| People v Lin Li |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 04565 [207 AD3d 566] [207 AD3d 566] |
| July 13, 2022 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Lin Li, Appellant. |
Wang Law Office, PLLC, Flushing, NY (Jean Wang of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Anthea H.Bruffee, JulianJoiris, and Andrew S. Ayala of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Deborah A.Dowling, J.), rendered February 26, 2020, convicting her of manslaughter in the firstdegree,attempted assault in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts),upon ajury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after ahearing,of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress her statementsto lawenforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Following the March 13, 2016 death of the defendant's two-year-old daughter and asubsequent investigation regarding the defendant's alleged physical abuse of both thedaughterand the defendant's four-year-old son, the defendant was tried and convicted ofmanslaughter inthe first degree as to the daughter, attempted assault in the first degree as to the son, andendangering the welfare of both children. The evidence at trial included over nine hoursof thedefendant's videotaped police interrogation with a police officer interpreting Mandarinfor thedefendant. The defendant was read and purportedly waived her Miranda rights(seeMiranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). During the police interrogation, thedefendantadmitted to forcibly pushing her children's heads under water as a form ofpunishment.
The defendant stated that, on March 13, 2016, she was bathing the daughter in aplastic bininside of the bathtub. The defendant admitted that because she was angry with thedaughter forurinating on herself, she scolded and spanked the child, and pushed the daughter's headunder thewater while the child struggled against her. After the defendant saw air bubbles surfacingfromthe daughter in the bin, the defendant left her daughter alone in the bathroom. When thedefendant returned to the bathroom, she found the daughter unresponsive in the plasticbin.Expert testimony at trial established that the daughter died by drowning, and that thebruising onthe daughter's face, torso, shoulders, upper and lower back, hips, buttocks, and thighswereconsistent with forcible gripping.
As to the son, the defendant admitted that she would frequently discipline him byforcinghim to stand and stare at the wall for extended periods of time. She also forced his head[*2]under the water while he was in the bath. The defendantadmittedthat, on March 12, 2016, the defendant forced the son's head under water in the bath,causing himto struggle against her, and told the police that she did this because she could not controlheremotions. The son's March 14, 2016 medical records confirmed physical childabuse.
On appeal, the defendant argues, inter alia, that her videotaped statements made tolawenforcement officials should be suppressed and that the evidence was not legallysufficient tosupport her convictions. We disagree.
The record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the defendant'sadmissions werevoluntarily made after the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived herMiranda rights (seePeople vSantos, 200 AD3d 1075 [2021]; see generally Miranda v Arizona, 384US 436[1966]). The evidence presented at the suppression hearing demonstrated that a policeofficerread the Miranda rights in Mandarin for the Mandarin-speaking defendant. Thedefendantconfirmed that she understood the rights read to her (see People v Garcia, 199 AD3d 701 [2021]; People v Alvarenga, 190 AD3d762 [2021]; People vZelaya,170 AD3d 1206, 1207 [2019]), and that she was capable of understanding "both thenatureof the rights [s]he was waiving and the consequences of [her] decision to abandon thoserights"(People v O'Brien, 186AD3d1406, 1407 [2020], citing People v Schompert, 19 NY2d 300, 305 [1967];see People v Van Guilder, 29AD3d1226, 1227-1228 [2006]).
Moreover, the defendant's contention that the interpretation of her statement fromMandarinto English was inaccurate is largely based on matter dehors the record and cannot bereviewed ondirect appeal (see People vAnderson, 197 AD3d 713 [2021]). To the extent that the contention may bereviewedupon the record before us, it is without merit, and the use of a police officer as thelanguageinterpreter was not per se improper (seee.g. People v Torres, 177 AD3d 579 [2019]). Therefore, the Supreme Courtproperlydenied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress herstatementsmade to the police.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that the evidence was legally sufficientto provebeyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the first degree (PenalLaw§ 125.20 [1]; seePeople vHeil, 188 AD3d 911, 912 [2020]; People v Santiago, 87 AD3d 707, 708 [2011]), attemptedassault inthe first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00; 120.10 [1]; see People v Martinez, 199AD3d834 [2021]), and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts) (Penal Law§ 260.10 [1]; seePeople vDuncanson, 200 AD3d 905 [2021]; People v Acevedo-Lopez, 200 AD3d 788 [2021]).Moreover, infulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence(see CPL 470.15 [5]; People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference tothejury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor(seePeople v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]).Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not againsttheweight of the evidence (seePeople vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]; People v Santiago, 87 AD3d at 708).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that she is entitled to reversal of herconvictions based upon the prosecution's failure to timely disclose allegedly pertinentmaterial,including a paramedic's report, a detective's memo book, and reports and vouchersgenerated bythe police department (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]; People vRosario, 9 NY2d 286 [1961]). The record shows that all relevant information wasprovidedto the defense during trial, if not sooner (see People v Johnson, 165 AD3d 1287, 1287-1288 [2018];People v Sanchez, 144 AD3d1179, 1180 [2016]; People v King, 298 AD2d 530, 531 [2002]), and thedefendantfailed to demonstrate that she suffered any prejudice from the alleged delays in disclosure(see People v Sanchez, 144 AD3d at 1180).
The defendant also waived any objection to the Supreme Court's granting of thePeople'sapplication to reopen their case. The defendant unequivocally consented to the Peoplereopeningtheir case to admit additional testimony from their expert (see People v Burns, 183 AD3d 835, 836 [2020]; People v Williams, 168 AD3d770[2019]).
The defendant's contention that it was error for the Supreme Court to allow the [*3]People to present evidence of alleged hearsay statementsmade bythe son is unpreserved for appellate review, as it was not raised before the court(see CPL470.05 [2]; People vHonghirun,133 AD3d 882 [2015], affd 29 NY3d 284 [2017]). Moreover, thiscontention waswaived, as defense counsel referenced these statements during her cross-examination of apolicewitness (see People vHonghirun,133 AD3d 882 [2015]; People vStalter, 77 AD3d 776, 776-777 [2010]; People v Brown, 57 AD3d 1461, 1462 [2008]).
The defendant's contention that she should have been allowed to use the videofootage of herhusband's interview to impeach a police witness is also unpreserved for appellate review(see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, this evidence was properly excluded underthecircumstances of this case "because it was repetitive and collateral, and posed an unduerisk ofconfusion of the issues" (PeoplevBowen, 67 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2009]; see People v Jack, 149 AD3d 779, 780 [2017]). TheSupreme Courtalso did not err in denying the defense's request to call certain witnesses where "therewas acomplete failure to demonstrate any relevance" with regard to their proposed testimony(People v Billups, 132 AD2d 612, 613 [1987]). Additionally, the hypotheticalquestionsasked by the People of the defendant's experts were properly "premised upon theexistence of[facts] that the evidence fairly tended to support" (People v Cruz, 233 AD2d 102,102[1996], affd 90 NY2d 961 [1997]; see Tarlowe v Metropolitan SkiSlopes, 28NY2d 410, 414 [1971]).
Finally, the defendant's contention that the duration of a final order of protectionissued at thetime of sentencing on behalf of the son exceeded the maximum period permissible underCPL530.13 (4) (A) is unpreserved for appellate review, as she failed to raise this issue atsentencingor move to amend the final order of protection on this ground (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Nieves, 2 NY3d310,316-317 [2004]; People vColon,187 AD3d 780 [2020]). We decline to reach the issue in the exercise of our interestofjustice jurisdiction (see People vSteward, 193 AD3d 888, 889 [2021]; see generally People v Nieves, 2NY3d at317).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Duffy, MalteseandGenovesi, JJ., concur.