[*1]
People v Polanco-Chavarria
2021 NY Slip Op 51297(U) [74 Misc 3d 1210(A)]
Decided on December 29, 2021
County Court, Rockland County
Schwartz, J.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on December 29, 2021
County Court, Rockland County


The People of theState of New York,

against

Elmer Polanco-Chavarria, Defendant.




Indict. No. 70072-21



James D. Licata, Public Defender, Rockland County (Stefanie Jordan of counsel), fordefendant.

Thomase E. Walsh, II, District Attorney, Rockland County (Thomas E.Walsh, II and Veronica Phillips of counsel), for the People.


Larry J. Schwartz, J.

The following papers were considered on the People's motion seeking vacatur of the Court'sAmended Compliance Conference Order dated November 22, 2021: (1) the Order to Show Causeand Affirmation in Support of District Attorney Thomas E. Walsh, II, (2) the Affirmation inOpposition of Assistant Public Defender Stefanie Jordan, (3) the Reply Affirmation of ADAVeronica Phillips, and (4) the memoranda of law of the Town of Ramapo Police Department andthe Rockland County Police Benevolent Association as amici curiae.[FN1]

Upon the foregoing papers, the motion is disposed of as follows:

On November 10, 2021, the Court held a compliance conference in this matter to addressoutstanding discovery issues. During the conference, the defense objected to the sufficiency ofthe People's inquiry of police or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government'sbehalf as required by CPL § 245.20(1)(k). The People advised that as to the instantprosecution, the following questions were posed to relevant law enforcement officers:

1. Have you ever been convicted of a criminal offense as defined by the NYS PenalLaw or Article 31 of the NYS VTL (Alcohol and Drug relatedoffenses)?

2. Are you aware of any pending criminal complaintsagainst you? (If so, don't give details-just charge, jurisdiction and defenseattorney)

3. Are you aware of any past or currently pendingfindings or decision by a court that you were untruthful? (If yes, Whatcase?)

4. Are you aware of any past or currently pending civillawsuits or substantiated departmental complaints of misconduct that may bear on the credibilityof your testimony in this case?

Among other objections, the defenseargued, as it does here, that the scope of question No.4 was too narrow because the People havean obligation pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1)(k) to provide more than just substantiatedcomplaints of misconduct but unsubstantiated, exonerated, and unfounded complaints as well. Atthe conference, the Court directed the People to inquire further as to unsubstantiated complaintsof misconduct and issued a compliance conference order dated November 10, 2021 and,subsequently, the Amended Compliance Conference Order dated November 22, 2021 that is nowat issue.[FN2]The Amended Compliance Conference Order states:

To facilitate compliance with Article 245, the Court in its discretion ORDERS thefollowing:

1 The People are to advise in writing whether any ofthe law enforcement officers who are potential testifying prosecution witnesses have ever beenthe subject of any civil suits or departmental complaints of misconduct whether substantiated orunsubstantiated.

2. The People are to advise the names and datesof the suits and complaints, if any.

3. The People confirm thatthe inquiry will be made of a superior officer who will confirm having reviewed the subjectofficers' personnel files.

4. The People are to file an additionalCOC pursuant to CPL § 245.35(3) as the Court previously directed on 5/12/21 and 7/13/21.Pursuant to CPL § 245.35(4), the additional COC shall also list all police officers and otherpersons who have participated in investigating or evaluating the case and confirm that each oneof those individuals has responded to the prosecution's inquiries under subdivision three of CPL§ 245.35.

5. All of the above is to be submitted by11/30/21.

The People argue, among other things, that their inquiry wassufficient to satisfy their CPL § 245.20(1)(k) obligations, and the Court should not haveordered the People to disclose materials not discoverable pursuant to Brady and itsprogeny such as unsubstantiated departmental misconduct complaints. The People also contendthe Court should stay this prosecution until the Appellate Division enters a determination andjudgment in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding (Matter of Sini v. Hon. Chris Ann Kelley etal., Suffolk Co. ind. No. 1064-19 [App. Div. 2d Dept]). There, the petitioner Suffolk CountyDistrict Attorney is challenging the Suffolk County Supreme Court's order requiring disclosure ofthe entirety of the misconduct investigation files of the relevant officers in a prosecutionincluding substantiated, unsubstantiated, unfounded, and exonerated allegations ofmisconduct.

The defendant opposes the motion and argues that the Court was within its authority to [*2]issue the Amended Compliance Conference Order directingdisclosure of substantiated and unsubstantiated complaints of misconduct. The defendant alsocontends that, in fact, the Court did not go far enough, and the Court should have also directedthe disclosure of the existence of unfounded and exonerated allegations of misconduct. This isso, the defense contends, because CPL § 245.20(1)(k) does not provide for thedetermination of what is discoverable to be guided by the People's assessment of the credibilityor usefulness of the allegations for impeachment. The defense also argues that the failure of thePeople to examine the relevant officers' disciplinary files themselves means they did not exercisedue diligence in determining the existence of discoverable impeachment material.

As is relevant here, CPL § 245.55(1) provides:

Sufficient communication for compliance. "The district attorney and the assistantresponsible for the case . . . shall endeavor to ensure that a flow of information is maintainedbetween the police and other investigative personnel and his or her office sufficient toplace within his or her possession or control all material and information pertinent to thedefendant and the offense or offenses charged, including, but not limited to, any evidence orinformation discoverable under paragraph (k) of subdivision one of section 245.20 of thisarticle." (emphasis added).

CPL § 245.20(1) provides inpertinent part:

The prosecution shall disclose to the defendant . . . all items and information thatrelate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of theprosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control, including but not limited to . .. (k) All evidence and information, including that which is known to police or other lawenforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case that tends to . . . (iv) impeachthe credibility of a testifying prosecution witness . . . Information under this subdivision shall bedisclosed . . . irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information.

Once the People have disclosed this evidence and information, they arerequired to file a certificate of compliance that certifies that the People have exercised "duediligence" and made "reasonable inquiries" in obtaining and providing discoverable materials(CPL § 245.50[1]).

Discussion

To begin, the Court disagrees with the People's view that CPL Article 245 is merely anattempt at codifying Brady and its progeny. While CPL § 245.20(1)(k) is acodification of certain categories of information favorable to the defense required to be disclosedby the People, the framework of CPL Article 245 imposes additional obligations on the People.One such obligation placed on the district attorney, or the assigned assistant, is to "endeavor toensure that a flow of information is maintained between the police . . . and his or her officesufficient to place within his or her possession or control" all the evidence and informationdescribed in CPL § 245.20(1)(k) (CPL § 245.55[1]). Thus, for the People todemonstrate they have exercised the "due diligence" required to file a certificate of compliance,they must ensure a flow of information that causes all impeachment evidence or information thatis in the possession of the police, to also be in the People's possession (CPL § 245.50[1];CPL § 245.20[1][k][iv]).

In other words, due diligence requires that the testifying police witnesses' personnel [*3]records be reviewed for impeachment material. Simply askingquestions of individual police officers, as the People did here, is not enough. It is the Court'sview that it is up to the People to designate who will review personnel records to ensure thePeople's compliance with CPL § 245.20(1) and CPL § 245.55(1). It neverthelessremains the People's obligation by statute to ensure all the evidence and information required byCPL § 245.20[1][k] is disclosed prior to filing a certificate of compliance with the Court.Where appropriate, the People can seek accommodations such as, among others, a protectiveorder to limit disclosure of information (CPL § 245.70[1]), or an extension of time upon ashowing of good cause (CPL § 245.70[2]) to obtain flexibility that the People may needwhile they endeavor to diligently meet their discovery obligations.

To that end, the question of what evidence and information tends to "impeach the credibilityof a testifying prosecution witness" is an important one (CPL § 245.20[1][k]). Chief JudgeDiFiore's Advisory Committee's Guide to New York Evidence (rule 6.16, Impeachment of a LawEnforcement Officer) explains that the credibility of a law enforcement witness may beimpeached "by evidence that has a tendency in reason to discredit the truthfulness or accuracy ofthe witness's testimony". Impeachment evidence is not limited to allegations of dishonestyagainst an officer. "[E]ven where the proof fall[s] outside the conventional category of immoral,vicious or criminal acts, it may be a proper subject for impeachment questioning where itdemonstrates an untruthful bent or significantly reveals a willingness or disposition on the part ofthe particular [witness] voluntarily to place the advancement of his individual self-interest aheadof principle or of the interests of society" (People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461[1994]).

Considering this relatively broad category of prior acts that may be relevant for impeachmentpurposes, the court in People v Randolph, 132 NYS3d 726 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk County,Sept. 15, 2020, Cohen, J.) identified a useful framework for the categorization of departmentalmisconduct allegations. "[A] case is 'substantiated' where it is determined that the facts clearlysupport the allegation, 'unsubstantiated' when the allegation cannot be resolved because sufficientevidence is not available, 'exonerated' where the act was legal, proper and necessary and'unfounded' when [the] evidence establish[ed] that the act did not occur" (id. at 727).

Here, the Court ordered the People to inquire of the police as to both substantiated andunsubstantiated misconduct allegations in civil suits or departmental complaints as to potentialtestifying prosecution witnesses.[FN3]The People argue that unsubstantiated allegations are not discoverable under Brady andits progeny. The defense argues the materiality requirement of Brady is replaced in CPL§ 245.20(1)(k) with a less stringent "tends to impeach" standard and, thus, unsubstantiated,unfounded, and exonerated allegations of police misconduct that tends to impeach theircredibility should be disclosed by the People.

The Court is persuaded by the analysis and holding in Randolph that falls somewherein the middle. There, the court found that the People must disclose all evidence and informationof substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations of police misconduct by testifying prosecutionwitnesses pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv). As the note to rule 6.16 of the Guide to NewYork Evidence explains, allegations in a civil lawsuit that are relevant to the credibility of apolice [*4]officer may be used for impeachment at trial whetheror not the allegations resulted in an adverse finding against that officer, subject to the trial court'sdiscretion (see id. at 4 citingPeople v Smith, 27 NY3d 652, 662 [2016]). Thus, even unsubstantiated allegations ofpolice misconduct can be properly used to impeach a police officer on cross-examination, allsubject to admissibility determinations by the trial court.

However, the Court finds that exonerated and unfounded allegations are not discoverable asimpeachment material because "there is no good faith basis for cross examination by thedefendant's counsel and as such it is not evidence or information that tends to or has aninclination to impeach a police witness" (Randolph at 727). As the defense notes, thisview of what category of allegations of police misconduct are discoverable for impeachmentpurposes is shared by many other courts in the state (see People v Akhlaq, 71 Misc 3d 823 [Sup. Ct., Kings County,2021]; People v Castellanos, 71 Misc 3d 1221[A] [Sup. Ct., Bronx County, 2021];People v Kelley, 71 Misc 3d 1202[A] [Crim. Ct., New York County, 2021]; People v Perez, 71 Misc 3d1214[A] [Crim. Ct., New York County, 2021]).

The remaining issue, then, is whether the underlying disciplinary records of substantiated andunsubstantiated misconduct allegations must be disclosed to the defense or, if a summary of theallegations will suffice. In the Matter of Jayson C., 2021 Slip. Op. 06794 (1st Dept 2021),the appellant juvenile sought disclosure in a delinquency proceeding of police disciplinaryrecords from the presentment agency pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv). The presentmentagency provided letters that summarized the disciplinary history of fourteen police officers whowere involved in the arrest and investigation of the appellant. It asserted these letters satisfied theagency's discovery obligations to provide impeachment information as it related to the fourtestifying police officers. The Family Court denied the appellant's request for discovery pursuantto CPL § 245.20(1)(k) because it held CPL Article 245 did not apply to juveniledelinquency proceedings under the Family Court Act.

The Appellate Division panel unanimously reversed on equal protection grounds, findingthat the appellant was entitled to discovery under CPL Article 245 because impeachmentevidence is equally crucial to juveniles in delinquency proceedings as it is to defendants incriminal prosecutions. Moreover, the Appellate Division found that letters summarizing thedisciplinary history of the officers were not enough to satisfy the presentment agency'sobligations under CPL Article 245. Specifically, the panel held that it was "the denial ofrecords available under CPL § 245.10(1)(k), which broadly requires disclosure of allimpeachment evidence" that constituted the equal protection violation (Matter of JaysonC. at 2) (emphasis added).

Consequently, I find that the People must disclose all the underlying disciplinary records ofall substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations of police misconduct for all testifyingprosecution witnesses in order to be in compliance with CPL § 245.10(1)(k)(iv). Thisdisclosure must be complete before the filing of a certificate of compliance absent a protectiveorder (see CPL § 245.50[1]). To the extent the People argue that disciplinary records are notin their possession so they cannot be required to disclose impeachment material from thoserecords, this argument is unpersuasive. As stated above, CPL § 245.55(1) requires thedistrict attorney or the assigned assistant to endeavor to ensure a flow, from the police to thePeople, of all evidence or information discoverable under CPL § 245.20(1)(k) "sufficient toplace [it] within his or her possession or control." In other words, the test of whether the Peoplehave satisfied their CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) obligations is whether those efforts have, in fact,ensured they possess or [*5]control all impeachment material in atestifying officer's disciplinary records. If they are not able to do so by the timelines set out inCPL Article 245, as explained above, there are remedies available to provide accommodationswhile their efforts continue.

As to the People's request for a stay of this proceeding pending the determination andjudgment of the Appellate Division in Matter of Sini, that request is denied. Thedefendant's incarceration militates against any delay of the prosecution due to a discoverydispute. Moreover, the Appellate Division's recent decision in Matter of Jayson C. makesit clear that the People are required to turn over the relevant disciplinary records in order tosatisfy the requirements of CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv).

This Court is cognizant that this is the first time this Court has written a decision articulatingits view of what the People's obligations are pursuant to these sections of CPL Article 245. Assuch, the Court ascribes no lack of due diligence to the People for not having previously turnedover disciplinary records in this matter for testifying prosecution witnesses. In light of theforegoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the People's motion is granted to the extent that the Amended ComplianceConference is hereby vacated, and it is further

ORDERED that the People are to disclose to the defense the underlying disciplinary recordsof all substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations of police misconduct, if any, for all testifyingprosecution witnesses within 20 calendar days of the date of this order, subject to a request for aprotective order (CPL § 245.70[1]) or a modification of the time period for disclosure forgood cause (CPL § 245.70[2]), and it is further

ORDERED that the People are to file an additional certificate of compliance within 20calendar days confirming they have provided all discovery required pursuant to CPL §245.20(1)(k)(iv) consistent with this decision.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:After the motion was fullysubmitted, the Appellate Division's decision in Matter of Jayson C., 2021 Slip. Op. 06794(1st Dept 2021) was issued, and the Court requested and received memoranda of law from thePeople and the defense as to that decision's relevance to the matters addressed in this decision.

Footnote 2:The People objected by letter tothe November 10, 2021 compliance order and the Court issued the Amended ComplianceConference order to narrow the scope of the law enforcement officers at issue in paragraph 1 ofthe order to those the People intend to call as prosecution witnesses pursuant to CPL §245.20(1)(k)(iv). The Court also directed the filing of an additional certificate of complianceconsidering the new inquiry directed pursuant to CPL § 245.35(3) and (4).

Footnote 3:The Court notes its complianceconference orders did not direct that any police personnel records be turned over to the defense.




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