| People v Herrera |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 50280(U) [71 Misc 3d 1205(A)] |
| Decided on April 5, 2021 |
| District Court Of Nassau County, First District |
| Engel, J. |
| As corrected in part through May 4, 2021; it will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on April 5, 2021
The People ofthe State of New York, Plaintiff, against Carlos Herrera, Defendant. |
CR-004539-20NA
For the People: Madeline Singas, Nassau County District Attorney
Attorney for Defendant: Robert J. Brunetti
Andrew M. Engel, J.
Papers Submitted:
AmendedNotice Motion 1
Affirmation in Support 2
Affirmation inOpposition 3
Reply Affirmation 4
On November 6, 2020, during a conference of this matter among the People, defensecounsel and the court, an issue arose concerning the disciplinary records of the arrestingand assisting officer in this matter, Officer Robert Galgano and Officer DanielConcannon. At the conclusion of that conference, the matter was adjourned to December17, 2020, for the People to provide the Defendant with the officers' disciplinary recordsand for a further conference.
On December 17, 2020, the People provided the Defendant with informationregarding civil lawsuits which have been brought against one or both of the officers. Atthat time, the People indicated that they would not be providing the Defendant with thedisciplinary records previously discussed, expressing the opinion that they had no legalobligation to turn them over to defense counsel. The parties were then provided with amotion schedule, so that their respective positions could be reduced to writing andsubmitted to the court for a determination.
On December 30, 2020, rather than move to compel the People to provide thedisciplinary records in issue, the Defendant filed a motion seeking to have the court issuea subpoena duces tecum for the production of the disciplinary records of OfficersGalgano and Concannon by the Nassau County Police Department ("NCPD"). Thismotion was served on the Office of the District Attorney of Nassau County and on theOffice of the Nassau County Attorney ("County Attorney"), on behalf of the NCPD,Officer Galgano and Officer Concannon. Neither the People, the NCPD nor OfficersGalgano or Concannon opposed the Defendant's motion.
On February 3, 2021 this court issued a Decision and Order granting the Defendant's[*2]unopposed motion and issued a subpoena ducestecum directing the NCPD to produce at the Nassau County District Court, on February19, 2021, the following items:
1. in accordance with Public Officers Law §§ 86, 87 and 89, alldisciplinary records, civilian complaints, investigations and Internal Affairs Bureaurecords pertaining to any investigation of Police Officer Robert Galgano, Shield No.2774, and
2. in accordance with Public Officers Law§§ 86, 87 and 89, all disciplinary records, civilian complaints, investigationsand Internal Affairs Bureau records pertaining to any investigation of Police OfficerDaniel Concannon, Shield # 308.
Following the issuance of thatsubpoena, defense counsel advised the court that the shield numbers previously providedto the court by defense counsel were incorrect and asked that the subpoena be correctedto reflect the officers' present status and serial numbers. On February 9, 2021 the courtissued the corrected subpoena, directing the NCPD to produce at the Nassau CountyDistrict Court, on February 19, 2021, the following items:
1. in accordance with Public Officers Law §§ 86, 87 and 89, alldisciplinary records, civilian complaints, investigations and Internal Affairs Bureaurecords pertaining to any investigation of Det. Robert Galgano, Serial No. 9555,and
2. in accordance with Public Officers Law§§ 86, 87 and 89, all disciplinary records, civilian complaints, investigationsand Internal Affairs Bureau records pertaining to any investigation of Det. DanielConcannon, Serial No. 9556.
On or about February 17, 2021,following the service of the subpoena dated February 9, 2021, the County Attorney fileda motion seeking an order, inter alia, quashing the subpoena duces tecum. On thatsame date, the County Attorney filed an amended set of motion papers. The Defendanthas filed opposition to this motion; and, the County Attorney has filed his reply to thatopposition. The District Attorney's office has taken no position herein.
The County Attorney seeks an order, quashing the subpoena duces tecum. In thealternative the County Attorney asks the court to conduct an in camera inspectionof the subpoenaed records, to limit the scope of production to "substantiated" internalinvestigations, and to direct the Defendant and his attorney to not publicly share the lawenforcement records at issue.
The court would first note that the Defendant's motion seeking the subpoena at issue,the court's issuance of that subpoena and the present motion would have been completelyunnecessary had the District Attorney's office and the NCPD complied with the veryclear mandates of CPL §§ 245.55(1), 245.20(1)(k)(iv) and 245.20(2) whichprovide:
CPL § 245.55(1) - The district attorney and the assistant responsiblefor the case, . . . , shall endeavor to ensure that a flow of information is maintained betweenthe police and other investigative personnel and his or her office sufficient to placewithin his or her possession or control all material and information pertinent tothe defendant and the offense or offenses charged, including, but not limited to, anyevidence or information discoverable under paragraph (k) of subdivision one of section245.20. (emphasis added)
CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) -1. The prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover,inspect, copy, photograph and test, all items and information that relate to thesubject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecutionor persons under the prosecution's direction or control, including but not limited to: (k)All evidence and information, including that which is known to police or otherlaw enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, [*3]that tends to: . . . (iv) impeach the credibility of a testifyingprosecution witness . . . Information under this subdivision shall be disclosed whether ornot such information is recorded in tangible form and irrespective of whether theprosecutor credits the information. The prosecutor shall disclose the informationexpeditiously upon its receipt and shall not delay disclosure if it is obtained earlier thanthe time period for disclosure in subdivision one of section 245.10 of this article.(emphasis added)
CPL § 245.20(2) - Theprosecutor shall make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material orinformation discoverable under subdivision one of this section and cause such material orinformation to be made available for discovery where it exists but is not within theprosecutor's possession, custody or control; provided that the prosecutor shall not berequired to obtain by subpoena duces tecum material or information which the defendantmay thereby obtain. For purposes of subdivision one of this section, all items andinformation related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New Yorkstate or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possessionof the prosecution.
The court would further note that CPL § 245.20(7)provides, "There shall be a presumption in favor of disclosure when interpreting sections245.10 and 245.25, and subdivision one of section 245.20, of this article."
There have been a number of published decisions addressing the manner in whichthe People may comply with their affirmative discovery obligations, when it comes tocompliance with CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv). Some of these decisions require more ofthe People, some require less. They all require the People to do something. For example,in People v. Akhlaq, 2021 WL 1047074, 2021 NY Slip Op. 21060 (Sup. Ct.Kings Co. 2021), the court found "providing impeachment information culled frompersonnel files of testifying police witnesses" to be sufficient. In People v.Suprenant, 2020 WL 5422819, 2020 NY Slip Op. 20227 (City Ct. Glens Falls 2020)the court found "the People's discovery obligation is satisfied where they disclose theexistence of the officer's disciplinary records and either produce copies of the records orcause the materials or information to be made available to defense counsel." In People v. Randolph, 69 Misc3d 770, 132 N.Y.S.3d 726 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2020) the court found that "filesinvolving allegations that have been determined to be exonerated or unfounded are notrequired to be provided as part of automatic discovery[,]" leaving substantiated andunsubstantiated files which must be produced. In People v. Cooper, 2021 WL728983, 2021 NY Slip Op. 21039 (County Ct. Erie Co. 2021) the court found that:
the definition of 'law enforcement disciplinary records' is a non-exhaustivelist referencing 'any record created in furtherance of a law enforcement disciplinaryproceeding' (Public Officers Law 86[6], see also, Buffalo Police BenevolentAssociation, Inc. v. Brown, 69 Misc 3d 998 [Sup Ct, Erie County October 9,2020]). . . . When the prosecution witness is a law enforcement officer that informationincludes the officer's disciplinary records.
Notwithstanding thisrange of options initially available to the People, at least until there is some appellateauthority addressing these issues, the People herein chose to do nothing, which is farfrom diligent good faith, reasonable under the circumstances.
Turning to the substance of this motion, contrary to the position taken by the CountyAttorney, the subpoena is neither "overbroad" nor "nebulous." (BergstromAffirmation 2/17/21, ¶ 8) As indicated hereinabove, the subpoena requires, "inaccordance with Public Officers Law [*4]§§86, 87 and 89," the production of "all disciplinary records, civilian complaints,investigations and Internal Affairs Bureau records pertaining to any investigation[s] ofDet. Galgano [and Det. Concannon.]"
Public Officers Law § 86(4) provides that:
" 'Record' means any information kept, held, filed, produced or reproducedby, with or for an agency or the state legislature, in any physical form whatsoeverincluding, but not limited to, reports, statements, examinations, memoranda, opinions,folders, files, books, manuals, pamphlets, forms, papers, designs, drawings, maps,photos, letters, microfilms, computer tapes or discs, rules, regulations orcodes."
" 'Agency' means any state or municipaldepartment, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority, publiccorporation, council, office or other governmental entity performing a governmental orproprietary function for the state or any one or more municipalities thereof, except thejudiciary or the state legislature." Public Officers Law §86(3)
Public Officers Law § 86(6) defines "Lawenforcement disciplinary records" as:
any record created in furtherance of a law enforcement disciplinaryproceeding, including, but not limited to:
(a) thecomplaints, allegations, and charges against anemployee;
(b) the name of the employee complained ofor charged;
(c) the transcript of any disciplinary trial orhearing, including any exhibits introduced at such trial orhearing;
(d) the disposition of any disciplinaryproceeding; and
(e) the final written opinion ormemorandum supporting the disposition and discipline imposed including the agency'scomplete factual findings and its analysis of the conduct and appropriate discipline of thecovered employee.
" 'Law enforcement disciplinary proceeding' " means the commencement of anyinvestigation and any subsequent hearing or disciplinary action conducted by a lawenforcement agency[;]" Public Officers Law § 86(7); and, "Law enforcementagency:"
means a police agency or department of the state or any politicalsubdivision thereof, including authorities or agencies maintaining police forces ofindividuals defined as police officers in section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law, asheriff's department, the department of corrections and community supervision, a localdepartment of correction, a local probation department, a fire department, or force ofindividuals employed as firefighters or firefighter/paramedics.
In this light, it is clear that there is nothing vague orunreasonably expansive about the items subject to the subpoena. The subpoena, in fact,directs the production of nothing more, or less, than that to which the Defendant wouldbe entitled pursuant to a FOIL request.
The County Attorney's objection to the issuance of the subpoena, because theDefendant has allegedly failed to demonstrate that the items sought are material andrelevant to the present criminal prosecution, is equally without merit. With the enactmentof Article 245 of the Criminal Procedure Law, effective January 1, 2020, the Defendantno longer has an obligation to make a demand or demonstrate the need for items subjectto the People's new automatic discovery obligations, as set forth in CPL §§245.10 and 245.20(1)(a-u). See: People v. Villamar, 69 Misc 3d 842, 132 N.Y.S.3d 593,(Crim. Ct. NY Co. 2020); People v. DeMilio, 66 Misc 3d 759, 117 N.Y.S.3d 830(County Ct. Dutchess Co. 2020); People v. Lobato, 66 Misc 3d 1230(A), 122 [*5]N.Y.S.3d 492 (Crim. Ct. Kings Co. 2020)
As indicated hereinabove, CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) specifically mandates the disclosureof, "All evidence and information, including that which is known to police or other lawenforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to: . . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness. . . ." See also: Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972) These items must be disclosed "regardless of whether theprosecutor finds the information to be 'material' or 'credible.'" People v.Suprenant, supra. That the People have chosen to shirk their responsibility inthis regard herein, does not prevent the Defendant from seeking the disclosure of thismaterial via subpoena.
The court further declines the entreaty of the County Attorney to limit the NCPD'sproduction of the subpoenaed material to "substantiated" law enforcement records.Contrary to the County Attorney, People v. Randolph, supra. did not limitdisclosure of the requested records to "substantiated" allegations of misconduct. Thatcourt, in fact, found that "substantiated" and "unsubstantiated" claims of misconduct maybe the subject of impeachment at hearing and/or trial. Moreover, while this courtappreciates the logic the Randolph, id. decision, this court finds thedecision in People v. Cooper, supra. more persuasive. As notedtherein:
The legislative intent in repealing 50-a [FN1] was to make law enforcementdisciplinary records fully available. The definition of 'law enforcement disciplinaryrecords' is expansive and inclusive. It does not distinguish between unfounded,exonerated, substantiated or unsubstantiated. Indeed, there is no indication that any ofthese terms are used with any uniformity between law enforcement agencies and acrossthe State. Additionally, the definition of "law enforcement disciplinary records" is anon-exhaustive list referencing "any record created in furtherance of a law enforcementdisciplinary proceeding" (Public Officers Law 86[6], see also Buffalo Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Brown,69 Misc 3d 998 [Sup Ct, Erie County October 9, 2020]).
Similarly, the court finds no reason, at this stage, to conduct an in camerareview of the material in question, to determine what the Defendant may see and what hemay not. "Once disclosed, the full and appropriate use of the information and itsadmissibility is subject to further debate and discussion before the court as a motionin limine before trial." People v. Cooper, supra.; See also:People v. Randolph, supra.
Likewise, the County Attorney provides no justifiable reason why the court shoulddirect the Defendant and his attorney to not publicly share the information they receive inresponse to the subpoena. The movant's reliance on Fowler-Washington v. City ofNew York, 2020 WL 7237683 (E.D.NY 2020) is misplaced. The limited protectiveorder issued therein was based upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not CPLArticle 245 or New York's Public Officers Law. The court therein specificallyrecognized "the scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 is likelymuch broader than New York's Freedom of Information Law, and so Plaintiff here willhave access to more documents than he would as a member of the public, even after therepeal of Section 50-a." Moreover, the court made clear that:
the protective order does not restrict the sharing of information that wouldbe publicly available following repeal of Section 50-a. . . . Furthermore, the protective order[*6]specifically allows that any record produced toPlaintiff need not be kept confidential if it . . . was 'otherwise publicly available.'(Protective Order ¶ 3.) Thus, if Plaintiff is correct, that all of the relevant recordsshould now be public following the repeal of Section 50-a, he may obtain them throughNew York's process for obtaining such records, and they will no longer be consideredconfidential under the protective order.
The County Attorney'sprivacy concerns should be allayed by limitations on disclosure as set forth in PublicOfficers Law § 87, particularly subparagraphs 4-a and 4-b, which provide:
4-a. A law enforcement agency responding to a request for lawenforcement disciplinary records as defined in section eighty-six of this article shallredact any portion of such record containing the information specified in subdivisiontwo-b of section eighty-nine of this article prior to disclosing such record under thisarticle.
4-b. A law enforcement agency responding to arequest for law enforcement disciplinary records, as defined in section eighty-six of thisarticle, may redact any portion of such record containing the information specified insubdivision two-c of section eighty-nine of this article prior to disclosing such recordunder this article.
In turn, Public Officers Law § 89(2-b) and (2-c) provided, in pertinent part:
2-b. For records that constitute law enforcement disciplinary records asdefined in subdivision six of section eighty-six of this article, a law enforcement agencyshall redact the following information from such records prior to disclosing such recordsunder this article:
(a) items involving the medicalhistory of a person employed by a law enforcement agency as defined in sectioneighty-six of this article as a police officer, peace officer, or firefighter orfirefighter/paramedic, not including records obtained during the course of an agency'sinvestigation of such person's misconduct that are relevant to the disposition of suchinvestigation;
(b) the home addresses, personaltelephone numbers, personal cell phone numbers, personal e-mail addresses of a personemployed by a law enforcement agency as defined in section eighty-six of this article as apolice officer, peace officer, or firefighter or firefighter/paramedic, or a family memberof such a person, a complainant or any other person named in a law enforcementdisciplinary record, except where required pursuant to article fourteen of the civil servicelaw, or in accordance with subdivision four of section two hundred eight of the civilservice law, or as otherwise required by law. This paragraph shall not prohibit otherprovisions of law regarding work-related, publicly available information such as title,salary, and dates of employment;
(c) any social securitynumbers; or
(d) disclosure of the use of an employeeassistance program, mental health service, or substance abuse assistance service by aperson employed by a law enforcement agency as defined in section eighty-six of thisarticle as a police officer, peace officer, or firefighter or firefighter/paramedic, unlesssuch use is mandated by a law enforcement disciplinary proceeding that may otherwisebe disclosed pursuant to this article.
2-c. For records thatconstitute "law enforcement disciplinary records" as defined in subdivision six of sectioneighty-six of this article, a law enforcement agency may redact records pertaining totechnical infractions as defined in subdivision nine of section eighty-six of this articleprior to disclosing such records under this article.
Pursuant to Public Officers Law § 86(9):
'Technical infraction' means a minor rule violation by a person employedby a law enforcement agency as defined in this section as a police officer, peace officer,or firefighter or firefighter/paramedic, solely related to the enforcement of administrativedepartmental rules that (a) do not involve interactions with members of the public, (b) arenot of public concern, and (c) are not otherwise connected to such person's investigative,enforcement, training, supervision, or reportingresponsibilities.
Finally, the County Attorney's request for aprotective order, pursuant to CPL § 245.70, is untimely, having been raised for thefirst time in their reply papers, See: Ritt v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 182AD2d 560, 582 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1st Dept. 1992) ["As we view it, the function of a replyaffidavit is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movantand not to permit the movant to introduce new arguments in support of the motion"]. Itshall not be considered by the court and is, nevertheless, substantively without merit.
Accordingly, the motion to quash is denied in its entirety; and, it is hereby
ORDERED, that, on or before May 14, 2021, the Nassau County PoliceDepartment shall produce the records which are the subject of the subpoena duces tecumdated February 9, 2021.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: April 5, 2021
Hempstead, New York
ANDREW M.ENGEL
J.D.C.
Footnote 1:Civil Rights Law §50-a