Matter of De Los Santos v Division of Parole
2012 NY Slip Op 05225 [96 AD3d 1321]
June 28, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2012


In the Matter of Marco De Los Santos, Appellant, v Division ofParole, Respondent.

—[*1]Marcos De Los Santos, Stormville, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Marlene O. Tuczinski of counsel), forrespondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), entered September 15, 2011 inAlbany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner's request for parolerelease.

Petitioner assisted his codefendants in the commission of an armed robbery by surveilling thestore prior to the robbery and providing the weapon that was used to fatally shoot one of thestorekeepers. As a result, he was convicted in 1997 of murder in the second degree and wassentenced to 15 years to life in prison. In July 2010, he made his first appearance before theBoard of Parole seeking to be released to parole supervision. At the conclusion of the hearing, hisrequest was denied and he was ordered held for an additional 24 months. After the determinationwas affirmed on administrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding.Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued.

We affirm. It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not bedisturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements of Executive Law§ 259-i (see Matter of Valentino vEvans, 92 AD3d 1054, 1055 [2012]; Matter of Matos v New [*2]York State Bd.of Parole, 87 AD3d 1193, 1194 [2011]).[FN*]We find no merit to petitioner's assertion that the Board based its decision solely upon the seriousnature of the crime. Rather, the record reveals that the Board also took into account the fact thatthis was petitioner's first criminal conviction, he had not had a disciplinary infraction for years,he had completed many programs while in prison and he would be deported if released (see Matter of Sanchez v Division ofParole, 89 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2011]). Moreover, petitioner was given the opportunityduring the parole interview to discuss the mental illness and disability that he experienced as aresult of a childhood virus (see Matter ofAbascal v New York State Bd. of Parole, 23 AD3d 740, 741 [2005]). Contrary topetitioner's claim, the Board did not disregard the recommendations of the sentencing judge; thesentencing minutes were before the Board and reveal that the judge did not express an opinion onparole (see generally Matter of Evans vDennison, 75 AD3d 711, 712 [2010]). In sum, given that the Board's decision does notexhibit " 'irrationality bordering on impropriety' " (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [1980]), we find no reason to disturb it.

Mercure, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote *: We note that while ExecutiveLaw § 259-i was amended in 2011 (see L 2011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1,subpart A, §§ 38-b, 38-f-1), the Board's decision in this case was rendered prior tothis amendment.


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