go shopping. As she wasgetting ready, her doorbell rang numerous times. Although she looked out her bedroomwindow and did not see anyone outside, she nevertheless checked her front door.Immediately upon unlocking the door, defendant pushed the door in, grabbed her sweaterwith his left hand, pushed her down on a bench inside the doorway and pulled a steakknife out of his pocket with his right hand and held it to her neck and chest area.Defendant subsequently dropped the knife, whereupon the victim was able to calm himdown, convince him that she was not going to call the police and that he had to leavebecause she was going to meet a friend. The victim reported the incident to police a fewhours later and, after the police located defendant at his home, he agreed to participate ina police interview.
Contrary to defendant's contention, there was ample evidence introduced at trialdemonstrating that he had the intent to commit a crime upon his entry into the victim'shome. In his interview with police, defendant candidly admitted that he was angry withthe victim that morning because she would not respond to his messages and that hesubsequently grabbed a steak knife from his home and drove, uninvited, to the victim'shouse. Defendant had never previously been to the victim's house nor been provided theaddress, but ascertained the location from looking at photographs on Facebook andconfirmed the address when he observed her red Jeep Grand Cherokee parked in thedriveway outside her house. Defendant did not park in the victim's driveway and chose topark on the side of the street a few doors down from the victim's house, walked to herfront door, rang the doorbell and, upon entering the house, pulled a steak knife out of hispocket. Despite admitting to the underlying conduct, defendant nevertheless maintainsthat he did not intend to harm the victim and that he only entered her house to talk withher.[FN2] Whenviewed in a light most favorable to the People, we find that the evidence at trial provideda valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury couldconclude that defendant committed burglary in the first degree when he drove to thevictim's home armed with a steak knife, pushed in her door, grabbed her, forced herdown on a bench and pulled out the knife and threatened her with it (see People v Womack, 143AD3d 1171, 1172 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1151 [2017]; People vRichards, 290 AD2d 584, 585-586 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 654[2002]).
Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial based upon the admission of certainMolineux evidence.[FN3] "Evidence of uncharged crimes or priorbad acts may be admitted where they fall within the recognized Molineuxexceptions—motive, intent, absence of mistake, common plan or scheme andidentity—or where such proof is inextricably interwoven with the charged crimes,provides necessary background or completes a witness's narrative and, further, the trialcourt determines that the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicialeffect" (People v Smith, 173AD3d 1441, 1444 [2019] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted],lv denied 34 NY3d 954 [2019]). Here, County Court's admission of certainstatements made by defendant to another coworker on the night immediately prior to thesubject incident, wherein he allegedly called the victim "a whore," were relevant toestablishing defendant's motive and intent and were inextricably interwoven with thecharged crime, as it provided relevant and necessary context with regard to defendant'sstate of mind, particularly his anger toward and fixation with the victim, and was moreprobative than it was prejudicial (see People v Pitt, 170 AD3d 1282, 1284 [2019], lvdenied 33 NY3d 1072 [2019]; People v Westerling, 48 AD3d 965, 967 [2008]).
Defendant's contention that County Court erred when it denied his request for a jurycharge on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the second degree is withoutmerit. Having reviewed the evidence submitted at trial, we agree with County Court thatthere was no reasonable view of the evidence set forth on the record demonstrating thatdefendant had any noncriminal purpose for forcibly entering the victim's home,brandishing a steak knife and threatening her with it (see People v Morrison, 127 AD3d 1341, 1344-1345[2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 932 [2015]; People v Sturdevant, 74 AD3d 1491, 1493 [2010], lvdenied 15 NY3d 810 [2010]).
Finally, "the mere fact that a sentence imposed after trial is greater than that offeredin connection with plea negotiations is not proof positive that defendant was punishedfor asserting his right to trial" (People v Malloy, 152 AD3d 968, 971 [2017] [internalquotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 30 NY3d 981 [2017]).Given defendant's criminal record, particularly his escalating history of criminal conducttowards women, we perceive no abuse of discretion or extraordinary circumstances thatwarrant a reduction of his sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Grayson, 167AD3d 1076, 1076 [2018]; People v Rotger, 129 AD3d 1330, 1333 [2015], lvsdenied 26 NY3d 1011 [2015], 27 NY3d 1005 [2016]). Defendant's further assertionthat the sentence imposed was the product of vindictiveness is belied by the record, asCounty Court expressly credited defendant's expressions of remorse in sentencing him toa prison term less than the maximum sentence allowable by law.
Garry, P.J., Mulvey and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote 1:The victim had nointerest in knowing defendant outside of work and the only communication she had withhim in that regard was via Facebook Messenger. She testified that the tone and content ofdefendant's messages often made her feel uncomfortable and she would often speak withhim at work and tell him that she was not interested in receiving such messages.
Footnote 2:After leaving thevictim's house, defendant sent the victim a message at 11:15 a.m. stating, "IM SOOSORRY."
Footnote 3:To the extent thatdefendant challenges County Court's Molineux ruling on hearsay grounds, saidchallenge is unpreserved for our review as defendant failed to object on this basis beforeCounty Court (see generallyPeople v Hilton, 166 AD3d 1316, 1321 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1205[2019]; see also People vSukhdeo, 103 AD3d 673, 674 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 914 [2013]).