People v Keith
2022 NY Slip Op 00193 [201 AD3d 738]
January 12, 2022
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 9, 2022


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Richard Keith, Also Known as Keith Richard,Appellant.

Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Lynn W.L. Fahey of counsel), for appellant.

Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill and Roni C. Piplani ofcounsel; Lorrie A. Zinno on the memorandum), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant, as limited by his motion, from a sentence of the Supreme Court,Queens County (Barry Kron, J.), imposed May 16, 2019, sentencing him to a determinate term ofimprisonment of nine years, to be followed by a period of postrelease supervision of three years,upon his conviction of assault in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, on the ground that thesentence was excessive.

Ordered that the sentence is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, byreducing the sentence imposed from a determinate term of imprisonment of nine years, to befollowed by a period of postrelease supervision of three years, to a determinate term ofimprisonment of seven years, to be followed by a period of postrelease supervision of threeyears.

The defendant's purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid because, inter alia, theSupreme Court mischaracterized the appellate rights waived as encompassing an absolute bar tothe taking of a direct appeal or seeking any postconviction relief separate from the direct appeal,and the loss of attendant rights to counsel and poor person relief (see People v Shanks, 37 NY3d 244[2021]; People v Thomas, 34 NY3d545, 560-564 [2019]; People vHoward, 183 AD3d 640 [2020]). Thus, the purported waiver does not preclude appellatereview of the defendant's excessive sentence claim (see People v Howard, 183 AD3d 640 [2020]; People v Fuller, 163 AD3d 715[2018]).

In considering whether a sentence is unduly harsh or severe under the circumstances(see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]), "we exercise our discretion giving consideration to, 'amongother things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the courtand the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation, anddeterrence' " (People vKordish, 140 AD3d 981, 982-983 [2016], quoting People v Farrar, 52 NY2d302, 305 [1981]; see Penal Law § 1.05; People v Diaz, 146 AD3d 803, 805-806 [2017]; People vSuitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]). In light of all of the facts and circumstances of this case, thesentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v Suitte, 90AD2d 80 [1982]). Duffy, J.P., Barros, Chambers and Ford, JJ., concur.


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