People v Etienne
2021 NY Slip Op 02409 [193 AD3d 971]
April 21, 2021
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 2, 2021


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Kervin Etienne, Appellant.

Mark Diamond, New York, NY, for appellant.

Madeline Singas, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Jason R. Richards and Mary Faldich ofcounsel), for respondent.

Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (RobertA. Schwartz, J.), both rendered July 26, 2019, convicting him of conspiracy in the second degreeunder indictment No. 1512/17, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree underindictment No. 157/18, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.

"The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty restswithin the sound discretion of the trial court and generally will not be disturbed absent animprovident exercise of discretion" (People v Johnson, 97 AD3d 695, 695 [2012] [internal quotationmarks and brackets omitted]). Here, the Supreme Court's denial of the defendant's motion towithdraw his pleas of guilty without conducting a hearing was not an improvident exercise ofdiscretion (see People v Bravo, 72AD3d 697, 697 [2010]; see alsoPeople v Mitchell, 21 NY3d 964, 967 [2013]; People v Frederick, 45 NY2d 520,524-525 [1978]; People v Jackson,170 AD3d 1040, 1040 [2019]; People v Johnson, 97 AD3d at 695).

In particular, the defendant's claim of actual innocence as to the count of conspiracy in thesecond degree was "generalized and unsubstantiated" (People v Ford, 44 AD3d 1070, 1070 [2007]) and, thus, "notsufficient to warrant the vacatur of the plea" as to that count (id. at 1071; see People v Griffin, 167 AD3d934, 934-935 [2018]). The defendant's claim that the Supreme Court forced him to waive hisright to appeal as part of the plea deal is refuted by the record of the plea proceeding, whichdemonstrates that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right toappeal (see People v Sanders, 25NY3d 337, 340-341 [2015]).

The defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes appellate review of hiscontention that his plea counsel was ineffective, except to the extent that the alleged ineffectiveassistance may have affected the voluntariness of his pleas (see People v Jackson, 170AD3d at 1041; People v Turner, 40AD3d 1018, 1019 [2007]). To the extent that the defendant claims that the allegedineffective assistance affected the voluntariness of his pleas, his contention is without merit. Inparticular, the defendant's claim that counsel coerced him into pleading guilty is "belied by hisstatements under oath at the plea proceeding" (People v Jackson, 170 AD3d at1040-1041), which [*2]reveal that he knowingly, intelligently,and voluntarily entered his pleas of guilty, absent any threats or force, having reached a favorableplea bargain with the assistance of competent counsel with whose representation the defendantwas satisfied (see People v Bhuiyan,181 AD3d 699, 700-701 [2020]; People v Johnson, 97 AD3d at 695-696; Peoplev Ford, 44 AD3d at 1070).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, he was not deprived of his right to the effectiveassistance of counsel on his motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty (see People vMitchell, 21 NY3d at 966; People v Caple, 279 AD2d 635, 635 [2001]; cf. People v Armstead, 126 AD3d805, 806 [2015]; People v Santana, 156 AD2d 736, 736 [1989]).

The defendant's separate contention, not raised on his motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty,that his pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered but rather the result ofcertain coercive conduct by the Supreme Court is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Andrea, 98 AD3d627, 627 [2012]). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit (see People vSeaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 8-9 [1987]; People v Bravo, 72 AD3d at 698).

The defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes appellate review of hischallenge to the factual sufficiency of his plea allocution on the count of conspiracy in the seconddegree (see People v Griffin, 167 AD3d at 934), as well as his contention that theSupreme Court failed to comply with the procedures of CPL 400.15 before sentencing him as asecond violent felony offender (seePeople v Bird, 164 AD3d 1357, 1358 [2018]).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not sentence him as a secondviolent felony offender on his conviction of conspiracy in the second degree. Rather, the courtsentenced the defendant as a second violent felony offender only on his conviction of criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree. Austin, J.P., Barros, Connolly and Iannacci, JJ.,concur.


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