| People v Williams |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 05467 [198 AD3d 466] |
| October 12, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Erica Williams, Appellant. |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Katharine Skolnick ofcounsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Stephen J. Kress of counsel), forrespondent.
Duane Morris LLP, New York (Eric R. Breslin of counsel), for amicus curiae.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ruth Pickholz, J.), entered on or aboutNovember 9, 2020, which denied defendant's CPL 440.47 motion for resentencing underthe Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) (L 2019, ch 31; L 2019, ch 55,§ 1, part WW, § 1), unanimously affirmed.
The court correctly denied defendant's motion for resentencing under the DVSJAbecause defendant failed to demonstrate that she was a victim of "substantial" abuse "atthe time of" the offense (Penal Law § 60.12 [1] [a]). The evidence was notsufficient to support a finding that the victim's behavior toward defendant rose to thelevel of substantial psychological abuse. It is also not enough that defendant wasindisputably subjected to substantial physical and psychological abuse in the past.Although the DVSJA does not require that the abuse occur simultaneously with theoffense or that the abuser be the target of the offense, and applies even in the context ofnonviolent and drug offenses, the "at the time of" language must create some requirementof a temporal nexus between the abuse and the offense or else it is meaningless (seePenal Law § 60.12; Matter of Mestecky v City of New York, 30 NY3d 239,243 [2017]). We find that the temporal limitation proposed by the People—thatthe abuse or abusive relationship be ongoing—is most consistent with thelanguage of the statute.
Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not reach defendant's argumentswith respect to the other prerequisites for resentencing. Concur—Renwick, J.P.,Kern, Oing, Mendez, Rodriguez, JJ.