| People v Jones |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 06028 [187 AD3d 612] |
| October 22, 2020 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Reginald Jones, Appellant. |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (John L. Palmer of counsel), forappellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (John T. Hughes of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, (Gilbert C. Hong, J.), rendered January 27,2017, as amended March 1, 2017, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possessionof a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of2
The verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight ofthe evidence. Defendant possessed a knife that met the statutory definition of a switchblade, thatis, "any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button,spring or other device in the handle of the knife" (Penal Law § 265.00 [4]). The"opens automatically" requirement was satisfied because the blade emerged at the touch of abutton, even though the knife needed to be manipulated further to lock the blade in place.Locking in place is not a statutory requirement of subdivision (4) of Penal Law§ 265.00.
The fact that the knife was disposed of after trial does not prevent effective appellate review(see People v Yavru-Sakuk, 98 NY2d 56, 59-60 [2002]). The testifying officer displayedthe knife for the jury, and described in detail its appearance and workings. The officer alsotestified that defendant told him how to operate the knife, which defendant did not dispute. Thereappears to be no dispute about the characteristics of the knife, but only as to whether they met thestatutory definition. Under the circumstances presented, this Court would not need to examinethe knife.
The court properly granted defendant's request to represent himself. The court's extensivecolloquy with defendant thoroughly covered all the appropriate matters, including defendant'sacknowledgement that he understood the charges, and it established that his waiver of counsel(who remained as a legal advisor) was knowing, intelligent and voluntary (see generallyPeople v Arroyo, 98 NY2d 101 [2002]).
Defendant waived his claim that he was deprived of a fair trial by appearing before the juryin prison clothing, which was described on the record as a tan shirt and pants. Defendant did notcall this situation to the court's attention until well after the jury had already seen him in hisuniform, and he did not request any remedy and stated that he was "not making it an issue" (see People v Oliveri, 29 AD3d 330[1st Dept 2006], lvs denied 7 NY3d 760, 792 [2006]).
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur—Renwick, J.P.,Manzanet-Daniels, Gesmer, Oing, JJ.