| Dutcher v Allen |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02359 [93 AD3d 1101] |
| March 29, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Raymond G. Dutcher Jr. et al., Respondents, v Edith E. HockinAllen, Appellant. |
—[*1] David A. Harper, Saratoga Springs, for respondents.
Stein, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), entered January 27,2011 in Saratoga County, which denied defendant's cross motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint.
Plaintiffs and defendant own adjacent parcels of land (hereinafter lot 8 and lot 7,respectively). Defendant obtained lot 7 in 1989 by deed from her parents, who had purchased thelot from Florence Holton in 1938. In the 1938 conveyance, Holton "reserve[d] the right to thewesterly twenty-five (25) feet of said [lot 7] as a roadway from the unnamed road on North to[lot 8]." The deed further specified that the roadway (hereinafter the right-of-way) was to be usedfor ingress and egress only. The same right-of-way is contained in defendant's deed.
It is undisputed that defendant has maintained obstructions—including, among otherthings, a retaining wall, stairs and an overhanging deck—within a portion of the 25-footright-of-way. In 2005, plaintiffs commenced this action seeking to permanently enjoin andrestrain defendant from interfering with plaintiffs' free use of the right-of-way. In their complaint,plaintiffs sought, as relevant here, a declaration establishing their interest in the right-of-way,money damages for defendant's trespass thereon and a permanent injunction restrainingdefendant from, among other things, interfering with the use of the right-of-way, placing anyobstruction within its bounds and building or maintaining any structure or improvement thereon.In her answer, defendant asserted various affirmative defenses including, among others,extinguishment of the easement by abandonment and/or adverse possession, and interposed acounterclaim seeking an injunction preventing plaintiffs from using any portion of the [*2]right-of-way. Defendant also cross-moved for summary judgmentdetermining the parties' rights with respect to the right-of-way.
In a 2005 order referring to plaintiffs' order to show cause and to defendant's cross motion,Supreme Court found that an easement appurtenant was created by Holton and that it ran with theland. The court, therefore, enjoined defendant from parking vehicles on the right-of-way,interfering with plaintiffs' use of the right-of-way and placing any obstruction within the boundsof the right-of-way. The court also denied defendant's cross motion for summary judgment.Defendant did not appeal from that order. Thereafter, in 2007, plaintiffs moved for an order ofcontempt based upon defendant's failure to remove the obstructions from the right-of-waypursuant to the 2005 order. Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment on her abandonmentand/or adverse possession affirmative defenses as to a portion of the right-of-way, and such crossmotion was denied.[FN1]This appeal by defendant ensued.
We agree with Supreme Court's determination that defendant was not entitled to summaryjudgment. As to defendant's claim that at least a portion of plaintiffs' easement was extinguished,it is well settled that an easement burdening land continues to pass with the dominant estateunless extinguished by, among other things, abandonment or adverse possession (see Will vGates, 89 NY2d 778, 784 [1997]; Gerbig v Zumpano, 7 NY2d 327, 330 [1960]; Janoff v Disick, 66 AD3d 963,967 [2009]; Arthur J. Quesnel Family Trust v Harstedt, 285 AD2d 704, 705 [2001]).Nonuse, alone, does not constitute abandonment; the party asserting abandonment must show anintention to abandon the easement, as demonstrated by an overt act or failure to act that impliesthat the owner does not claim any interest in the easement (see Janoff v Disick, 66 AD3dat 966; Gold v Di Cerbo, 41 AD3d1051, 1053 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 811 [2007]). Under long recognized rules, "inorder to extinguish an easement by adverse possession, a party is required to 'establish that theuse of the easement has been adverse to the owner of the easement, under a claim of right, openand notorious, exclusive and continuous for a period of 10 years' " (Gold v Di Cerbo, 41AD3d at 1054, quoting Spiegel v Ferraro, 73 NY2d 622, 625 [1989]; see Zeledon vMacGillivray, 263 AD2d 904, 905 [1999]).
Here, even assuming that defendant met her initial burden of demonstrating either plaintiffs'abandonment of a portion of the right-of-way or defendant's adverse possession thereof, plaintiffshave raised material questions of fact that preclude an award of summary judgment. It isundisputed that plaintiffs and their lessees have regularly used a portion of the right-of-way as ameans of ingress and egress. Although defendant offered some evidence that a stone retainingwall was installed in the 1950s which rendered at least a 10 to 15-foot portion of the right-of-wayunusable for ingress or egress by motor vehicle, plaintiffs alleged that it was not until defendantconstructed a wooden retaining wall in or about 2004 that a portion of the right-of-way becameunusable. Likewise, plaintiffs alleged that defendant's deck and stairs did not significantlyobstruct the right-of-way until defendant extended the deck in 2004. This action was commencedin 2005. Accordingly, questions of fact remain that prevent a finding, as a matter of law, that anyportion of plaintiffs' easement was extinguished by either abandonment or adverse possession.[*3]
Defendant also argues that the 2005 order constituted apreliminary injunction and, therefore, plaintiffs should have been required to post an undertakingduring the pendency of this action (see CPLR 6312 [b]; Marietta Corp. v Pacific Direct, Inc., 9AD3d 815, 818 [2004]). Indeed, much of the parties' arguments on appeal revolve aroundthe issue of whether the 2005 order constituted a temporary injunction or a permanentinjunction.[FN2]It appears that this action was commenced simultaneously with an order to show cause which, inturn, was based upon the affidavit of plaintiff Raymond G. Dutcher Jr., as well as the summonsand complaint, with annexed exhibits. The order to show cause—which contained atemporary restraining order and was ultimately signed by Supreme Court—indicates that apermanent injunction was sought and Dutcher's affidavit states that it is in support of plaintiffs'application for an order to show cause and a temporary restraining order. The order to showcause did not specifically indicate that plaintiffs were seeking summary judgment and, given thevery preliminary stage of the action, defendant apparently believed that it only sought reliefduring the pendency of the action and, accordingly, that the 2005 order was intended to beinterlocutory.
Under all of the circumstances, Supreme Court would have had the authority to grantsummary judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the form of a permanent injunction, without thenecessity of a motion by plaintiffs explicitly requesting such relief (see CPLR 3212 [b];Brighton Inv., Ltd. v Har-Zvi, 88AD3d 1220, 1224 [2011]; compareMoore v Ruback's Grove Campers' Assn., Inc., 85 AD3d 1220, 1221 [2011]), despitethe fact that a permanent injunction is typically granted only after trial (see Moore v Ruback'sGrove Campers' Assn., Inc., 85 AD3d at 1221; Ryan v McLean, 209 AD2d 913, 914[1994]). Nonetheless, Supreme Court did not articulate [*4]that it"searched the record" (Brighton Inv., Ltd. v Har-Zvi, 88 AD3d at 1224; see Dickson v Slezak, 73 AD3d1249, 1250 n 3 [2010]; see also CPLR 3212 [b]) or otherwise indicate its intentionsas to the duration of the 2005 order. However, the language of the November 2008 orderreserving determination of plaintiffs' request for a direction that defendant remove certainencroachments from the right-of-way made clear that the 2005 order was not intended to be apermanent injunction. Thus, Supreme Court should have required plaintiffs to post anundertaking, and this matter must be remitted to Supreme Court so that it may fix the amountthereof, nunc pro tunc, and plaintiffs may post such undertaking (see Confidential Brokerage Servs., Inc. vConfidential Planning Corp., 85 AD3d 1268, 1270 [2011]; Putter v Singer, 73 AD3d 1147,1149 [2010]), as well as for any other appropriate further proceedings.
Peters, J.P., Lahtinen, Kavanagh and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified,on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as found that defendant was previouslyordered to remove certain objects that obstruct plaintiffs' easement and by adding a provisionthereto that plaintiffs shall post an undertaking as provided in CPLR 6312 (b); matter remitted tothe Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as somodified, affirmed.
Footnote 1: Plaintiffs' contempt motion wasnot addressed in the order now on appeal, and the record before us does not indicate whether anydetermination has been made thereon.
Footnote 2: They also argue about whetherthe 2005 order required defendant to remove the existing encroachments or simply required herto forebear from creating future obstructions. Notwithstanding defendant's failure to appeal the2005 order, we must necessarily review the parties' contentions in this regard in light ofdefendant's challenge to the language in the 2011 decision and order indicating that "[d]efendantwas ordered to remove the objects that obstruct the plaintiffs' easement in 2005 by this court."The 2005 order enjoined defendant from "parking vehicles in the right-of-way, interfering with. . . plaintiffs' use of the right[-]of[-]way, and placing any obstruction, barricade,cinder block or any other item within the bounds of the right-of-way." In our view, that languagecannot reasonably be interpreted as directing defendant to remove the existing deck or otherencroachments on the right-of-way, and Supreme Court's dictum in its 2011 order cannot alterthat result (see generally 28 NY Jur 2d, Courts and Judges § 213). This view issupported by the language of a November 2008 order amending the 2005 order, in whichSupreme Court stated that "plaintiff[s'] claim seeking the removal of defendant's property fromany part of the twenty-five (25) foot right[-]of[-]way shall be reserved pending decision onplaintiffs' motion for contempt and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment."