Gottwald v Sebert
2022 NY Slip Op 01515 [203 AD3d 488]
March 10, 2022
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 4, 2022


[*1]
 Lukasz Gottwald, Professionally Known as Dr. Luke, et al.,Appellants,
v
Kesha Rose Sebert, Professionally Known as Kesha, Respondent, et al.,Defendants.

Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, New York (Christine Lepera of counsel), forappellants.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP, New York (Leah Godesky of counsel), for respondent.

Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, New York (Alan S. Lewis and John J. Walsh ofcounsel), for Samuel D. Isaly, amicus curiae.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jennifer G. Schecter, J.), entered on or about June30, 2021, which granted defendant's motion for a ruling that Civil Rights Law§ 76-a applies to plaintiffs' defamation claims against her and for leave to assert acounterclaim against plaintiffs under Civil Rights Law § 70-a, unanimouslyreversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion denied.

Contrary to the decision of the motion court and in other nonbinding decisions (see e.g.Palin v New York Times Co., 510 F Supp 3d 21 [SD NY 2020]), there is insufficientevidence supporting the conclusion that the legislature intended its 2020 amendments to theanti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) law (see Civil Rights Law§ 70 et seq.) to apply retroactively to pending claims such as the defamationclaims asserted by plaintiffs in this action.

The Court of Appeals has stated, in general terms, that "ameliorative or remedial legislation"should be given "retroactive effect in order to effectuate its beneficial purpose" (Matter ofMarino S., 100 NY2d 361, 370-371 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1059 [2003]), andthis Court, in limited circumstances, has found the requisite legislative intent to apply a statuteretroactively based on the remedial nature of the statute (see e.g. Matter of Jaquan L. [Pearl L.], 179 AD3d 457 [1st Dept2020] [retroactive application of amendment that acts remedially to expand existing benefits to aclass of persons arbitrarily denied those benefits by the original legislation]). Nevertheless, in Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v NewYork State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal (35 NY3d 332 [2020]), the Courtof Appeals noted that the United States Supreme Court had previously limited "the continuedutility of the tenet that new 'remedial' statutes apply presumptively to pending cases" (35 NY3d at365), and it has otherwise noted that "[c]lassifying a statute as remedial does not automaticallyovercome the strong presumption of prospectivity since the term may broadly encompass anyattempt to supply some defect or abridge some superfluity in the former law" (Majewski vBroadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 584 [1998] [internal quotation marksomitted]). In addition, where, as here, the fact that the legislature has provided that amendmentsshall "take effect immediately," even though that may evince a "sense of urgency," the meaningof that phrase is, at best, "equivocal" in an analysis of retroactivity (Majewski, 91 NY2dat 583; see Aguaiza v Vantage Props.,LLC, 69 AD3d 422 [1st Dept 2010]).

In light of the above principles and the factual evidence that the amendments to New York'santi-SLAPP law were intended to better advance the purposes of the legislation by correcting thenarrow scope of the prior anti-SLAPP law, we find that the presumption of prospectiveapplication of the amendments has not been defeated. The legislature acted to broaden the scopeof the law almost 30 years after the law [*2]was originallyenacted, purportedly to advance an underlying remedial purpose that was not adequatelyaddressed in the original legislative language. The legislature did not specify that the newlegislation was to be applied retroactively. The fact that the amended statute is remedial, and thatthe legislature provided that the amendments shall take effect immediately, does not support theconclusion that the legislature intended retroactive application of the amendments.

Given the conclusion that the 2020 amendments expanding the scope of Civil Rights Law§ 76-a do not apply retroactively to cover plaintiffs' pending defamation claims, themotion seeking a ruling to that effect and for leave to assert a Civil Rights Law§ 70-a counterclaim premised on plaintiffs' claims being subject to the anti-SLAPPlaw must be denied in both respects. Concur—Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Mazzarelli,González, Shulman, Rodriguez, JJ.

Motion of nonparty Samuel D. Isaly for leave to file brief as amicus curiae, granted.


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