Matter of Sabino v DiNapoli
2011 NY Slip Op 09244 [90 AD3d 1392]
December 22, 2011
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 1, 2012


In the Matter of Anthony J. Sabino, Appellant,
v
ThomasP. DiNapoli, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]DeGraff, Foy & Kunz, L.L.P., Albany (James W. Roemer Jr. of Roemer, Wallens, Gold& Mineaux, L.L.P., of counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), forrespondents.

Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), entered April 18,2011 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, grantedrespondents' motion to dismiss the petition.

Petitioner, an attorney admitted to practice in New York, was employed by the Town ofOyster Bay, Nassau County for various periods of time between 1965 and 2001. Since October1989, he has also held the part-time position of counsel to the Bethpage Water District in NassauCounty and, for at least part of that time, he also had a private law practice. During the course ofhis employment with both the Town and the Water District, petitioner was reported as anemployee to respondent New York State and Local Retirement System.

In 2008, respondent Comptroller promulgated regulations for the Retirement System toprovide guidance as to whether employers should classify professional service providers asemployees or as independent contractors (see 2 NYCRR 315.3 [c]). Previously, suchdetermination had been guided by the employer's consideration of several common-law factors,[*2]which were set forth in a "Financial Management Guide"issued by the Comptroller in 1992. Here, after reviewing petitioner's status with respect to hisemployment with the Water District, respondent Deputy Comptroller determined in August 2010that petitioner was an independent contractor and revoked a portion of his service credits in theRetirement System. The Deputy Comptroller's determination was expressly based upon sevenfactors, all of which were consistent with the 2008 regulations. Petitioner [have] advised that hewas entitled to an administrative hearing if he wished to contest the determination. In addition torequesting such a hearing,[FN1] petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, seeking an order annullingthe Deputy Comptroller's determination.

Petitioner argues that respondents violated his rights under article V, § 7 of the NYConstitution and the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution by retroactively applying newstandards and factors that were not in effect at the time he became a member of the RetirementSystem.[FN2] Respondents moved, pre-answer, to dismiss the petition based upon petitioner's failure toexhaust his administrative remedies. Supreme Court rejected petitioner's assertions that he wasexcused from the exhaustion requirement because he raised constitutional issues and that pursuitof available administrative remedies would be futile because he cannot factually dispute thefactors enumerated in support of the Deputy Comptroller's determination. Accordingly, SupremeCourt granted respondents' motion, without prejudice, and this appeal ensued.

We affirm. It is well settled that a party seeking to challenge the action of an administrativeagency must first exhaust available administrative remedies (see Watergate II Apts. v BuffaloSewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; Matter of Connor v Town of Niskayuna, 82 AD3d 1329, 1330[2011]; Swergold v Cuomo, 70 AD3d at 1293). Although the exhaustion requirementmay be excused when, for example, a party asserts a constitutional challenge to an agency'saction or "when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile" (Watergate II Apts. vBuffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d at 57; see Matter of Connerton v Ryan, 86 AD3d 698, 699 [2011]), "themere assertion that a constitutional right is involved will not excuse the failure to pursueestablished administrative procedures that can provide adequate relief" (Matter of Pfaff vColumbia-Greene Community Coll., 99 AD2d 887, 888 [1984]; see Matter of Schulz vState of New York, 86 NY2d 225, 232 [1995], cert denied 516 US 944 [1995]).Thus, for instance, "[a] constitutional claim that may require the resolution of factual issuesreviewable at the administrative level should initially be addressed to the administrative agencyhaving responsibility so that the necessary factual record can be established" (Matter ofSchulz v State of New York, 86 NY2d at 232; accord Matter of Finch, Pruyn & Co. vKearns, 282 AD2d 858, 859 [2001]).[*3]

Here, even assuming that the Deputy Comptroller appliedthe 2008 regulation to determine petitioner's status, a factual issue remains as to whether theregulation represents a meaningful and substantial change in the policy of the Retirement Systemor was merely the codification of existing policy. Such a determination, which involvesinterpretation of the Retirement System's own regulations, is best left in the first instance to theadministrative agency "so that a clearer formulation of and the rationales for agency policy maybe fully aired" (Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 87 NY2d 136, 143 [1995]; see Matter of Hakeem v Wong, 223 AD2d765, 766 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 802 [1996]; Matter of Grattan v Department ofSocial Servs. of State of N.Y., 131 AD2d 191, 193-195 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d616 [1988]). Nor is there anything in the record "which clearly indicates that respondent[s][have] predetermined the issue . . . or [have] construed the relevant regulation in away that would dictate an adverse result of an administrative hearing. Hence, petitioner has failedto make the requisite showing that pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile"(Matter of Grattan v Department of Social Servs. of State of N.Y., 131 AD2d at 193).Supreme Court, therefore, properly granted respondents' motion to dismiss the petition, withoutprejudice.

Petitioner's remaining contentions have been considered and are unavailing.

Mercure, A.P.J., Peters, Malone Jr. and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: At petitioner's request, thehearing was adjourned pending the resolution of this litigation.

Footnote 2: The application of the 2008regulations to individuals, such as petitioner, who were already enrolled in the RetirementSystem has been the subject of much litigation (see Matter of Hoover v DiNapoli, 75 AD3d 875, 875 n 1 [2010]; Matter of D'Agostino v DiNapoli, 70AD3d 1285 [2010]; Swergold vCuomo, 70 AD3d 1290 [2010]; Matter of Roemer v Cuomo, 67 AD3d 1169 [2009]; Matter of Hogan v Cuomo, 67 AD3d1144 [2009]).


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