People v Pastrana
2022 NY Slip Op 03058 [205 AD3d 461]
May 5, 2022
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 29, 2022


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Pablo Pastrana, Appellant.

Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Mark W. Zeno of counsel), forappellant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Nicole Neckles of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John W. Carter, J.), rendered April 19, 2018,convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree,criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree and unlawful possession of marijuana, andsentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 16 years to life,unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence recoveredfrom his vehicle after it was stopped at a checkpoint. Initially, we find no basis for disturbing thecourt's credibility determinations (see People v Prochilo, 41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]),regarding the circumstances of the checkpoint stop as well as the ensuing search.

The police testimony, and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, were sufficient tosatisfy the People's burden at the hearing of establishing the elements of a valid checkpoint stop(see People v Dugan, 57 AD3d300 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 924 [2009]). The testimony established thatthe primary purpose of the checkpoint was vehicular safety and enforcement of vehicular lawsand regulations rather than general crime control, that the checkpoint was effective in advancingthose interests, that the checkpoint and its primary purpose originated at a higher policesupervisory level than the officers at the scene, and that the degree of intrusion on drivers' libertyand privacy interests was minimal (see Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US 32 [2000];People v Scott, 63 NY2d 518 [1984]). The officer's testimony that the checkpoint stoppedevery third car satisfied the requirement that "the procedure followed be uniform and notgratuitous or subject to individually discriminatory selection" (People v Serrano, 233AD2d 170, 171 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 929 [1996]), and there was nocredible evidence of unlawful discrimination adduced at the hearing. We have considered andrejected defendant's remaining arguments on the checkpoint issue.

The hearing evidence also established that there was probable cause to search the lockedglove box where a pistol and other contraband were found. Pursuant to the automobile exception,"[s]tate actors may search a vehicle without a warrant when they have probable cause to believethat evidence or contraband will be found there" so long as there is "a nexus between the arrestand the probable cause to search" (People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463, 467 [1993]; People v McCray, 195 AD3d 555,556 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1028 [2021]). When defendant's car was pulledover at the check point, the officer directed defendant to roll down the windows, at which time hedetected a "very strong" odor of marijuana emanating from the car. The officer asked defendantto step out of the car and for his license and registration. When defendant did so, the officerobserved a "twist" of marijuana on the passenger side floor. Based upon the strong smell ofmarijuana in the [*2]car, and the presence of marijuana in plainview, the officer searched the interior of the car for more marijuana. Noticing that the smell wasstrongest in the front passenger area in the vicinity of the glove compartment, the officer openedthe glove compartment wherein he discovered two large Ziploc bags. One contained seven bagsof marijuana; the other contained a 9 millimeter firearm, a magazine and cartridges. The strongodor of marijuana, coupled with the visible presence of marijuana in the car, provided probablecause to search the interior of the car and provided a nexus that justified the officer's search ofthe glove box (compare People vPonder, 195 AD3d 123 [1st Dept 2021] [odor of marijuana emanating from car did notprovide probable cause for search of trunk]).

We also conclude that newly-enacted Penal Law § 222.05 (3), which affectswhether a finding of probable cause may be made on evidence of the odor of cannabis, shouldnot be applied retroactively (see Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 241 [2011];People v Martello, 93 NY2d 645, 648 [1999]). "[N]othing in the plain language of PenalLaw § 222.05 (3) indicates that the legislature clearly intended that provision tohave retroactive effect" (People vVaughn, 203 AD3d 1729, 1730 [4th Dept 2022]).

We also decline to vacate defendant's marijuana convictions based on recent changes to thelaw relating to substantive marijuana offenses (see People v Utsey, 7 NY3d 398, 404 [2006]; People vWalker, 81 NY2d 661 [1993]). Instead, CPL 440.46-a provides a specific mechanism for theresentencing of defendants who were convicted under former Penal Law article 221, but whoseconduct would constitute a lesser offense or no offense under Penal Law article 222 (see People v Ramos, 202 AD3d410 [1st Dept 2022]). Concur—Gische, J.P., Kern, Oing, González, Scarpulla,JJ.


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