| Matter of County of Sullivan (Fay) |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 09318 [79 AD3d 1409] |
| December 16, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Foreclosure of Tax Liens by County of Sullivan.County of Sullivan, Respondent; Judith Ann Fay et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Samuel S. Yasgur, County Attorney, Monticello (Karen Mannino of counsel), forrespondent.
Spain, J. Appeal from an order of the County Court of Sullivan County (LaBuda, J.), enteredAugust 11, 2009, which, in a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 11, denied respondents' motion tovacate a default judgment entered against them.
The subject of this dispute is a large improved tract of land in the Town of Delaware, SullivanCounty. The property was acquired by respondent Judith Ann Fay—a resident of Las Vegas,Nevada—in 2005. Pursuant to a 2006 settlement agreement with respondent Phillip DeAngelodesigned to resolve certain disputes and terminate several business relationships betweenthem,[FN1]Fay agreed to transfer the property to DeAngelo. Although the transfer was never actually executed,DeAngelo began maintaining and renovating the property and holds himself out as the beneficial owner.In May 2008, DeAngelo submitted a check to petitioner marked "for 2007 taxes" with the property'stax identification number, but petitioner returned it [*2]to him as it didnot cover the total amount of taxes due on the property for 2007. DeAngelo re-sent this check the nextmonth, along with another check marked as payment for the 2008 taxes on the property. Together, thechecks totaled the amount necessary for payment of the 2008 taxes in full and were so applied. The2007 taxes on the property remained unpaid, prompting petitioner to commence this proceeding toforeclose tax liens in October 2008. Despite efforts to notify Fay of the pending foreclosure,respondents never answered the petition or otherwise sought to rectify the tax delinquency. Thus,petitioner sought, and was awarded, a default judgment of foreclosure that was entered in February2009.
Respondents assert that they did not learn of the delinquency and foreclosure until April 2009, aftersomeone DeAngelo had sent to routinely check on the property discovered a notice posted bypetitioner indicating that the property had been seized. Respondents thereafter moved by order to showcause to, among other things, vacate the default judgment and allow respondents to reacquire the lot.County Court denied respondents' motion and respondents now appeal.[FN2]
We affirm, as respondents' motion to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure was untimely.According to RPTL 1131, "[a] motion to reopen [a default judgment of foreclosure] may not bebrought later than one month after entry of the judgment" (see Matter of County of Sullivan [Spring Lake Retreat Ctr., Inc.], 39 AD3d1095, 1095-1096 [2007]; Matter ofCounty of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 81 [2006]; Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens by County of Clinton [Tupaz], 17 AD3d914, 915 [2005]). Here, the judgment was entered in February 2009, yet respondents did notmove to vacate until July 2009. Thus, respondents' motion was untimely and should have been deniedon that basis.
Respondents' assertions that the limitations period to move to vacate never commenced runningbecause respondents were not given adequate notice under RPTL 1125 and, in accordance with dueprocess, are unavailing. By statute, petitioner was required to direct notice by mail only to Fay,inasmuch as neither DeAngelo's equitable interest in the property nor his name and address wasascertainable from the public record (see RPTL 1125 [1] [a]).[FN3]Petitioner mailed notices by first class and certified mail to both the property's address and to Fay at"567 Radwich Drive" in Las Vegas. That address was obtained from a real property transferform which, as it appears in the record, is barely legible; unfortunately, Fay's correct Las Vegas [*3]address is "567 Radwick Drive." After the notice was returnedmarked "attempted-not known" and "not deliverable as addressed unable to forward," petitioner sentan inquiry to the relevant Las Vegas post office seeking an alternative address for Fay, but the inquirywent unanswered (see RPTL 1125 [1] [b] [i]). A similar inquiry to the local post officecovering the address of the property produced no new information. Because no alternative mailingaddress could be found, petitioner posted the notice at the property itself (see RPTL 1125 [1][b] [iii]; [1] [c]). In addition, petitioner posted notices in a variety of government offices and post officesand complied with the statutory publication requirement by publishing notices in two local newspapers(see RPTL 1124). Accordingly, petitioner's efforts were in accordance with RTPL article 11(see Matter of Harner v County of Tioga,5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]).
Petitioner's efforts also complied with the requirements of due process, which are "satisfied where'notice [is] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of thependency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections' " (id. at 140,quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]). Dueprocess does not require actual notice by the property owner, only reasonable efforts to provide noticeunder the circumstances (see Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d at 83).Where, as here, petitioner fully complied with the notice requirements of RPTL article 11 and there isno evidence that a search of the public record would have yielded any further information, due processdoes not require petitioner to go to lengths beyond the inquiry, publication and posting measures takenhere (see Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 10 [2003]; Matter of County of Broome, 50 AD3d 1300, 1301-1302 [2008];Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d at 83; see also Jones v Flowers,547 US 220, 235-236 [2006]).
Respondents assert that the notice posted on the property was defective because the date specifiedin the petition for redemption of the property (January 31, 2009) was not at least 30 days later than thedate on which the notice was posted (allegedly between January 5 and January 12). This argument,however, was not preserved. In any event, the argument lacks merit inasmuch as RPTL 1125 does notrequire the posting to be at least 30 days before the specified final date for redemption. Instead, thestatute provides that the relevant person may either redeem the property or serve an answer "until eitherthe thirtieth day after such posting or delivery, or the date specified by the notice of foreclosureas the last day for redemption, whichever is later" (RPTL 1125 [1] [b] [iii] [emphases added]).Even if the posting was not accomplished until January 12, respondents admittedly did not act within 30days.
Given that respondents' motion was untimely, consideration of respondents' remaining contentionsis not necessary, including allegations that petitioner did not comply with petitioner's repurchaseprogram notification requirements (see Code of the County of Sullivan § 164-8 [B] [6])and that the amount of the lien was erroneously omitted from petitioner's list of 2007 tax liens.
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Kavanagh and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote 1: Respondents were involved in along-term romantic relationship and also shared a variety of business and property interests.
Footnote 2: As an initial matter, we rejectpetitioner's argument that dismissal is necessary because respondents failed to include in the appellaterecord either a transcript of the oral argument on respondents' motion to vacate the default judgment ora statement in lieu of the transcript pursuant to CPLR 5525 (d) (see CPLR 5526; Matter ofConklin v Rogers, 98 AD2d 918 [1983], lv granted 61 NY2d 608 [1984]). As nomaterial factual issues are in dispute and it appears that no evidence was presented at the hearing, therecord before the Court is sufficient to review the parties' legal arguments (see Personnel Sys. Intl. vClifford R. Gray, Inc., 146 AD2d 831, 832 [1989]).
Footnote 3: The settlement agreement thatpurportedly granted DeAngelo equitable title to the property was not recorded.