| People v Martz |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 01528 [181 AD3d 979] |
| March 5, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v John K. Martz, Appellant. |
Marshall Nadan, Kingston, for appellant.
Christopher C. Shambo, District Attorney, Indian Lake (Susan M. Johnson ofcounsel), for respondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Hamilton County(Feldstein, J.), rendered March 13, 2018, which resentenced defendant following hisconviction of the crimes of criminal sexual act in the first degree and sexual abuse in thefirst degree.
In March 2016, defendant pleaded guilty to the crimes of criminal sexual act in thefirst degree and sexual abuse in the first degree and waived his right to appeal. Defendantcommitted the crime of criminal sexual act in the first degree at the age of 15 andcommitted the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree at the age of 17. At sentencing,defense counsel requested that County Court grant defendant youthful offender status.County Court stated that it did not know whether defendant was eligible for youthfuloffender status but that, "assuming for the sake of discussion" defendant was eligible, itwould "deny the application," based on the need for deterrence and the concern that thecrimes at issue "may reflect a proclivity." Defendant was thereafter sentenced to anaggregate prison term of eight years to be followed by 20 years of postreleasesupervision.
Defendant appealed, and this Court held that County Court's admission that it did notknow whether defendant was eligible for youthful offender status established that thecourt was unaware of the applicability of the statutory override provisions of CPL 720.10(3) (158 AD3d 991, 992 [2018]). Given County Court's failure to make such adetermination, this Court vacated defendant's sentence and remitted the matter to CountyCourt for resentencing for that purpose (id.). Upon remittal, County Courtdetermined, on the record, that defendant was not eligible for a youthful offenderadjudication because neither of the factors set forth in CPL 720.10 (3) was present.Adhering to the original sentence and plea agreement, County Court then resentenceddefendant to an aggregate prison term of eight years to be followed by 20 years ofpostrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.
Defendant contends that County Court abused its discretion in denying him youthfuloffender status and that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive. Initially, althoughdefendant waived his right to appeal at the time of the plea, this waiver was invalid.During the plea colloquy, County Court informed defendant that, although he had a rightto make certain postconviction motions "to this court or to other courts" regarding hisconvictions and/or sentence, as a result of waiving the right to appeal, he would be"giving up the right to do any of those things, appeal or make such motions, for all timewith regard to these convictions." County Court further informed defendant that, bywaiving his right to appeal, he would be giving up his right to make any postconvictionmotions pursuant to Penal Law articles 330 and 440, "as well as [to] bring habeas corpusproceedings and have other courts look at whether it was a proper conviction or a propersentence." As this waiver purported to encompass certain nonwaivable rights, it was notknowing, intelligent and voluntary and, thus, invalid (see People v Thomas,34 NY3d 545, 565-568 [2019]; People v Barrales, 179 AD3d1313, 1314-1315 [2020]).
Turning to the merits, "[t]he decision to grant or deny youthful offender status restswithin the sound exercise of the sentencing court's discretion and, absent a clear abuse ofthat discretion, its decision will not be disturbed" (People v Soule, 162 AD3d 1407, 1407 [2018] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 32 NY3d 1068 [2018]). Uponremittal, County Court expressly found that there were "no mitigating circumstances thatbear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed," that defendant was thesole participant in the crime and that "[h]is participation was far from relatively minor,"and it that he was not an eligible youth (see CPL 720.10 [2] [a] [iii]; [3]).Accordingly, having considered the factors set forth in CPL 720.10 (3), and in theabsence of mitigating circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in County Court'sdetermination that defendant was not an eligible youth (see People v Singh, 171 AD3d953, 955 [2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1108 [2019]; People v Brodhead, 106 AD3d1337, 1337 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v Orcutt, 51 AD3d1404, 1405 [2008]). Finally, given the nature of the crimes committed and the factthat defendant agreed to the sentence imposed as part of his negotiated plea agreement,we find no extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion warranting a reduction ofthe sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Williams, 155 AD3d 1260, 1261 [2017],lv denied 30 NY3d 1121 [2018]).
Garry, P.J., Lynch, Mulvey and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur. Ordered that thejudgment is affirmed.