| People v Person |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 03278 [184 AD3d 447] |
| June 11, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Thomas Person, Appellant. |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Jan Hoth of counsel), forappellant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Kyle R. Silverstein of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ralph Fabrizio, J., at speedy trial motion; April A.Newbauer, J., at plea and sentencing), rendered June 7, 2018, convicting defendant of attemptedsexual abuse in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 4years with 15 years' postrelease supervision, unanimously affirmed.
The principal issue presented on this appeal is whether a recent amendment to the speedytrial statute, which grants a defendant who has pleaded guilty the right to raise a statutory speedytrial claim on appeal, also precludes a waiver of that right. We conclude that under thisamendment, appellate review of the denial of a statutory speedy trial motion is no longerforfeited by a guilty plea, but such review may be voluntarily waived.
Initially, we find that defendant made a valid waiver of his right to appeal (see People v Thomas, 34 NY3d545 [2019]; People v Bryant,28 NY3d 1094, 1096 [2016]). The court's oral colloquy with defendant, when viewed as awhole, and in connection with a detailed written waiver, carefully separated the right to appealfrom the rights automatically forfeited by a guilty plea, and otherwise satisfied the requirementsof a valid waiver. Furthermore, the waiver was comprehensive and intended to encompass allwaivable issues (see People v Kemp, 94 NY2d 831, 833 [1999]).
Formerly, a defendant who pleaded guilty automatically forfeited appellate review of a denialof a statutory speedy trial motion, as opposed to a constitutional claim (People v Suarez,55 NY2d 940, 942 [1982]). The new version of CPL 30.30 (6) provides that "[a]n order finallydenying a [30.30] motion to dismiss . . . shall be reviewable upon an appeal from anensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is entered upon aplea of guilty."
Defendant relies heavily on the phrase "shall be reviewable," arguing that it renders review ofa 30.30 issue mandatory and therefore nonwaivable. While this phrase clearly creates areviewability that did not previously exist, the reviewability of an issue does not render itnonwaivable. On the contrary, the general purpose of an appeal waiver is to serve as anagreement not to raise otherwise reviewable issues on appeal. "A defendant's decision to waiveappeal does not interfere with the court's jurisdiction, however; it is simply a decision not toinvoke the court's review power" (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 9-10 [1989]).
We note that review by the Appellate Division of the claimed excessiveness of a sentence,even where a defendant has pleaded guilty and agreed to a particular sentence, is mandated notonly by statute but also by the State Constitution (People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264,267-268 [1986]; People v Thompson, 60 NY2d 513, 520 [1983]). Nevertheless, adefendant is free to voluntarily relinquish this otherwise mandatory review by validly waiving theright to appeal (People v Lopez, 6NY3d 248, 255 [2006]). Similarly, the phrase "shall be reviewable" in CPL 30.30 (6)unequivocally directs that appellate review of a 30.30 claim shall no longer be forfeited by aguilty plea, but neither that phrase, nor any other language in the statute, precludes a voluntarywaiver.
Regardless of whether defendant made a valid waiver of his right to appeal, and whether thatwaiver forecloses the issues raised on this appeal, we find those issues unavailing. With regard toperiods excluded because of the victim's serious illness (see CPL 30.30 [4] [g];People v Goodman, 41 NY2d 888, 889 [1977]), we find that the People met their burden ofproviding satisfactory proof that the victim, a cancer patient, was medically unavailable despitediligent efforts. The remaining periods at issue, even if included and added to the undisputedlyincludable time, would not be enough to require dismissal; in any event, the court properlyexcluded those periods.
Likewise, we perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur—Richter, J.P.,Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick, Kern, Oing, JJ.