| Janoff v Disick |
| 2009 NY Slip Op 07800 [66 AD3d 963] |
| October 27, 2009 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Lori Janoff et al., Appellants, v Mae Disick,Respondent. |
—[*1]
In an action, inter alia, to compel the determination of claims to real property pursuant toRPAPL article 15, the plaintiffs appeal (1), as limited by their brief, from so much of an order ofthe Supreme Court, Westchester County (Smith, J.), dated July 2, 2008, as granted thosebranches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the secondcause of action alleging adverse possession and the third cause of action alleging abandonment,and denied those branches of their cross motion which were for summary judgment on thosecauses of action, and (2) from an order of the same court dated October 7, 2008, which deniedthat branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment on the first cause of action,among other things, for a judgment declaring, in effect, that the withholding of their consent tothe erection of a split-rail fence in the location proposed by the defendants is not unreasonable,and, upon searching the record, awarded summary judgment to the defendants, in effect,declaring that the plaintiffs' withholding of their consent is unreasonable.
Ordered that the order dated July 2, 2008, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisionthereof granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgmentdismissing the second cause of action alleging adverse possession and substituting therefor aprovision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order dated July 2, 2008, isaffirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated October 7, 2008, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements,and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings onthe second cause of action and, if warranted, the entry of a judgment in accordance herewithdeclaring that the plaintiffs' withholding of their consent to the erection of a split-rail fence in thelocation proposed by the defendants is unreasonable.
Since 1992, the plaintiffs, Lori Janoff and Peter Janoff (hereinafter the Janoffs), have ownedresidential property in Mamaroneck, abutting residential property owned by the defendant MaeDisick. Pursuant to a 1991 agreement (hereinafter the agreement), the Janoffs'predecessor-in-interest granted, to Disick and Disick's now-deceased husband (hereinaftertogether the Disicks), the right to the exclusive use and possession of a portion (hereinafter thegrant area) of what is now the Janoffs' real property. The agreement, which was recorded in theOffice of the County Clerk, Westchester County, in 1991, also authorized the Disicks to erect asplit-rail fence less than four feet high in the grant area, provided that the Disicks first obtainedthe permission of Janoffs' predecessor-in-interest, which permission could not be [*2]unreasonably withheld.
Disick notified the Janoffs in August 2007 that she intended to erect a split-rail fence in thegrant area, and the Janoffs commenced the instant action alleging, in part, that the proposedlocation of the fence was unreasonable and that, therefore, under the agreement, they couldwithhold their consent to its erection. They further alleged that Disick's interest in a portion ofthe grant area (hereinafter the disputed portion) was extinguished by abandonment or,alternatively, by adverse possession. Disick moved for summary judgment dismissing theabandonment and adverse possession causes of action, and the Janoffs cross-moved for summaryjudgment on those causes of action, as well as on the cause of action for a judgment declaringthat the withholding of their consent to the erection of the proposed fence is reasonable. In anorder dated July 2, 2008, the Supreme Court granted Disick's motion for summary judgment anddenied the Janoffs' cross motion for summary judgment as to the abandonment and adversepossession causes of action, and directed the parties to submit further evidence with respect tothe cause of action regarding the reasonableness of the Janoffs' withholding of their consent tothe erection of the fence. After further submissions, the Supreme Court, in an order datedOctober 7, 2008, denied that branch of the Janoffs' cross motion which was for summaryjudgment declaring that the withholding of their consent is reasonable and, upon searching therecord, awarded summary judgment to Disick, in effect, declaring that the Janoffs' withholdingof their consent is unreasonable. The Janoffs appeal from both orders.
The 1991 agreement created an easement appurtenant in the grant area of the Janoffs'property benefiting Disick's property (see Corrarino v Byrnes, 43 AD3d 421, 423 [2007]; Strnad vBrudnicki, 200 AD2d 735, 736 [1994]). An easement created by grant may be lost byabandonment (see Consolidated Rail Corp. v MASP Equip. Corp., 67 NY2d 35, 39[1986]), but abandonment does not result from nonuse alone, no matter how long, inasmuch asowners are not required to make use of their property (id.; see Koshian v Kirchner,139 AD2d 942, 942-943 [1988]; cf.Navin v Mosquera, 26 AD3d 556, 557 [2006]). Instead, abandonment occurs throughthe holder's nonuse, combined with the holder's intention to abandon. Moreover, the partyasserting abandonment must demonstrate such intention by clear and convincing evidence(see Consolidated Rail Corp. v MASP Equip. Corp., 67 NY2d at 39-40; 450 W. 14thSt. Corp. v 40-56 Tenth Ave., 298 AD2d 113, 114 [2002]). "The acts relied upon must beunequivocal, and must clearly demonstrate the owner's intention to permanently relinquish allrights to the easement" (Consolidated Rail Corp. v MASP Equip. Corp., 67 NY2d at 40;see Gerbig v Zumpano, 7 NY2d 327, 331 [1960]). Here, inasmuch as the record containsno evidence that Disick intended to abandon the easement, the Supreme Court properly awardedsummary judgment to her dismissing the abandonment cause of action. (See Navin vMosquera, 26 AD3d at 557-558; B.J. 96 Corp. v Mester, 222 AD2d 798, 800 [1995];Will v Gates, 254 AD2d 275, 276 [1998]).
The Supreme Court erred, however, in granting that branch of Disick's motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging that her easement in the disputedportion was extinguished by adverse possession. Specifically, the Supreme Court erred inholding that, as the title owner of the disputed portion, the Janoffs could not assert a claim foradverse possession (see Spiegel v Ferraro, 73 NY2d 622, 625 [1989]). Moreover, neitherthe Janoffs nor Disick were entitled to summary judgment on the cause of action allegingadverse possession. A party seeking to extinguish an easement by adverse possession mustestablish "that the use of the easement has been adverse to the owner of the easement, under aclaim of right, open and notorious, exclusive and continuous for a period of 10 years. . . Thus 'an easement may be lost by adverse possession if the owner or possessorof the servient estate claims to own it free from the private right of another, and excludes theowner of the easement, who acquiesces in the exclusion for [the prescriptive period]' "(Spiegel v Ferraro, 73 NY2d at 625-626, quoting Woodruff v Paddock, 130 NY618, 624 [1892] [citations omitted]). Here, there are triable issues of fact regarding the claim ofadverse possession, including whether the Janoffs' possession was under a claim of right (see Walling v Przybylo, 7 NY3d228, 230-233 [2006]; Merget vWestbury Props, LLC, 65 AD3d 1102 [2009]; Beyer v Patierno, 29 AD3d 613, 615 [2006]), or was with Disick'spermission (see Goldschmidt v Ford St.,LLC, 58 AD3d 803, 805 [2009]; Orsetti v Orsetti, 6 AD3d 683, 684 [2004]; Solow v Liebman,253 AD2d 808, 809 [1998]).
As to the order dated October 7, 2008, we agree with the Supreme Court that Disick'sproposed placement of the fence was reasonable and there is no basis upon which the Janoffscould reasonably withhold their consent to erection of the fence. Inasmuch as the Janoffs' firstcause of action, inter alia, sought a judgment declaring the rights of the parties, we remit thematter for further proceedings on the second cause of action and, if it is determined that adversepossession does not apply here, for the [*3]entry of a judgmentdeclaring that the Janoffs' withholding of their consent to the erection of the split-rail fence in thelocation proposed by Disick is unreasonable (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334[1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]; Willsey v Gjuraj, 65 AD3d 1228[2009]).
The Janoffs' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be addressed in lightof the foregoing determinations. Mastro, J.P., Fisher, Angiolillo and Leventhal, JJ., concur.