People v Ayala
2021 NY Slip Op 03216 [194 AD3d 1255]
May 20, 2021
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 30, 2021


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Ismael Ayala, Appellant.

Mark Diamond, Albany, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Vincent Stark of counsel), for respondent.

Egan Jr., J.P. Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Lynch,J.), rendered September 13, 2016, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofmanslaughter in the first degree, and (2) by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court(Lynch, J.), entered February 3, 2020 in Albany County, which denied defendant's motionpursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, after a hearing.

Defendant was charged in a four-count indictment with various crimes, the most seriousbeing murder in the second degree. In satisfaction thereof, defendant pleaded guilty to thereduced charge of manslaughter in the first degree and waived his right to appeal. At sentencing,County Court declined to adjudicate defendant a youthful offender and sentenced him to a prisonterm of 22 years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision.

Defendant later moved pro se pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of convictionbased upon ineffective assistance of counsel. Supreme Court appointed new counsel fordefendant and a hearing on the motion was held, during which both defendant and defendant'strial counsel testified. After the hearing, Supreme Court denied defendant's motion. Defendantappeals from the judgment of conviction and, by permission, from the denial of his CPL 440.10motion.

Initially, we reject defendant's contention that his appeal waiver was invalid. Defendant wasinformed at the outset of the plea proceeding that waiving his right to appeal was part of the pleaagreement. County Court advised defendant that the right to appeal was separate and distinctfrom the rights automatically forfeited by a guilty plea, which defendant indicated he understood.Defendant also executed a written waiver of appeal after reviewing it with counsel and heassured the court that he understood it. Discerning no infirmities in the combined oral and writtenwaiver (compare People v Thomas,34 NY3d 545, 562-563 [2019]), we find that defendant knowingly, intelligently andvoluntarily waived the right to appeal (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Gumbs, 182 AD3d 701,701-702 [2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1066 [2020]).

The valid appeal waiver precludes defendant's challenge to County Court declining to granthim youthful offender status (see Peoplev Caggiano, 150 AD3d 1335, 1336 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1124 [2017]; People v Simon, 140 AD3d 1533,1534 [2016]). Although a valid appeal waiver will not preclude review "when a sentencing courthas entirely abrogated its responsibility to determine whether an eligible youth is entitled toyouthful offender status" (People vPacherille, 25 NY3d 1021, 1023 [2015] [citation omitted]), the court here founddefendant to be eligible for youthful offender status but expressly denied granting such status asinappropriate (see People vMinemier, 29 NY3d 414, 421 [2017]; People v Pacherille, 25 NY3d at 1023; People v Simmons, 159 AD3d1270, 1271 [2018]).

Defendant also challenges [*2]the denial of his CPL 440.10motion that was based upon his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.Specifically, he argues that counsel failed to discuss a potential justification defense with himand that counsel did not adequately pursue a youthful offender adjudication. "In general, anineffective assistance claim does not lie so long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstancesof a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that theattorney provided meaningful representation" (People v Rudolph, 170 AD3d 1258, 1262 [2019] [internalquotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 34 NY3d 937 [2019]; see People vBaldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). "Further, it is well settled that, in the context of a guiltyplea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation when he or she receives anadvantageous plea and nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel"(People v Roshia, 133 AD3d1029, 1031 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], affd 28NY3d 989 [2016]; see People v Rudolph, 170 AD3d at 1262).

At the hearing on the motion, defendant testified that the victim had threatened to kill him inthe past and that he feared for his life. Defendant further testified that he had obtained a gun inthe days prior to the incident out of fear of the victim and, when the victim approached him thatday and reached into his fanny pack, defendant shot and killed him in self-defense. According todefendant, he provided this information to defense counsel but, despite acknowledging the factthat he met with counsel approximately 13 times prior to pleading guilty, with the meetingslasting two hours each, he testified that counsel never discussed a potential justification defensewith him. In contrast, counsel testified that he had discussed a justification defense withdefendant several times "because it went to the heart of his case" but that, based upon the facts ofthe case, he was of the opinion that it would have been a "difficult defense." As Supreme Courtfound counsel's testimony to be credible, and "[s]uch credibility assessments are entitled to greatdeference on appeal," we find that counsel discussed a potential justification defense withdefendant prior to his plea (People vBodah, 67 AD3d 1195, 1196 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted],lv denied 14 NY3d 838 [2010]; see People v Perry, 174 AD3d 1225, 1226 [2019], lv denied34 NY3d 1018 [2019]).

Regarding defendant's youthful offender status, he argued in his motion that counsel failed tobring certain mitigating factors to County Court's attention at sentencing that would have resultedin defendant being granted such status, including his lack of a criminal record and that the victimhad threatened him in the past. We note, however, that in denying defendant's CPL 440.10motion, Supreme Court stated that the factors referenced by defendant were included in thepresentence investigation report [*3]and that the court had takensuch factors into consideration in reaching its decision. As such, defendant has not shown that hewas prejudiced as a result of counsel's omissions (see People v Mercer, 105 AD3d 1091, 1093-1094 [2013], lvdenied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; People v Thomson, 46 AD3d 939, 940 [2007], lv denied 9NY3d 1039 [2008]; People v Williams, 299 AD2d 580, 580 [2002], lv denied 99NY2d 621 [2003]). In light of the foregoing, we will not disturb Supreme Court's denial ofdefendant's CPL 440.10 motion.

Clark, Aarons, Pritzker and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment andorder are affirmed.


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