| Matter of Arthur v Soares |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 04255 [95 AD3d 1619] |
| May 31, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of D. Richard Arthur, Petitioner, v P. DavidSoares, as District Attorney of Albany County, Respondent. |
—[*1] Thomas Marcelle, County Attorney, Albany (John E. Maney of counsel), forrespondent.
Mercure, J.P. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order ofthe Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent whichterminated petitioner's employment.
Petitioner is the former Director of Administration in the office of respondent, the AlbanyCounty District Attorney. In April 2009, respondent suspended petitioner from that position withpay and, in June 2009, charged petitioner with misconduct, insubordination and incompetence.The charges alleged that petitioner delegated job responsibilities without authorization and failedto comply with a directive to resume those duties, misrepresented his job duties in a letter to theUnited States Department of Justice, and mismanaged financial transactions, therebyjeopardizing the District Attorney's office.[FN*] Respondent claims that he [*2]designated the Albany CountyCommissioner of Social Services to be the Hearing Officer in the Civil Service Law § 75disciplinary proceeding against petitioner. The Hearing Officer found petitioner guilty of thecharges and recommended termination, and respondent thereafter adopted that recommendation,prompting this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Because the record evinces that the Hearing Officerlacked jurisdiction, did not properly weigh the evidence, and failed to adequately detail thespecific factual findings and hearing evidence relied upon, we are constrained to annul thedetermination and reinstate petitioner to his position, with back pay and benefits.
Pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 (2), a hearing on employee disciplinary charges"shall be held by the officer or body having the power to remove the person against whom suchcharges are preferred, or by a . . . person designated by such officer or body inwriting for that purpose." It is well settled that absent "a written delegation authorizing a deputyor other person to conduct the hearing, the removing [body] or officer has no jurisdiction todiscipline an employee" (Matter of Wiggins v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d385, 387 [1983]; see Matter of Gardnerv Coxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 92 AD3d 1093, 1094 [2012]). ThisCourt has previously determined that the requirements of Civil Service Law § 75 (2) aresatisfied by a written record of such designation, such as the minutes of a board meeting at whicha resolution was adopted appointing the hearing officer, or a letter to the hearing officer advisinghim or her that the official designation has taken place (see Matter of Perryman v Village of Saranac Lake, 64 AD3d 830,832-833 [2009]; Matter of Stafford vBoard of Educ. of Mohonasen Cent. School Dist., 61 AD3d 1259, 1259-1260 [2009],lv denied 13 NY3d 704 [2009]; see also Matter of Salley v Hempstead SchoolDist., 121 AD2d 547, 548 [1986]); correspondence to the hearing officer that does notreference the official designation is insufficient, as is written notice to the petitioner of thehearing officer's identity (see Matter of Gardner v Coxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd.of Educ., 92 AD3d at 1094-1095; Matter of Pieczonka v Jewett, 273 AD2d 842, 843[2000]; Matter of Teamster Local Union No. 182 v Upper Mohawk Val. Regional WaterBd., 259 AD2d 1008, 1008 [1999]; Matter of Perez v New York State Dept. ofLabor, 244 AD2d 844, 844-845 [1997]).
There is no evidence in the record on appeal that respondent ever designated the HearingOfficer in a writing sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. Respondent's reference to thedesignation in the notice of charges sent to petitioner is not sufficient in the absence of anyevidence of the written designation itself (see Matter of Pieczonka v Jewett, 273 AD2d at843; Matter of Teamster Local Union No. 182 v Upper Mohawk Val. Regional WaterBd., 259 AD2d at 1008; see also Matter of Gardner v Coxsackie-Athens Cent. SchoolDist. Bd. of Educ., 92 AD3d at 1094-1095). While such notice to the petitioner has beendeemed to satisfy the statutory mandate when the respondent separately issues a writtenresolution incorporating the notice by reference (see Matter of Scharf v Levittown Union FreeSchool Dist., 294 AD2d 508, 509 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 613 [2002]),respondent provides us with no evidence of any written document doing so here.
Petitioner's failure to object to the absence of such written designation is of no moment,inasmuch as this jurisdictional defect cannot be waived (see Matter of Gardner vCoxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 92 AD3d at 1095; see also Matter ofWiggins v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d at 388-389). Because the HearingOfficer lacked jurisdiction to conduct the hearing, his determination and respondent's adoptionthereof are nullities. Accordingly, petitioner must be restored to his former position with backpay and benefits (see Matter of Wiggins v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d at388-389; Matter of Gardner v [*3]Coxsackie-Athens Cent.School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 92 AD3d at 1095; Matter of Perez v New York State Dept. ofLabor, 244 AD2d at 845).
Should any further proceedings be commenced against petitioner, we note that althoughcourts employ the substantial evidence standard of review in resolving challenges to CivilService Law § 75 determinations, the hearing officer does not review an employer'sdisciplinary actions against a public employee to determine whether those actions wereundertaken based upon substantial evidence, as occurred here; rather, it remains the responsibilityof the hearing officer to weigh the evidence and resolve credibility determinations (see e.g.Matter of Silberfarb v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., Third Supervisory Dist., Suffolk County,60 NY2d 979, 981 [1983]; Matter of Perryman v Village of Saranac Lake, 64 AD3d at834-835). Further, "administrative findings of fact must be made in such a manner that theparties may be assured that the decision is based on the evidence in the record, uninfluenced byextralegal considerations, so as to permit intelligent challenge by an aggrieved party and adequatejudicial review" (Matter of Langhorne v Jackson, 206 AD2d 666, 667 [1994]; seeMatter of Simpson v Wolansky, 38 NY2d 391, 396 [1975]). Inasmuch as the Hearing Officerfailed to adequately detail the specific factual findings and hearing evidence relied upon tosupport the determination of guilt here, remittal would be required for the development ofappropriate findings even if jurisdiction had been properly conferred (see Matter of Collins vParishville-Hopkinton Cent. School Dist., 256 AD2d 700, 701-702 [1998]; Matter ofLanghorne v Jackson, 206 AD2d at 667-668).
Petitioner's argument that the charges have not been proven has been rendered academic byour decision. His remaining argument has been considered and found to be lacking in merit.
Spain, Stein, Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is annulled,without costs, and petition granted to the extent that petitioner is restored to his former positionwith back pay and benefits.
Footnote *: We reject petitioner's argumentthat the last charge was untimely (see Civil Service Law § 75 [4]); "[t]he relevantmeasuring date" for statute of limitations purposes "is service of the first set of charges andspecifications" (Matter of Mikoleski v Bratton, 249 AD2d 83, 84 [1998]).