People v Alvarez
2021 NY Slip Op 03286 [194 AD3d 618]
May 25, 2021
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 30, 2021


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Bianca Alvarez, Appellant.

Caprice R. Jenerson, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Kami Lizarraga ofcounsel), for appellant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Shera Knight of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (William I. Mogulescu, J. at speedy trial motion;April A. Newbauer, J. at jury trial and sentencing), rendered April 28, 2016, convicting defendantof leaving the scene of an incident without reporting, and sentencing her to a conditionaldischarge, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the indictment dismissed.

Over the two years preceding trial of this uncomplicated case, the prosecution obtainedrepeated adjournments that delayed defendant's trial for 247 days, well over the 184-day limit setforth under CPL 30.30, precisely the sort of unfair prejudice to the accused the statute wasenacted to prevent. We accordingly reverse and dismiss the indictment.

The six-month period set forth in the statute runs from "the filing of the first accusatoryinstrument and the People's declaration of readiness," excluding any pre-readiness delay thatmeets the statutory criteria and adding any post-readiness delay "actually attributable to thePeople and . . . ineligible for an exclusion" (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201,208 [1992]).

The court erred, firstly, in excluding 93 days of pre-readiness delay in which the prosecutionfailed to present its case to the grand jury. "[T]he obligation to obtain a proper accusatoryinstrument is the prosecutor's alone" (People v Waring, 206 AD2d 329, 330 [1st Dept1994]), making "the period prior to the People's obtaining an indictment . . .chargeable to them, absent the applicability of some exclusion" (People v Anderson, 252AD2d 399, 400 [1st Dept 1998]).

The court found that the exclusion set forth in CPL 30.30 (4) (g) for exceptionalcircumstances applied because the prosecution was "[u]nable to present the case" withoutcomplainant and had sufficiently established her unavailability.

However, the prosecutor did not and could not establish its inability to proceed with the casesince the complainant was not necessary to present its case to the grand jury. The charges againstdefendant were for leaving the scene of the accident without reporting it. The complainantremembered nothing of the accident, let alone defendant's actions in its aftermath, professing tothis lack of memory on the very day of the accident.

Thus, from the very beginning, the prosecution knew that it would have to rely on theeyewitness and the officers—not the complainant—to prove defendant's actions.The complainant's husband, who was waiting for his wife in a nearby parked car and watched asdefendant's vehicle struck the complainant and then left, testified that he "never t[ook] his eyesoff [defendant's] vehicle," "never . . . los[ing] sight of her." He described howdefendant stopped, exited the vehicle, looked around, and then took off. He followed defendant'svehicle from the accident scene and intercepted her, testifying at length as to same. Theprosecution elicited less than six pages of testimony from the complainant, who testified that she"started crossing the street, and then I don't know what happened [*2]after that." Her next memory was when she "woke up in thehospital." To establish the complainant's injuries, the prosecution had only to call a physician,which is what it did at trial. It thus cannot be said that the complainant's unavailability made itimpossible to proceed with the grand jury presentation.

The exclusion for special circumstances applies "only when the People for practical reasonsbeyond their control cannot proceed with a legally viable prosecution" (People v Price, 14 NY3d 61, 64[2010]), and it is for the prosecutor to establish a material witness's unavailability, its own duediligence, and its ground for believing in the imminent availability of the witness (see Peoplev Kato, 178 AD2d 381, 382 [1st Dept 1991]), none of which was established here. Theprosecutor did not create a contemporaneous record of the witness' injuries, much less offermedical substantiation, showing that the complainant was unavailable for the entire 93-dayperiod[FN*] (comparePeople v Pharr, 204 AD2d 126, 127 [1st Dept 1994]). It must also be remembered that theprosecution needed only reasonable cause, and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to make itsgrand jury presumption (CPL 190.65 [1]), as to which the complainant's testimony was patentlyunnecessary. The court also erred in excluding 83 days of post-readiness delay that was due tothe prosecutor's improper declaration that its readiness was "moot" because lead defense counselwas on trial. While acknowledging that a colleague of defense counsel was present, the courtnonetheless erroneously concluded that "the People's state of readiness is irrelevant wherecounsel is unavailable," misconstruing the law as to what constitutes "unavailability."

CPL 30.30 (4) (f) provides for an exclusion based on the absence of counsel only for a"period during which the defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court." The Courtof Appeals has instructed that a person is not "without counsel" where she has an "appointed"attorney, as defendant did here (People vRouse, 12 NY3d 728, 729 [2009] [a person "had counsel" where substitute counsel hadbeen appointed at the calendar call]).

In People v Nunez (47 AD3d545, 546 [1st Dept 2008]), we held that a defendant was not "without counsel" within themeaning of the statute where the Legal Aid attorney assigned to the defendant's case was absent,but a different Legal Aid attorney had appeared on the defendant's behalf.

Because a colleague of defense counsel stood up on the case on July 8, 2015, as the courtitself acknowledged, defendant was not without representation on the basis that "counsel wasunavailable."

Since the People's lack of readiness is irrelevant only where defense counsel has failed toappear, the court erred in finding otherwise and in excusing the People from their statutoryreadiness obligation. The purpose of the statute is to "address[ ] only the problem of prosecutorialreadiness" (People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, [*3]535[1985]). "The right to a speedy trial is not dependent in any way on whether the defendant hasexpressed his readiness for trial" (People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843 [1992] [internalquotation marks omitted]). That is all the more true where, as here, the prosecution stated "notready" at the two prior court appearances. The consecutive announcements of "not ready"preceding the July 8, 2015 court date raise doubts about the People's true state of readiness.

The prosecution's contention that the 83-day delay should be excluded because it wasrequested at defendant's behest is without merit. The Court of Appeals has made clear that anysuch consent to an adjournment "must be clearly expressed by the defendant or defense counsel[in order] to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay" (Liotta,79 NY2d at 843). The record of the July 8, 2015 appearance does not contain any request orconsent by the defense to an adjournment. Indeed, the adjournment was fixed by the court at theprosecution's prompting. After counsel entered appearances, the prosecutor stated, "it's myunderstanding that defense counsel of record is on trial currently. Based on that, it's the People'sposition that the People's readiness is moot," whereupon the court proceeded to discussion ofother matters. The silence of defense counsel was not, as the People contend, tantamount to acommunication of a request for time. The "mere failure by defense counsel to object to anadjournment does not constitute 'consent' within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (4) (b)" (People vCortes, 80 NY2d 201, 214 [1992]). Indeed, substitute counsel participated in a discussion asto a possible plea. It bears further noting that neither the prosecutor nor the court made anyrecord indicating that lead counsel on trial that day requested or consented to the delay.

In light of this determination, we do not reach defendant's claim that the evidence was legallyinsufficient. Concur—Acosta, P.J., Manzanet-Daniels, Moulton, Scarpulla, JJ.

Footnotes


Footnote *:At most, the prosecution showedthe complainant to be unavailable for the 11-day period during which she was hospitalized. Therewas no medical evidence corroborating her unavailability post-discharge.


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