| People v Santjer |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 00438 [190 AD3d 983] |
| January 27, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Charles Santjer, Appellant. |
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Felice B. Milani of counsel), for appellant.
Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Timothy P. Finnerty and Marion Tang ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Timothy P.Mazzei, J.), rendered September 28, 2016, convicting him of leaving the scene of an incidentwithout reporting, and tampering with physical evidence, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of thedefendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to a law enforcementofficial.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that he was subject to a custodial interrogation prior to beingadvised of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), andthat the pre-Miranda questioning by the police officer rendered his subsequent waiver ofhis Miranda rights invalid, is unpreserved for appellate review. The defendant failed tomove to suppress his statements to the police on this ground or otherwise raise the issue beforethe County Court (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Escamilla, 168 AD3d 758, 759 [2019]; People v Pleasant, 146 AD3d 985,986 [2017]). In any event, the claim is without merit. "The Miranda rule protects theprivilege against self-incrimination and, 'because the privilege applies only when an accused is"compelled" to testify, the safeguards required by Miranda are not triggered unless asuspect is subject to "custodial interrogation" ' " (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122,129 [2005], quoting People v Berg, 92 NY2d 701, 704 [1999]). "The standard forassessing a suspect's custodial status is whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoingwould have believed that he or she was not free to leave" (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d at129; see People v Harris, 48 NY2d 208, 215 [1979]; People v Brown, 177 AD3d 763, 764-765 [2019]). The issue ofwhether a suspect is in custody is generally a question of fact that does not turn on the subjectiveintent of the police (see People vReardon, 124 AD3d 681, 683 [2015]), or the subjective beliefs of the defendant (seePeople v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969]). "The factors to be weighed include the amount oftime which the defendant spent with the police, the manner, if any, in which his freedom wasrestricted, the location and atmosphere of his questioning, the degree of cooperation which heexhibited, whether he was apprised of his constitutional rights, and whether the questioning wasinvestigatory or accusatory in nature" (People v Petrovich, 202 AD2d 523, 524 [1994],affd 87 NY2d 961 [1996]; see People v Blake, 177 AD2d 636, 636 [1991]).
Here, on April 4, 2015, a pedestrian crossing Carleton Avenue in East Islip was struck [*2]by a dark-colored pickup truck. The suppression hearing testimony,which was adduced to adjudicate other issues raised on the suppression motion, established that apolice detective went to the defendant's home at approximately 7:35 p.m. on April 7, 2015. Thedetective explained to the defendant that he was investigating a hit-and-run accident involving apedestrian, and that the defendant's vehicle matched the description of the vehicle involved in theaccident. The defendant voluntarily agreed to allow the detective to inspect his vehicle, whichwas parked in the driveway of his home, and answered questions regarding his whereabouts onthe evening of the accident. After the detective observed that the vehicle's passenger headlightassembly was missing, the defendant revealed, in response to the detective's questions, amongother things, that the defendant had been out at a bar on the evening in question, and that hewould have used the road where the accident occurred to navigate home. The detective thenasked if he and the defendant could go inside the house, at which time the defendant, inter alia,was read, and then waived, his Miranda rights. At no point during the interview was thedefendant handcuffed or restricted in his movement, and the pre-Miranda questions wereinvestigatory and not designed to elicit an incriminating response. The interview did not takeplace in a coercive environment, and a reasonable, innocent person would not have believed thathe or she was in custody at the time (seePeople v Hirji, 185 AD3d 1053, 1053 [2020]; People v Coggins, 234 AD2d 469,470 [1996]). Accordingly, the defendant's pre-Miranda statements did not meritsuppression, and did not invalidate his subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v Contes,60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guiltof leaving the scene of an incident without reporting, and tampering with physical evidence,beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that theverdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643 [2006]). The defendantdoes not contest that he was operating the vehicle that struck the pedestrian. Instead, he contendsthat the evidence failed to demonstrate that he knew, or had cause to know, that he had struck apedestrian. Given the circumstances of the accident, including that the area of the accident hadlighting, that the victim was crossing the street when he was struck, that the victim was propelled10 to 20 feet by the force of the impact, and that an eyewitness heard the sound of the impactfrom inside her closed vehicle, as well as the damage to the defendant's vehicle, the evidenceestablished that the defendant knew, or had cause to know, that he had caused personal injury toanother person (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 [2] [a]; People v Williams, 150 AD3d 902,902 [2017]; People v Kohler, 85AD3d 1203, 1203 [2011]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Dillon, J.P., Chambers, LaSalle, and Iannacci, JJ., concur.