| Matter of Deraway v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs.Appeals Bd. |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 01727 [181 AD3d 1150] |
| March 13, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1](March 13, 2020)
| In the Matter of Vaughn D. Deraway,Petitioner, v New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board,Respondent. |
John G. Leonard, Rome, for petitioner.
Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Owen Demuth of counsel), forrespondent.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of theSupreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, OneidaCounty [Erin P. Gall, J.], entered August 29, 2018) to review a determination ofrespondent. The determination revoked petitioner's driver's license.
It is hereby ordered that the determination is unanimously annulled on the lawwithout costs and the amended petition is granted.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking toannul the determination revoking his driver's license based on his refusal to submit to achemical test following his arrest for driving while intoxicated. A police officer initiallystopped petitioner on a suspected violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 600 (1) (a), i.e., leaving the scene of an accident that caused propertydamage without reporting it. The officer observed petitioner approximately one milefrom the accident site driving a white pickup truck, which matched the description of thevehicle involved in the accident. The officer effected a stop of the truck by activating thepatrol vehicle's lights and ultimately took petitioner into custody after petitionerexhibited signs and made statements that indicated he was intoxicated. Petitioner refusedto submit to a chemical test, and thus his driver's license was temporarily suspended. Arefusal revocation hearing was thereafter held pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 1194 (2) (c). The Administrative Law Judge revoked petitioner's licenseafter concluding, inter alia, that the traffic stop was legal. In affirming that determinationon petitioner's administrative appeal, respondent concluded that the stop was lawfulbecause the officer "had a reasonable basis for stopping" petitioner.
We agree with petitioner that respondent reviewed the determination under anincorrect legal standard inasmuch as "the Court of Appeals has made it 'abundantly clear'. . . that 'police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant toroutine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when there exists atleast a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed,are committing, or are about to commit a crime' . . . [,] or where the policehave 'probable cause to believe that the driver . . . has committed a trafficviolation' " (People v Washburn, 309 AD2d 1270, 1271 [4th Dept 2003];see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 348-349 [2001]). We further agree withpetitioner that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination that theofficer had the requisite probable cause at the time of the stop (cf. Matter of Deveines v New YorkState Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 136 AD3d 1383, 1384-1385 [4th Dept2016]; see generally Robinson, 97 NY2d at 349; People v Robinson, 122 AD3d1282, 1283 [4th Dept 2014]). We therefore annul the determination and grant theamended petition. Present—Whalen, P.J., Centra, Lindley, Troutman andWinslow, JJ.