| Matter of Bailey v Binghamton Precast & SupplyCorp. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 01112 [103 AD3d 992] |
| February 21, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Sandra Bailey, Appellant, vBinghamton Precast & Supply Corporation et al., Respondents. Workers' CompensationBoard, Respondent. |
—[*1] Michael Miliano, State Insurance Fund, Endicott (Mark A. Kenyon of counsel), forBinghamton Precast & Supply Corporation and another, respondents.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed July26, 2011, which ruled that decedent's death was not causally related to his employmentand disallowed claimant's claim for workers' compensation death benefits.
Claimant's husband (hereinafter decedent) worked as a truck driver and heavyequipment mechanic for the employer for more than 20 years. Decedent, who had apreexisting heart condition, was admitted to a local hospital in September 2007, at whichtime he was found to be suffering from atrial fibrillation, exacerbation of congestiveheart failure, morbid obesity, hypertension and hyperlipidemia, and a heartcatheterization performed on November 15, 2007 "revealed diffused coronary diseaseinvolving . . . all three coronary systems." Various medications wereprescribed, and decedent returned to work without restrictions on November 21, 2007.
On November 30, 2007, decedent worked his normal shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.)and thereafter remained on the employer's premises to perform certain repairs to hispersonal vehicle. [*2]At some point between 7:30 p.m.and 8:00 p.m. that evening, the employer's plant manager arrived and observed decedentworking on his vehicle in the employer's garage. Shortly thereafter, the plant managerfound decedent unresponsive on the floor of the garage, started CPR and called 911.Decedent was pronounced dead later that evening.
Claimant thereafter filed this claim for workers' compensation death benefits, whichthe employer and its workers' compensation carrier controverted. Following a hearing, aWorkers' Compensation Law Judge disallowed the claim finding, insofar as is relevanthere, that claimant was not entitled to the presumption set forth in Workers'Compensation Law § 21 (1) and, further, failed to demonstrate a causalrelationship between decedent's death and his employment. The Workers' CompensationBoard affirmed that decision and subsequently denied claimant's application forreconsideration and/or full Board review. Claimant now appeals from the Board'sdecision denying her claim for death benefits.
We affirm. Although claimant testified that decedent telephoned her on the night inquestion and indicated that he was staying late "to clean the pit," there is nothing in theemployer's records to suggest that decedent either worked a double shift on the day of hisdeath, incurred any overtime on that date or actually was performing work for theemployer at the time of his death. Accordingly, we have no quarrel with the Board'sfinding that decedent "cannot be considered to have been in the course of hisemployment at [the] time of his demise."
As to the issue of causal relationship, claimant bore the burden ofestablishing—by competent medical evidence—that a causal connectionexisted between decedent's death and his employment (see Matter of Droogan v RaymarkIndus., Inc., 59 AD3d 803, 804 [2009]; see also Matter of Norton v North Syracuse Cent. School Dist.,59 AD3d 890, 890-891 [2009]). Contrary to claimant's assertion, this is not a casewhere the Board ignored uncontroverted medical evidence and impermissibly fashionedits own opinion; rather, this is a case where the medical proof adduced by claimant wasinsufficient to establish the required causal connection (see Matter of Zahm v NationalFuel, 72 AD3d 1311, 1312-1313 [2010]; Matter of Albert v Miracle Makers of Bedford Stuyvesant HFDC,Inc., 13 AD3d 925, 926 [2004]; Matter of Freitag v New York Times,260 AD2d 748, 749 [1999]).
Claimant's primary care physician indeed testified that it was "extremely likely" thatthe "heavy work" that decedent performed on the day of his death contributed to hispassing, and both claimant's cardiologist and the physician who conducted anindependent review of decedent's medical records reached a similar conclusion.However, a review of the record reveals that these opinions were based upon erroneousassumptions and facts not borne out by the documentary evidence or hearingtestimony—namely, that decedent worked a double shift and was engaged instrenuous physical activity on the day of his death (see id.; compare Matter ofOwoc v Syracuse Univ., 301 AD2d 765, 766 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d501 [2003]).
As noted previously, there is no support for a finding that decedent worked a doubleshift or otherwise incurred overtime on the day of his death. Similarly, the employer'spresident testified that heavy lifting was "[n]ot . . . a normal part of[decedent's] job," as "various types of equipment" were available to lift anything over 50pounds. The employer's president further testified that he was aware that decedent didnot "feel well" and "was struggling," as a result of [*3]which "[n]obody was pushing [decedent] toohard."[FN*]In light of such testimony, there is substantial evidence to support the Board's findingthat claimant failed to establish a causal connection between decedent's employment andhis death.
Mercure, J.P., Spain and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision isaffirmed, without costs.
Footnote *: Upon reviewing thehearing testimony and records, the physician who conducted the independent medicalreview issued an addendum to his report, wherein he indicated "a change of. . . opinion on the [issue of] causal relationship" and stated that he nolonger could "definitely conclude" that a causal relationship existed between decedent'semployment and his death.