| People ex rel. Ferro v Brann |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 04897 [197 AD3d 787] |
| August 27, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1](August 27, 2021)
| The People of the State of New York ex rel. Shane Ferro, onBehalf of Maximo Burdier, Petitioner, v Cynthia Brann,Respondent. |
Queens Defenders, Forest Hills, NY (Shane Ferro pro se of counsel), for petitioner.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, Sharon Y. Brodt, andHannah X. Scotti of counsel), for respondent.
Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application to release Maximo Burdier upon hisown recognizance pursuant to CPL 30.30 (2) (a) or, in the alternative, for bail reduction, uponQueens County indictment No. 1361/2020.
Adjudged that the writ is sustained, without costs or disbursements, and the matter isremitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, to set reasonable bail or to release MaximoBurdier on his own recognizance, and to fix such other terms and conditions upon the release ofMaximo Burdier as may seem to it to be just and proper.
A defendant making a motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismiss an indictment has the initialburden of demonstrating, by sworn allegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delaybeyond the time set forth in the statute (see People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859 [1986]). Oncea defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time has elapsed without adeclaration of readiness by the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficientexcludable delay (see id.; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 348-349 [1980]).The burden is on the People "to ensure, in the first instance, that the record of the proceedings. . . is sufficiently clear to enable the court considering the . . . CPL30.30 motion to make an informed decision as to whether the People should be charged" withany delay (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 [1992]).
The current statutory framework of CPL 245.10 "abolishes the prior mechanism for obtainingdiscovery through serving a demand upon the People and instead requires that the People providethe discovery listed in CPL 245.20 'automatically' within the deadlines established" therein (People v Mashiyach, 70 Misc 3d456, 461 [2020]). "As discovery demands are now defunct, the exclusion provided for in[CPL 30.30 (4) (a)] is no longer applicable to the period of time when the defendant is waitingfor discovery to be provided by" the People (id. at 462).
Here, contrary to the People's contention, their filing of the certificate of compliance pursuantto CPL 30.30 (5) could not be deemed complete until all of the material and informationidentified in the certificate as subject to discovery and electronically shared with the defendantwas actually produced to the defendant, pursuant to CPL 245.50 (1) and (3) (see People v Aquino, 72 Misc 3d518, 523 [2021]). Moreover, in this case, the substitution of a different assistant districtattorney did not [*2]constitute an exceptional circumstance thatwould render excludable for speedy trial purposes the time period between the date to which theSupreme Court adjourned the matter for the filing of the People's response to the defendant'somnibus motion, and the date upon which the People ultimately filed their response (see People v Headley, 100 AD3d775, 776 [2012]; People v Warren, 85 AD2d 747, 748 [1981]). Thus, the People arechargeable with the time between the court-imposed deadline to respond to the omnibus motionand the date on which the People actually filed a response (see People v Delosanto, 307AD2d 298, 299 [2003]). Accordingly, since more than 90 days of delay in bringing MaximoBurdier to trial on Queens County indictment No. 1361/2020 are chargeable to the People, CPL30.30 (2) (a) requires that he be released on bail which he is capable of meeting, or upon his ownrecognizance (see People ex rel. Chakwin v Warden, N.Y. City Correctional Facility, RikersIs., 63 NY2d 120 [1984]; People exrel. Campbell v Brann, 193 AD3d 669 [2021]). Austin, J.P., Christopher, Wooten andFord, JJ., concur.