| Matter of Mallery v Shah |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01542 [93 AD3d 936] |
| March 1, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of M. Paula Mallery, Petitioner, v Nirav R. Shah, asCommissioner of Health, Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of counsel), forrespondent.
Stein, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of theSupreme Court, entered in Broome County) to review a determination of respondent which foundpetitioner ineligible for Medicaid benefits for a certain period of time.
After falling in her home in March 2009, petitioner was admitted to a skilled nursing facilitywhich applied for Medicaid on her behalf. The Broome County Department of Social Services(hereinafter DSS) ultimately found petitioner ineligible for nursing home coverage for a penaltyperiod of approximately 19 months based upon transfers of assets for less than fair market valueto petitioner's friend and attorney-in-fact, Ron Stanton, within the 60-month "look-back" periodunder Social Services Law § 366 (5) (e) (1) (vi). Respondent affirmed that determinationafter a fair hearing. Petitioner then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78asserting that respondent's determination was arbitrary and capricious and affected by an error oflaw or, alternatively, was not supported by substantial evidence. After finding that respondent'sdetermination was not affected by an error of law, Supreme Court (Tait, J.) transferred theproceeding to this Court (see CPLR 7804 [g]).[*2]
We confirm. In reviewing a Medicaid eligibilitydetermination rendered after a hearing, this Court must "review the record, as a whole, todetermine if the agency's decisions are supported by substantial evidence and are not affected byan error of law" (Matter of Campbell vCommissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 14 AD3d 766, 768 [2005]; accord Matter of Loiacono v Demarzo,72 AD3d 969, 969 [2010]; Matterof Rogers v Novello, 26 AD3d 580, 581 [2006]). Pursuant to Social Services Law§ 366 (5) (e) (3), "any transfer of an asset by [an] individual . . . for less thanfair market value made within or after the look-back period shall render the individual ineligiblefor nursing facility services." Petitioner bears the burden of proving eligibility (see Matter ofCampbell v Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 14 AD3d at 768). Specifically,petitioner must " 'rebut the presumption that the transfer of funds was motivated, in part if not inwhole, by . . . anticipation of a future need to qualify for medical assistance' "(Matter of Loiacono v Demarzo, 72 AD3d at 970, quoting Matter of Carter vBrandwein, 182 AD2d 620, 621 [1992]; see Matter of Campbell v Commissioner of N.Y.State Dept. of Health, 14 AD3d at 767). Thus, unless a petitioner is able to show that atransfer of assets falls within a statutory or regulatory exception, such transfer for less than fairmarket value will result in a penalty period of ineligibility (see Matter of Rogers vNovello, 26 AD3d at 581).
Here, petitioner concedes that she transferred certain assets during the 60-month "look-back"period immediately preceding the date she entered a nursing home and applied for medicalassistance benefits (see Social Services Law § 366 [5] [e] [1] [vi]; [3]). However,she asserts that all such transactions fall within the scope of a statutory exception in that theassets were "transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical assistance"(Social Services Law § 366 [5] [e] [4] [iii] [B]), namely, as an estate planning tool. Uponour review of the record, we find that respondent's determination to the contrary was supportedby substantial evidence.
At the fair hearing, DSS presented evidence that most of the assets in question consisted ofbank accounts held jointly by petitioner and Stanton from which Stanton had written countlesschecks and made numerous substantial withdrawals in 2007 and 2008. The record also reflectsthat Stanton had been made a joint tenant of petitioner's residence with a right of survivorshipand that petitioner retained a life estate therein. Stanton testified that he became petitioner'sattorney-in-fact prior to being named a joint owner of her accounts and that, over a period ofyears, he received many financial gifts from petitioner and made large withdrawals on her behalf.According to Stanton, petitioner wanted him to have the money and not only gave him unfetteredaccess to her accounts, but encouraged him to use it. Petitioner's counsel conceded that$141,410.12 of the funds that Stanton withdrew during the look-back period were foruncompensated value. However, counsel argued that petitioner had transferred the various assetsto Stanton because she was grateful for his friendship of over 40 years and wished to avoidprobate so that her relatives would be unable to challenge the disposition of her estate. Thisassertion was supported by the affidavit of petitioner's former estate planning attorney, whoalleged that petitioner had indicated to her in 2005 that she wished to leave her entire estate toStanton and that, when petitioner sought her advice in 2007 on how to avoid probate so that herrelatives would be unable to interfere with her estate plans, she advised her that she could do soby creating joint tenancies with Stanton.
Despite the existence of evidence that would support a contrary result, substantial evidencesupports respondent's determination that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that thesubject transfers were made, at least in part, for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid benefits(see Matter of Loiacono v Demarzo, 72 AD3d at 970; Matter of Campbell v [*3]Commissioner of N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 14 AD3d at 768).There is no evidence, other than Stanton's self-serving allegations, that the withdrawals he madefrom the joint accounts were, in fact, "gifts" from petitioner,[FN*] and the evidence demonstrated that Stanton was uncooperative in petitioner's eligibilityevaluation process and had failed to disclose the alleged monetary gifts from petitioner as anincome source on other unrelated applications for public assistance. Moreover, DSS establishedthat petitioner was elderly and she was diagnosed with senile dementia after her fall. No medicalevidence was presented regarding the state of petitioner's health prior to her admission to anursing home. Thus, the allegations of petitioner's estate planning attorney that petitioner was ingood health and had no intention of ever entering a nursing care facility were unsubstantiated.We defer to DSS's assessment of the witnesses' credibility (see Matter of Cullen v New YorkState Dept. of Social Servs., 155 AD2d 857, 857 [1989]; see generally Matter ofBerenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436, 443 [1987]; Matter of Bello v New York State Off. of Temporary & DisabilityAssistance, 90 AD3d 1706, 1707 [2011]) and discern no basis to disturb itsdetermination here.
We also find that respondent's determination was not affected by an error of law. Pursuant toSocial Services Law § 366 (5) (e) (6), all of the transfers carried out by Stanton areattributed to petitioner for purposes of determining her eligibility for Medicaid benefits,regardless of whether she was suffering from senile dementia prior to her admission to thenursing home. Thus, petitioner's argument that the transfers of assets were made by Stanton forhis own personal gain, rather than by petitioner in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits, isunavailing.
We have considered petitioner's remaining contention and, to the extent that it is properlybefore us, find it to be without merit.
Peters, J.P., Lahtinen, Kavanagh and Garry, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote *: We note that the AdministrativeLaw Judge questioned petitioner at the nursing home in the presence of counsel for the partiesand that such questioning was recorded. Based on petitioner's answers, the Administrative LawJudge determined that petitioner could not render any competent testimony with regard toStanton.