People v Dunbar
2020 NY Slip Op 02581 [183 AD3d 1263]
May 1, 2020
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 1, 2020


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Naaron Dunbar, Appellant. (Appeal No.1.)

Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Sara A. Goldfarb of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Kenneth H. Tyler, Jr., ofcounsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Stephen J. Dougherty, J.),rendered July 21, 2017. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, ofattempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him,upon his plea of guilty, of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in thethird degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 220.16 [1]). In appeal No. 2,defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of attemptedcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§§ 110.00,265.03 [3]). Defendant committed the crime in appeal No. 2 while released on bail forthe charges underlying appeal No. 1. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant's waiversof the right to appeal were invalid, we nevertheless reject his challenges to the judgmentin each appeal.

Contrary to defendant's contention in appeal No. 1, County Court properly refused tosuppress the drugs recovered from his bag at the time of his arrest for menacing. Thewarrantless search of defendant's bag was permissible "because the bag was withindefendant's grabbable area at the time of the arrest and the police reasonablybelieved that he was armed" given the contemporaneous reports that he had justmenanced someone with a handgun (People v Jimenez, 22 NY3d 717, 722 [2014] [emphasisadded]; see People v Johnson, 59 NY2d 1014, 1016 [1983], affg 86AD2d 165 [1st Dept 1982]; People v Wylie, 244 AD2d 247, 250-251 [1st Dept1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 946 [1998]; see generally People v Gokey, 60NY2d 309, 312-314 [1983]). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the fact that the bag wasno longer within his immediate reach at the time of the search is irrelevant(see People v Smith, 59 NY2d 454, 459 [1983]). Contrary to defendant's furtherassertion, the fact that neither officer testified that he feared for his safety or that of thepublic does not control the applicability of the search incident to arrest doctrine (see People v Bowden, 87AD3d 402, 405 [1st Dept 2011], appeal dismissed 18 NY3d 980 [2012];People v Fernandez, 88 AD2d 536, 536 [1st Dept 1982]). Indeed, it is wellestablished that the "officer need not affirmatively testify to the exigency" whendefending the search of a closed container incident to arrest (People v Harris, 174 AD3d185, 189 [1st Dept 2019], lv granted 2019 NY Slip Op 78701[U] [Sept. 3,2019]).

In appeal No. 2, defendant argues that the court erred in imposing the sentence inthat case consecutively to the sentence in appeal No. 1. Under Penal Law§ 70.25 (2-b), a court must impose a consecutive sentence for a crimecommitted while the defendant was released on bail unless certain mitigatingcircumstances exist, and defendant contends that such mitigating circumstances exist inthis case.

Preliminarily, we note that defendant's argument is actually a claim of legal error bythe sentencing court in deeming itself bound by Penal Law § 70.25 (2-b) toimpose a consecutive sentence in appeal No. 2 (see People v Diaby, 172 AD3d 473, 474 [1st Dept 2019],lv denied 33 NY3d 1068 [2019]; see generally People v Garcia, 84 NY2d336, 336-344 [1994]). Defendant's argument is not, as he characterizes it, a claim underCPL 470.15 (6) (b) that the sentence in appeal No. 2 is unduly harsh or severe.Defendant's argument is therefore subject to the preservation requirement (see Peoplev Fernandez, 251 AD2d 142, 143 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 924[1998]; see also People v Parks, 309 AD2d 1172, 1173 [4th Dept 2003], lvdenied 1 NY3d 577 [2003]), and there is no dispute that the argument isunpreserved. Moreover, granting relief on defendant's unpreserved sentencing argumentwould frustrate the People's statutory right to "an opportunity to present relevantinformation to assist the [sentencing] court in making th[e] determination" regardingmitigating circumstances (Penal Law § 70.25 [2-b]).

In any event, defendant's claim of legal error is without merit. "[T]he sentencingcourt does not have an independent obligation, in the first instance, to make findings ofthe presence or absence of mitigating circumstances [under Penal Law§ 70.25 (2-b)], and . . . if the claim is not raised [at sentencing]then the sentences must be consecutive" (People v Hamlet, 227 AD2d203, 204 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 1021 [1996] [emphasisadded]).

Finally, we note that the uniform sentence and commitment form in appeal No. 2incorrectly states that defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in thesecond degree, and it must be amended to reflect defendant's conviction ofattempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see People v Facen, 71 AD3d1410, 1411 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 749 [2010], deniedreconsideration 15 NY3d 804 [2010]). Present—Peradotto, J.P., Lindley,NeMoyer, Troutman and DeJoseph, JJ.


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