| Harrison v Westview Partners, LLC |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 08826 [79 AD3d 1198] |
| December 2, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Maria J. Harrison et al., Appellants, v Westview Partners, LLC,et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Coughlin & Gerhart, L.L.P., Binghamton (Oliver N. Blaise, III of counsel), for Westview Partners,LLC and another, respondents. Michael A. Yehl, Ithaca, for Jay Orear, respondent.
Spain, J.P. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (O'Shea, J.), entered September 16,2009 in Tompkins County, which, among other things, denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminaryinjunction, and (2) from an order of said court, entered January 6, 2010 in Tompkins County, which,among other things, upon reargument, adhered to its prior order.
In this action, we are called upon to decide whether a covenant to provide and maintain a waterline under and along property owned by defendant Westview Partners, LLC in the Town of Lansing,Tompkins County for the benefit of plaintiffs' parcels, runs with the land and, thus, is binding onWestview and defendant Boris Simkin, sole owner of Westview, as successors in interest to the originalcovenantor.
Plaintiffs are neighboring landowners who receive their water from the water line at issue. Thesubject line begins at the municipal water line running along the state highway, which is accessible fromWestview's property but not plaintiffs', passes underground through Westview's land and leads to adistribution box from which each plaintiff maintains a private line that delivers water into his or herhome. There is no water district directly accessible to plaintiffs [*2]fromwhich they can maintain their own direct water lines. Westview—like plaintiffs or plaintiffs'predecessors in title—acquired its property from defendant Jay Orear.
Initially, Orear owned a 45-acre parcel of land and sold the first of the three lots now owned byplaintiffs in the late 1970s to plaintiff Joann H. Beischer. In that deed, Orear covenanted "to provide,maintain, repair and replace when necessary an adequate water main and distribution system formunicipal water service" and "not to impair or decrease the amount or pressure of waterprovided."[FN1]Plaintiff Maria Harrison, who purchased her property from Carol Kammen, was promised "[r]ights toan adequate water main and distribution system for municipal water service" restated as described inKammen's deed from Orear, which was virtually identical to that of Beischer. The last lot at issue wasowned by Orear's ex-wife, Virginia Watts, and is now held in trust by plaintiff Peter Sayet, as trusteefor the Virginia Watts Revocable Trust. The deed from Orear to Watts is silent on the issue ofwater.[FN2]
For years after these transfers, Orear fulfilled his promises to maintain the water line in good repair.In 2005 and 2007, Orear sold the rest of his original parcel (hereinafter the Westview lots) toWestview in two conveyances. Contained within the 2005 deed to Westview was Orear's promise to"retain responsibility for the maintenance, upkeep and payment for all utilities associated with the watermeter currently located on the premises conveyed herein until such a time as the water system isreplaced by a water main through the property to service properties located to the west." The 2007deed imposed similar obligations on Orear, but such obligations were set to terminate at the earlier oftwo years from the execution of the deed or the construction of a new water main by Westview. As thedate for termination of Orear's obligation as described in the 2007 deed neared, Westview sent aproposal to plaintiffs whereby the parties would share the expense of installing a new water main. Atone point in 2009, Simkin shut the water off to force discussion of the issue. No agreement wasreached.
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in July 2009 seeking, among other things, preliminary andpermanent injunctions to restrict Westview and Simkin from interfering with the flow of water to theirresidences and to enforce the affirmative covenant to "provide, maintain, repair and replace whennecessary an adequate water main" as against Westview, Simkin and/or Orear. Supreme Court deniedplaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and adhered to that decision after reargument. Plaintiffsappeal from both the original order denying the preliminary injunction and the order after reargument,and we now reverse.
Supreme Court declined to issue a preliminary injunction because it found that defendants could notmake the requisite showing of "a probability of success on the merits" (Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Hous.,Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]; see CPLR 6301). This finding was premised onSupreme Court's conclusion that the covenants contained within the deeds did not run with the land but,rather, were personal covenants binding only on Orear as the covenantor and not on subsequentowners such as Westview.
It is well settled that "affirmative covenants may be enforced against subsequent holders of theoriginally burdened land whenever it appears that (1) the original covenantor and covenantee intendedsuch a result; (2) there has been a continuous succession of conveyances between the originalcovenantor and the party now sought to be burdened; and (3) the covenant touches or concerns theland to a substantial degree" (Nicholson v 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 NY2d 240, 245[1959]; see Neponsit Prop. Owners' Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY 248, 255[1938]; Johnson v Nisbet, 68 AD3d1333, 1336 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 704 [2010]). The second prong of thetest—privity of estate—is not in dispute here. Hence, we must determine whether Orearand the original grantees intended for the covenant to run with the land and, if so, whether this covenant"touches or concerns" the land to a substantial degree.
In ascertaining intent at the time that the covenant was created, we turn first to the language of thedeed (see Brody v St. Onge, 167 AD2d 671, 672-673 [1990]; Clarke v Caldwell,132 AD2d 171, 173 [1987]). In two of the deeds originally executed by Orear, there is languageimmediately preceding the covenant language which expresses intent that the promise be binding on thesellers as well as their heirs and assigns. Although not necessarily dispositive, this clear language isstrong evidence that the grantor and grantees intended that the covenants would run with the land(see Brody v St. Onge, 167 AD2d at 673).
In addition, we find ample evidence of intent from the circumstances in existence at the time thecovenants were created that also support the conclusion that they were intended to run with the land.The benefitted parcels have no source of water other than through the Westview lots; indeed, becauseplaintiffs' lots are positioned along the edge of a gorge, the prospect of drilling a productive well is poorat best. Further, when defendant Town of Lansing approved Orear's subdivision plan in the 1970s, itimplicitly relied on the continuing obligation of the owner of the property with access to the municipalwater main—Orear at the time—to provide a water line for the service of the three lots,now owned by plaintiffs, so that each lot owner "would be permitted to hook up [his or her] propertyfor water . . . through a central box." Finally, it is significant that the covenant to maintainthe line is expressly limited—in the 1984 deed to Kammen—by the language "until theobligation to maintain same is taken over by a municipal water system." That this promise was intendedto end should the municipality provide a direct line of water to the benefitted parcels evinces an intentthat the covenant would exist until it was no longer necessary (cf. Sync Realty Group, Inc. v Rotterdam Ventures, Inc., 63 AD3d 1429,1431 [2009]).
We do not view Orear's agreements in 2005 and 2007 to continue to maintain the waterline asevidence of Orear's intention for the covenants to be personal. Indeed, Orear's promises to Westviewto continue maintaining the waterline would have been meaningless unless Westview had becomeburdened by the existing covenants when it purchased the land. Likewise, Westview's reliance on thefact that the covenants could expire should municipal water become directly available is unavailing; acovenant need not be permanent to run with the land (see 328 Owners Corp. v 330 W. 86 Oaks Corp., 8 NY3d 372, 384[2007]; Booth v Knipe, 225 NY 390, 396 [1919]). In fact, the Court of Appeals has voicedthe opposite, stating that where a covenant contains no outside limitation on its duration, it may "fall[ ]prey to the criticism that it creates a [*3]burden in perpetuity, andpurports to bind all future owners, regardless of the use to which the land is put" (Eagle Enters. vGross, 39 NY2d 505, 510 [1976]).
Finding, therefore, that Orear and the original grantees intended for the covenant to run with theland, we turn to the question of whether the covenant substantially touches or concerns the land. "[A]covenant should be held to touch or concern the land, to run with the land, if it affects 'the legalrelations—the advantages and the burdens—of the parties to the covenant, as owners ofparticular parcels of land and not merely as members of the community in general, such as taxpayers orowners of other land' " (Nicholson v 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 NY2d at 245, quotingNeponsit Prop. Owners' Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY at 257; see Johnsonv Nisbet, 68 AD3d at 1336). Significantly, "whether a particular covenant is sufficiently connectedwith the use of the land to run with the land, must be in many cases a question of degree" (NeponsitProp. Owners' Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY at 258), "dependent on the particularcircumstances of a case" (Eagle Enters. v Gross, 39 NY2d at 510).
Here, we find that the covenants requiring maintenance of the water line and prohibiting interferencewith water distribution "substantially alter" the "legal rights which otherwise would flow from ownershipof land and which are connected with the land" and, thus, touch or concern the land (see NeponsitProp. Owners' Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY at 258). In particular, our decision issupported by Nicholson v 300 Broadway Realty Corp. (7 NY2d 240 [1959], supra),where the Court of Appeals held that a covenant to furnish heat and maintain pipes for that purpose forthe benefit of a building on a neighboring property touched or concerned the land because it impactedthe legal relations of the parties to the covenant as owners of particular parcels of land (id. at246). Here, in 1975 the Town of Lansing relied upon the covenants in question in allowing Orear tosubdivide plaintiffs' lots, plaintiffs' use of their lots is dependent upon the water line and, given that theline runs under Westview's property, the servient parcel is also directly impacted by the covenant.Hence, we hold that the legal rights stemming from the ownership of the parties' properties aresubstantially altered because of the covenants and, therefore, the covenants touch and concern the land(see 328 Owners Corp. v 330 W. 86 Oaks Corp., 8 NY3d at 384; Nicholson v 300Broadway Realty Corp., 7 NY2d at 245-246; see also City of New York v Delafield 246Corp., 236 AD2d 11, 25-26 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 811 [1998]; cf. Johnson vNisbet, 68 AD3d at 1336).
Given our conclusion that plaintiffs can demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as againstWestview and Simkin, the matter should be remitted to Supreme Court for consideration of the otherfactors necessary to the grant of a preliminary injunction (see CPLR 6301; Nobu NextDoor, LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d at 840).
Kavanagh, Stein, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are reversed, onthe law and facts, with costs, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings notinconsistent with this Court's decision.
Footnote 1: This covenant was restated in adeed conveying the property from Beischer to plaintiff Tompkins Trust Company, as trustee of theSecond Restated Trust Agreement for Joann H. Beischer.
Footnote 2: Inasmuch as a single water linefurnishes water to a common distribution box, the relief requested is not divisible between plaintiffs and,accordingly, we need not address the significance, if any, of the omission of the covenant from thisdeed.