| People v DiTore |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 05541 [209 AD3d 665] |
| October 5, 2022 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Appellant, v Anthony DiTore, Respondent. |
Anne T. Donnelly, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Cristin N. Connell and DanielBresnahan of counsel), for appellant.
Barket Epstein Kearon Aldea & LoTurco, LLP, Mineola, NY (DanielleMuscatello and Donna Aldea of counsel), for respondent.
Appeals by the People from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Felice J. Muraca, J.), entered March 17, 2021, and (2) an amended order of the samecourt entered March 22, 2021, which granted, without a hearing, the defendant's motionpursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of the same court (Philip Grella, J.)rendered February 3, 2011, convicting him of driving while intoxicated in violation ofVehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), driving while intoxicated in violationof Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), aggravated unlicensed operation ofa motor vehicle in the third degree, and speeding, upon his plea of guilty, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed, as that order was superseded bythe amended order; and it is further,
Ordered that the amended order is reversed, on the law, the defendant's motionpursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment rendered February 3, 2011, is denied, theorder is vacated, and the judgment is reinstated.
On December 1, 2010, the defendant appeared before the Supreme Court andpleaded guilty to various offenses in connection with an alleged instance of his drivingunder the influence of alcohol. The court informed the defendant that, as a condition ofhis plea, "[y]our license and driving privileges will be revoked for one year." Thedefendant indicated that he understood. The defendant then admitted that, on June 4,2010, in Bethpage, Nassau County, he drove a motor vehicle at an unreasonable speed,while intoxicated, and while his driver license was suspended. In a judgment renderedFebruary 3, 2011, the defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated in violationof Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), driving while intoxicated inviolation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), aggravated unlicensedoperation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, and speeding, and he was sentenced inaccordance with his plea.
In September 2012, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafterthe DMV) adopted regulations found at 15 NYCRR 136.5 (a) (3) and (b) (2). By letterdated December 4, 2012, the DMV informed the defendant that pursuant to thoseregulations, and in light [*2]of his history ofalcohol-related driving convictions or incidents, his application to reinstate his driverlicense was denied.
On September 22, 2020, the defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate thejudgment rendered February 3, 2011, on the ground that the Supreme Court failed toinform him that pleading guilty could result in the permanent revocation of his driverlicense and, thus, his right to due process was violated. In support of the motion, thedefendant submitted his own affidavit, in which he stated, "I was never advised, either bythe court, or by my attorneys that my conviction would actually cause my driver's licenseto be permanently revoked. Instead, both the court and my attorney specifically advisedme that my driver's license would be revoked for one year, and that after the one-yearperiod, I would be able to re-apply for my license." The defendant stated that he wouldnot have pleaded guilty if he had known that his plea of guilty would have led to thepermanent loss of his driver license, and he would have taken his chances at trial. Thedefendant also stated that he had joined a class action lawsuit challenging the validity ofthe subject regulations, which reached the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appealsultimately upheld the validity of the subject regulations (see Matter of Acevedo v New YorkState Dept. of Motor Vehs., 29 NY3d 202 [2017]).
The People opposed the motion on the ground that the Supreme Court had noobligation to explain to the defendant that his plea of guilty could result in the permanentloss of his driver license, since, inter alia, the subject regulations did not exist at the timethe defendant pleaded guilty.
In an amended order entered March 22, 2021, the Supreme Court granted thedefendant's motion to vacate the judgment, vacated the defendant's plea of guilty, anddirected that the matter be restored to the trial calendar. The People appeal.
The Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant's motion to vacate the judgmenton the ground that his due process rights were violated. The subject regulations that ledto the denial of the defendant's application to restore his driver license did not exist at thetime he pleaded guilty, and the defendant failed to identify any conduct that occurredduring the plea proceedings that constituted a violation of his due process rights (see People v Avital, 64 Misc3d 483 [East Fishkill Just Ct 2019]; People v Wheaton, 49 Misc 3d 378 [Seneca County Ct2015]). "The defendant's grievance lies with the enactment and enforcement of the newregulation, not the manner of his conviction" (People v Wheaton, 49 Misc 3d at379).
Moreover, the loss of a driver license is a collateral consequence of a plea of guiltyand is not a consequence within the control of the court system (see People v Peque, 22 NY3d168, 185 [2013]). The Supreme Court had no duty to inform the defendant of thisconsequence during the plea colloquy (see People v Garraway, 144 AD3d 703 [2016]). As theCourt of Appeals stated in Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of MotorVehs. (29 NY3d at 220), "the Commissioner [of the DMV] will have exclusiveauthority over post-revocation relicensing, and . . . those relicensingdeterminations will be discretionary."
Furthermore, the instant record does not contain a promise from the Supreme Courtthat the defendant would definitely get his driver license back following the one-yearrevocation. The court informed the defendant simply that "[y]our license and drivingprivileges will be revoked for one year." The defendant himself stated in his affidavit thathe was told that, "after the one-year period, I would be able to re-apply for my license."There was no promise that the defendant's driver license would be automaticallyreinstated following the one-year revocation.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion pursuantto CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment. Connolly, J.P., Rivera, Dowling and Voutsinas,JJ., concur.