People v Heiserman
2022 NY Slip Op 02588 [204 AD3d 1249]
April 21, 2022
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 1, 2022


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Michael Heiserman, Appellant.

G. Scott Walling, Slingerlands, for appellant.

Jonathan J. Miller, Acting District Attorney, Malone (Jennifer M. Hollis of counsel), forrespondent.

Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Franklin County (Champagne,J.), rendered September 4, 2019, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of assault inthe second degree.

In February 2019, defendant was charged by indictment with assault in the second degreestemming from allegations that, while being processed at the Franklin County Jail forharassment, he struck a police sergeant intentionally causing him injury. After a jury trial,defendant was convicted as charged and thereafter sentenced, as a second felony offender, to aprison term of five years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendantappeals.

Defendant argues that County Court erred in denying his request for a jury charge on thedefense of justification. In a criminal action, "[i]n judging whether to accede to a defendant'srequest to charge an affirmative defense, a court is bound to view the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the defendant . . . . The charge must be given if there is evidencereasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence which, if credited, wouldnegate it" (People v McKenzie, 19 NY3d 463, 466 [2012] [citation omitted]; see People v J.L., 36 NY3d 112,119 [2020]; People v Vega, 33NY3d 1002, 1004-1005 [2019]). "The rule serves as a bulwark against judicial intrusion intothe fact-finding province of the jury" (People v J.L., 36 NY3d at 121).

Specific to the affirmative defense of justification, as relevant here, "[a] person may. . . use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or shereasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself [or] herself . . . fromwhat he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force bysuch other person" (Penal Law § 35.15 [1]; see People v Goetz, 68 NY2d96, 105-106 [1986]). This defense involves both subjective and objective elements whereby the"determination of reasonableness must be based on the circumstances facing a defendant or his[or her] situation" (People v Goetz, 68 NY2d at 114 [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]; see People vYoung, 33 AD3d 1120, 1122-1123 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 929 [2007]). It iswell settled that a defendant charged with assault of a police officer or a correction officer can,under certain circumstances, assert self-defense where the officer uses excessive force (seee.g. People v Stevenson, 31 NY2d 108, 112 [1972]; People v Banyan, 187 AD3d 643, 644 [2020], lv denied 36NY3d 1049 [2021]; People vBrown, 169 AD3d 1488, 1489 [2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 1064 [2020];compare Penal Law § 35.27).

Here, since justification is a complete defense, and given the overwhelming evidence thatdefendant committed the crime of assault, the instruction is of crucial importance. Most notably,the People introduced into evidence a video recording of the assault, in which defendant canclearly be seen punching a police sergeant after defendant is [*2]sprayed in the face with pepper spray. Testimony revealed, and thevideo corroborated, that the pepper spray was deployed because defendant was refusing to takeoff his shoes and change into footwear provided by the jail so that an officer could finishsearching him before bringing him into the jail. However, the video depicts a very brief timeperiod between the initial directive for defendant to remove his footwear and the deployment ofthe pepper spray.[FN1]Based on this fact, combined with other circumstances surrounding the incident, we find thatthere is a reasonable view of the evidence that the use of the pepper spray constituted excessiveforce in this scenario.[FN2]Thus, when "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . defendant" (People v Johnson, 91 AD3d 1121,1122 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 18 NY3d 959[2012]), there is a reasonable view of the evidence by which the jury could find that defendant'sacts were justified (see People vTaylor, 156 AD3d 86, 96 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1120 [2018]; People v Ball, 154 AD3d 1060,1061-1062 [2017]). Accordingly, it was error for County Court not to instruct the jury on thedefense of justification such that a new trial is required. In light of this determination, defendant'sremaining contention has been rendered academic.

Garry, P.J., and Lynch, J., concur.

Colangelo, J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent.

In our view, County Court acted properly in admitting evidence of defendant's earlierbehavior and in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of justification.

In our view, County Court did not err in permitting the People to elicit testimony on redirectexamination of the police officer who arrested defendant regarding crimes or bad acts that heallegedly committed earlier in the day, prior to the indicted instant offense. "When a party opensthe door during cross-examination to excluded evidence, the opponent may seek to admit theexcluded evidence in order to explain, clarify and fully elicit the question that has been onlypartially exposed on cross-examination" (People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 425 [2004][internal quotation marks and citations omitted], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]). "A trialcourt has the discretion to decide door opening issues by considering whether, and to whatextent, the evidence or argument said to open the door is incomplete and misleading, and what ifany otherwise inadmissible evidence is reasonably necessary to correct the misleadingimpression" (People v George, 199AD3d 1064, 1066 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied37 NY3d 1146 [2021]; see People v Massie, 2 NY3d 179, 184 [2004]).

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked the police officer who defendant allegedlyharassed and who had transported defendant to the jail if he knew defendant on December 1,2018 and if he knew whether defendant called the police station because his son was missing.The [*3]officer testified that he was dispatched to the vicinity ofan apartment building earlier that day for that reason. Then, defense counsel asked the officer ifdefendant "appear[ed] calm" while being processed at the jail, to which the officer responded that"[defendant] was calm inside [his] vehicle [during the transport and when he] brought him in."Prior to redirect examination, the prosecutor argued—outside of the jury'spresence—that he could ask the officer about the initial police call because defensecounsel had opened the door to such. County Court agreed and permitted such questioning. Theofficer testified that the call he responded to was that a young child was missing from anapartment building. The officer, after speaking to the property manager and learning thatdefendant was behaving aggressively toward him and did not live in the building, wasapproached by defendant. When defendant reached approximately 18 inches away from theofficer, the officer asked him, "Hey, give me some space. What's your name?" Defendantidentified himself and did not move back. The officer "put [his] hand up, [placed his] handlightly on [defendant's] chest where his jacket was and said '[j]ust please step back, give me somespace.' " The officer testified that he again requested that defendant step back, anddefendant took the officer's arm and "slapped [it] off of him," and then the officer "went hands onand attempted to take [defendant] to the ground." The officer arrested defendant for the offenseof harassment in the second degree. Before defendant was placed inside the car, he spat on thehood of the car, and told the officer, "When you're out of blue, you're f****** dead. You'redead."

County Court determined that, even though defense counsel had not questioned the officerabout why defendant was arrested or what specifically had transpired that led to his arrest, it wasappropriate for the People to follow up on the question that defense counsel had initially asked"in such a way to impress upon the jury that [defendant] was simply calling the police becausehis son was missing and that may not be at all accurate." We agree. The evidence elicited oncross-examination was incomplete and misleading and provided the jury with no context as tohow defendant's seemingly innocuous call to the police about his son led to his arrest and theeventual assault on a sergeant at the jail. In our view, the details elicited on redirect wereessential to explain, clarify and fully elicit the question that had been only partially exposed oncross-examination (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d at 425). Accordingly, the redirectexamination as to defendant's behavior earlier in the day was "reasonably necessary to correct themisleading impression" (People v George, 199 AD3d at 1066 [internal quotation marksand citations omitted]).

Even if County Court should not have allowed such questioning on redirect examination, anyerror in this regard was harmless[*4]. "An error of law may befound harmless where 'the proof of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, isoverwhelming' and where there is no 'significant probability . . . that the jury wouldhave acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error' " (People v Arafet, 13 NY3d 460,467 [2009], quoting People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]). The evidenceagainst defendant consisted of the testimony of the correction officers who were present at thejail when the assault occurred, the chemical agents policy, the sergeant's medical records and thevideo of the assault from two different angles. We find that this evidence overwhelminglyestablished defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no "reasonable possibilitythat the . . . error may have contributed to the defendant's conviction" (People v Serrano, 200 AD3d 1340,1346 [2021], lv granted 38 NY3d 931 [2022]).

In our view, defendant was not entitled to a justification charge. " 'Although therecord must be considered in the light most favorable to the accused, a court need not chargejustification if no reasonable view of the evidence establishes the elements of thedefense' " (People v Sands,157 AD3d 1136, 1137 [2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 986 [2018], quoting People vReynoso, 73 NY2d 816, 818 [1988]). "[A] person may . . . use physical forceupon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary todefend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use orimminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person" (Penal Law § 35.15[1]). The police officer who transported defendant to the jail testified that when his patrol carreached the "sally port" or secure garage area of the jail, defendant was removed from the vehicleand turned over to the staff at the jail. The testimony establishes that defendant was subject to apat frisk of his clothing and person and was asked several times to remove his boots, but herefused to comply. The sergeant at the jail called for other correction officers to enter the sallyport, and defendant was given a direct order to remove his boots, which he did not do. Thesergeant then told defendant that he would spray defendant with a chemical agent akin to pepperspray if he did not comply and the sergeant then removed the spray from his belt and again gavedefendant a direct order to "[r]emove [his boots]" or he was "going to be sprayed." Defendant didnot remove his boots and the spray was administered to defendant's face. Within seconds ofbeing sprayed, defendant, who was facing the wall, came off the wall and punched the sergeant inthe left side of his face with a closed fist, hitting his eye. The sergeant fell toward the driver sidedoor of the police officer's vehicle and braced himself next to the vehicle. Defendant continuedmoving towards the sergeant and then, with his left hand, grabbed the hand-held radio from the[*5]hood of the vehicle and began to swing it towards otherofficers as he was going down. Once defendant was down, multiple officers eventually gainedcontrol of defendant's legs and arms.

The correction officer who was instructed to pat frisk defendant testified that after hechecked defendant's clothing and patted his hands over defendant's body to check for contraband,he asked defendant to remove his footwear in accordance with standard procedure. The officerexplained that defendant was to be given county-issued footwear to enter the facility and hisfootwear needed to be searched to ensure that contraband does not enter the jail. It is undisputedthat the order given to defendant to remove his boots was a lawful order. Defendant responded bysaying, "And then what? What comes next? 'Please take your footwear off.' " The officertestified that he heard the sergeant advise defendant that if he did not remove his footwear, hewould be sprayed. The sergeant stated that defendant did not remove his boots because he wantedthe officer to say "please." Further, the sergeant testified that between 8 and 10 minutes elapsedbetween the first order to defendant to remove his boots and the time that the spray wasadministered and only after several attempts to get defendant to comply, including pleading withhim, had failed. The chemical agents policy at the jail states, "After verbal commands havefailed, spray the inmate." As the sergeant and other officers testified, the spray is used uponrefusal of a direct order, instead of "going hands on where somebody [including the officers]could get hurt."

According to the written chemical agents policy at this jail, chemical agents may be usedwithout supervisory authority "[i]n emergency situations, when a delay in [their use] presents animmediate threat of death, or serious physical injury." Further, chemical agents may be usedwithout prior notification of facility health services staff "in emergency situations when a delayin the use of such agents presents an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury, [or],severely threatens the safety or security of the facility." Incidents that may require the use ofchemical agents include "[a]fter verbal commands have failed, spray the inmate." Here, theofficers did not know what potentially dangerous items might be concealed in defendant's boots;items such as knives, needles and drugs have been removed from footwear in the past. As noreasonable view of the evidence reflects that an act of unlawful physical force was committedagainst defendant (see People v Sands, 157 AD3d at 1137), County Court was notrequired to charge the jury on the defense of justification.

We would affirm. McShan, J., concurs.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the County Court ofFranklin County for a new trial.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Testimony of the witnessesdiffered as to the amount of time that had elapsed and the video of the incident lacks audio.However, we note that defendant was sprayed with the pepper spray approximately four minutesinto the video, which was less than two minutes after he was first presented with the jail footwearthat he was directed to change into.

Footnote 2:That the use of the pepper spraywas permissible under certain circumstances pursuant to the policies of the Franklin County Jaildoes not change this determination.


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