| People v Talluto |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 00575 [201 AD3d 1333] |
| January 28, 2022 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Daniel Talluto, Appellant. |
Keem Appeals, PLLC, Syracuse (Bradley E. Keem of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), dated December 11,2020. The order determined that defendant is a level one risk pursuant to the Sex OffenderRegistration Act and designated him a sexually violent offender.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In this proceeding under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law§ 168 et seq.), defendant appeals from an order that, inter alia, designatedhim a "sexually violent offender" pursuant to Correction Law § 168-k (2). We rejectdefendant's challenge to that designation.
A " '[s]exually violent offender' means a sex offender who has been convicted of asexually violent offense" (Correction Law § 168-a [7] [b]). A " '[s]exuallyviolent offense,' " among other things, is "a conviction of an offense in any otherjurisdiction which includes all of the essential elements of any [New York] felony [enumeratedin section 168-a (3) (a)] or conviction of a felony in any other jurisdiction for which theoffender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the convictionoccurred" (§ 168-a [3] [b] [emphasis added]). It is undisputed that defendantwas convicted of a felony in Michigan "for which [he] is required to register as a sex offender in[that] jurisdiction" (id.). Defendant's Michigan conviction thus constitutes a" '[s]exually violent offense' " as defined by the second of the two disjunctiveclauses that comprise section 168-a (3) (b). It follows that defendant was properly designated asexually violent offender, even though he would not qualify as such had he committed the sameconduct in New York (see § 168-a [3] [a]; [7] [b]).
This result, we acknowledge, is illogical and unfair. As the dissent explains, the seconddisjunctive clause of Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b) makes the first disjunctiveclause largely—but not entirely—superfluous, and it treats many out-of-stateconvictions more harshly than identical in-state convictions. Indeed, the dissent makes acompelling case that the second disjunctive clause of section 168-a (3) (b) is simply a legislativedrafting error.
But our hands are tied. "[A]ll statutes must have a construction according to the languageemployed, and where no ambiguity exists courts cannot correct supposed defects" (Benton vWickwire, 54 NY 226, 228-229 [1873]; see Schoenefeld v State of New York, 25 NY3d 22, 26 [2015];Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 548-549 [1983]).The language of Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b) is plain and unambiguous, and we" 'may not resort to rules of construction' " to defeat such a legislativepronouncement (Matter of Raritan Dev. Corp. v Silva, 91 NY2d 98, 107 [1997]). Indeed," 'no rule of construction gives the court[s] discretion to declare the intent of [a] lawwhen the words are unequivocal' " (id.). If "the wording of the statute hascreated an 'unintended consequence,' . . . it is the prerogative of the legislature, not[the courts], to correct it" (Matter of LisaT. v King E.T., 30 NY3d 548, 556[*2][2017]).Parenthetically, we note that defendant does not attack the constitutionality of section 168-a (3)(b) as written.
Defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
All concur except Carni, J.P., and Lindley, J., who dissent and vote to modify in accordancewith the following memorandum.
Carni, J.P., and Lindley J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent. Although the People did notsubmit a brief on appeal, they conceded below, in our view correctly, that defendant should notbe designated a sexually violent offender because the felony he committed in Michigan wouldnot be a sexually violent offense if committed in New York. Over the objection of both defendantand the People, County Court determined that such designation is mandated by Correction Law§ 168-a (3) (b), notwithstanding that the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders didnot consider defendant to be a sexually violent offender and there was no evidence at the SexOffender Registration Act (SORA) hearing that his out-of-state sexual offense involved violenceor the use of force. Although the majority finds this result to be illogical and unfair, it concludes,not unreasonably, that our hands are tied by the literal terms of the statute and we must thereforeaffirm. We come to a different conclusion.
The majority accurately lays out the relevant statutory scheme. A sexually violent offender isdefined as a sex offender "who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense" (Correction Law§ 168-a [7] [b]). In New York, a sexually violent offense is a conviction for a crimeenumerated in Correction Law § 168-a (3) (a). For out-of-state convictions, section168-a (3) (b) defines a sexually violent offense as a conviction for an offense that "includes all ofthe essential elements of any such felony provided for in paragraph (a)," or a "conviction of afelony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender inthe jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred."
Stated otherwise, for out-of-state convictions a sexually violent offense is an offense thatmatches the essential elements of a sexually violent offense in New York, or any felony forwhich the defendant had to register as a sex offender in the other state. The second part of thedefinition in Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b) renders the first part largelymeaningless because, for practical purposes, every out-of-state offense that meets the essentialelements test will be an out-of-state felony for which registration is required in the otherstate.
Moreover, as defendant points out, the definition of a " '[s]exually violentoffense' " in section 168-a (3) (b) as a felony in any other jurisdiction for which theoffender must register as a sex offender is, word for word, the same definition of a mere" '[s]ex offense' " for out-of-state convictions set forth in section 168-a (2) (d)(ii), thereby collapsing the distinction between violent and non-violent sex offenses as they applyto out-of-state offenders who reside in New York.
It has been noted that the latter definition of a sexually violent offense in Correction Law§ 168-a (3) (b) may be the result of a legislative drafting error. In the 2020 Reportof the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure to the Chief Administrative Judge ofthe Courts of the State of New York, the Advisory Committee concluded that the seconddefinition "was presumably included in error" and offered a plausible explanation for how themistake was made (Report of Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure at 122 [Jan.2020]). The Advisory Committee therefore recommended that the legislature amend the statuteby deleting the "errant phrase" in order to clarify that an out-of-state felony is a sexually violentoffense if, and only if, it includes the essential elements of a sexually violent offense in NewYork (id.). Although a bill was introduced in the Assembly to amend the statuteaccordingly, it has not been enacted into law.
With respect to the case at hand, there is no dispute that the felony for which defendant wasconvicted in Michigan does not include "all of the essential elements" of an offense enumeratedin section 168-a (3) (a). Thus, if defendant had committed that felony in New York, he would notqualify as a sexually violent offender. Nevertheless, because defendant was required to register asa sex offender in Michigan based on his felony conviction in that state, he meets the seconddefinition of a sexually violent offender under section 168-a (3) (b), even though, as the Peopleconceded at the SORA hearing, there is no evidence that defendant used force or violence duringthe commission of his felony. The question presented is whether, in light of the clear andunambiguous language of section 168-a (3) (b), we are powerless to correct what the majorityagrees is an illogical and unfair result.
[*3] "Ininterpreting the statute we are guided by a well-settled principle of statutory construction: courtsnormally accord statutes their plain meaning, but 'will not blindly apply the words of a statute toarrive at an unreasonable or absurd result' " (People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 242 [2004], quoting Williams vWilliams, 23 NY2d 592, 599 [1969]). Thus, while courts are "governed by the principle thatwe must interpret a statute so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law" (People v Garson, 6 NY3d 604, 614[2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]), courts should also strive to give " 'effect andmeaning' " to every part of a statute (Matter of New York State Superfund Coalition, Inc. v New York State Dept.of Envtl. Conservation, 18 NY3d 289, 296 [2011]; see McKinney's Cons Lawsof NY, Book 1, Statutes § 98).
Here, we conclude that a literal application of the words contained in Correction Law§ 168-a (3) (b) would not only fail to give meaning to the essential elements test setforth in the statute, but it would also lead to an unreasonable if not absurd result, i.e., thedesignation of defendant as a sexually violent offender when he did not use violence or threats ofviolence during the course and commission of the underlying felony and when the out-of-statecrime he committed would not be a sexually violent offense if committed in New York. As aresult of the designation, defendant must register for life as a sex offender even though he wasfound to be only a level one risk at the SORA hearing. In our view, the sexually violent offenderdesignation should be reserved for those offenders who are truly violent and hence moredangerous than nonviolent offenders.
We would therefore modify the order by vacating the sexually violent offender designation,and otherwise affirm. Present—Carni, J.P., Lindley, NeMoyer, Winslow and Bannister,JJ.