| People v Burgos |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 05351 [198 AD3d 672] |
| October 6, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Luis Burgos, Appellant. |
Leon H. Tracy, Jericho, NY, for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, William H.Branigan, and Matthew C. Harnisch of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Gene Lopez, J.), rendered September 11, 2015, convicting him of robbery in the seconddegree (three counts), and robbery in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Steven W. Paynter, J.), after ahearing (Thomas Demakos, J.H.O.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motionwhich was to suppress his statement to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The hearing court properly determined that the defendant was lawfully arrested uponprobable cause. The police officer possessed probable cause to stop the defendant's carbecause she observed him commit a traffic infraction by rolling through a stop sign(see People v Wright, 98 NY2d 657 [2002]; People v Robinson, 97 NY2d341 [2001]; People vGraham, 54 AD3d 1056, 1057, 1058 [2008]). The officer had a right to requestthe defendant's driver license, registration, and insurance card (see People vRobinson, 97 NY2d at 351; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 [1976];People v Graham, 54 AD3d at 1058; Vehicle and Traffic Law§§ 312 [1] [b]; 319 [3]; 401 [4]; 507 [2]). When the defendant openedhis glove compartment to retrieve the items requested, the officer was able to see a can ofpepper spray in the glove compartment. The officer also noticed that the defendant's carmatched the make, color, and partial license plate number of a car that was reportedlyinvolved in robberies in the same area the previous evening in which one of the robberyvictims was pepper sprayed in the eyes. Those observations established probable causefor the officer to arrest the defendant for criminal possession of a weapon in the fourthdegree (Penal Law § 265.01 [2]; see People v Mojica, 171 AD2d698 [1991]; People v Jenkins, 133 AD2d 348, 349 [1987]). Furthermore, thecourt properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was tosuppress his statement to law enforcement officials. As the officer possessed probablecause to arrest the defendant, his subsequent statement cannot be deemed "the fruit of thepoisonous tree" (Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 488 [1963]) subject tothe exclusionary rule. Moreover, the statement was voluntarily made after the defendantknowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights (Mirandav Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]; see People v O'Brien, 186 AD3d 1406, 1407 [2020]; People v Figueroa, 6 AD3d720, 722 [2004]; People vDayton, 66 AD3d 797, 798 [2009]).
[*2] The defendant only partially preserved for appellate review his challenge to thelegal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions (see CPL 470.05[2]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution(see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legallysufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, infulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]), wenevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hearthe testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383 [2004];People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here,we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]). Dillon, J.P., Iannacci, Christopher and Wooten, JJ., concur.