People v LeClair

2020 NY Slip Op 02498 [182 AD3d 919]

April 30, 2020

Appellate Division, Third Department

As corrected through Wednesday, June 3, 2020

[*1]

The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Scott LeClair, Appellant.

Todd G. Monahan, Schenectady, for appellant.

Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh (Rebecca L. Fox of counsel), forrespondent.

Garry, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (Bruno,J.), rendered July 11, 2017, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes ofunlawful manufacturing of methamphetamine in the third degree, possession ofmethamphetamine manufacturing material and the traffic infraction of speeding.

In satisfaction of a seven-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfulmanufacturing of methamphetamine in the third degree, possession of methamphetaminemanufacturing material and speeding, and waived his right to appeal. Thereafter,defendant made a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he wascoerced by and received the ineffective assistance of counsel. County Court denied themotion without a hearing and sentenced defendant, a second felony offender, inaccordance with the terms of the plea agreement, to a prison term of 31/2years, followed by 11/2 years of postrelease supervision, on the convictionof unlawful manufacturing of methamphetamines in the third degree and a one-yearconcurrent sentence on the conviction of possession of methamphetamine manufacturingmaterial, as well as a fine on the traffic infraction. Defendant appeals.

We affirm. Defendant challenges the voluntariness of his plea based upon allegedineffective assistance of counsel and contends that County Court abused its discretion insummarily denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Initially, we note that defendant'schallenge to the voluntariness of the plea is not foreclosed by the unchallenged appealwaiver and is preserved by his motion to withdraw his plea (see People v Blanford, 179AD3d 1388, 1391 [2020]; People v Ozuna, 177 AD3d 1040, 1041 [2019]).Nevertheless, defendant's contentions are without merit. Defendant, in response toinquiry by the court, affirmatively acknowledged that he had sufficient time to conferwith counsel and was satisfied with the representation he received. Further, defendantdenied that he was threatened or pressured into pleading guilty and that he was freely andvoluntarily entering into the guilty plea. Defendant then unequivocally admitted toengaging in the conduct charged and made no statements during the colloquy that calledinto question his actual innocence. Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact thatcounsel informed him of the potential maximum sentence to which he was exposed doesnot generally amount to coercion or render a plea involuntary (see People v Walker, 173AD3d 1561, 1562 [2019]; People v Seuffert, 104 AD3d 1021, 1022 [2013], lvdenied 21 NY3d 1009 [2013]). Upon inquiry by the court, no further support wasoffered by defendant for withdrawing the plea. As the record reflects that defendant'splea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered, we find no abuse of discretionin the court summarily denying his motion to withdraw such plea (see People vOzuna, 177 AD3d at 1041; People v Palmer, 174 AD3d 1118, 1119 [2019]; Peoplev Walker, 173 AD3d at 1562). Defendant's remaining contentions areunpersuasive.

Egan Jr., Lynch, Mulvey and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur. Ordered that thejudgment is affirmed.