| Matter of Hudson Riv. Val., LLC v Empire Zone DesignationBd. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01490 [115 AD3d 1035] |
| March 6, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Hudson River Valley, LLC, Appellant, vEmpire Zone Designation Board et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Owen Demuth of counsel), forrespondents.
Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ceresia Jr., J.), entered July19, 2012 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article78 and action for declaratory judgment, among other things, partially grantedrespondents' motion to dismiss the petition/complaint.
Petitioner, a real estate holding company, and a related entity, KRNH, Inc., wereformed to develop a traumatic brain injury center located in Ulster County.[FN1]Petitioner and KRNH each obtained certifications as empire zone business enterprisesthrough the Empire Zones Program (see General Municipal Law § 955et seq.), effective March 1998.[FN2]Following [*2]certain statutory reforms to that program(see L 2009, ch 57, § 1, part S-1, § 3), petitioner was advised in June2009 by the Department of Economic Development (hereinafter DED) that it was beingdecertified—retroactive to January 2008—as an empire zone enterprisebecause it failed to meet certain of the program's statutory requirements, specifically the"shirt-changer test" and the "1:1 benefit-cost test" (see General Municipal Law§ 959 [a] [v] [5], [6]; 5 NYCRR 11.9 [c] [1], [2]). Upon petitioner's timely appealof that decision, respondent Empire Zone Designation Board (hereinafter the Board)upheld the revocation of petitioner's certification. Petitioner thereafter commenced thiscombined CPLR article 78 proceeding and action for declaratory judgment seeking,among other things, annulment of the revocation of its certification. Supreme Courtgranted that part of the petition/complaint that challenged the retroactivity of therevocation, but dismissed the remainder of the petition/complaint. Petitioner nowappeals, and we affirm.
Petitioner argues that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious and contraryto law because the Board did not consider petitioner's business annual reports(hereinafter BARs[FN3]) in combination with those of KRNH and claims that they were a "single enterprise" forthe purpose of determining whether petitioner met the 1:1 benefit-cost test.[FN4]Petitioner asserts that, although it was necessary to form separate entities in order tocomply with applicable legal requirements to acquire a mortgage on the building, "thetwo entities are one and the same." According to petitioner, it and KRNH qualify as asingle enterprise for the purpose of the Empire Zones Program because they are ownedby the same principals, maintain the same business address and have commonmanagement and financial control (see General Municipal Law § 957 [k]).Petitioner concedes that it could not satisfy the 1:1 benefit-cost test based on its ownBARs for the relevant period, but asserts that, when its BARs are combined with those ofKRNH, the collective BARs show investments and wages that exceed the tax creditsreceived for the relevant years. However, petitioner did not advance this argument to theBoard in support of its administrative appeal[FN5]and, accordingly, did not offer any evidence to substantiate it. Under [*3]these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Board'sdetermination in this regard was irrational.
Moreover, in view of petitioner's failure to advance any argument to the Board withregard to the 1:1 benefit-cost test, we cannot consider such argument. It is axiomatic thata determination made by an administrative agency must first be challenged through everyavailable administrative remedy before it can be raised in a court of law (seeWatergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; Matter of Connerton v Ryan,86 AD3d 698, 699 [2011]). Correspondingly, judicial review of an administrativeaction is limited to consideration of those issues that were raised before the agency in thefirst instance (see Matter ofVeltri v New York State Off. of the State Comptroller, 81 AD3d 1050, 1054[2011]; Matter of Roggemann v Bane, 223 AD2d 854, 856 [1996]). Theexhaustion of administrative remedies rule " 'furthers the salutory goal[ ] of. . . preventing premature judicial interference' with the administrativeprocess" (Matter of Connerton v Ryan, 86 AD3d at 699, quoting Watergate IIApts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d at 57). Here, petitioner concedes that itsadministrative appeal to the Board addressed only the determination that it failed to meetthe shirt-changer test and that it did not raise the single enterprise theory or any otherargument regarding the 1:1 benefit-cost test. Nevertheless, petitioner claims that theexhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is inapplicable because exceptions to thatrule apply. We disagree.
The narrow exceptions to the exhaustion rule (see Matter of Connerton vRyan, 86 AD3d at 699; Matter of Cullen v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals, 30AD3d 850, 851 [2006]) include, as relevant here, circumstances in which anadministrative challenge would be futile or where the issue to be determined is purely aquestion of law (see Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d at 57;Matter of Cady v Clark, 176 AD2d 1055, 1056 [1991]). The question of whetherpetitioner and KRNH constitute a single enterprise invokes resolution of factual, notpurely legal, issues that must be determined by the administrative agency in the firstinstance (see Matter of Sabino vDiNapoli, 90 AD3d 1392, 1394 [2011]). Moreover, the record is bereft of anyevidence that an administrative challenge to the revocation of its certification based onthe 1:1 benefit-cost test would have been futile (compare Subdivisions, Inc. v Town of Sullivan, 86 AD3d830, 833 [2011]), particularly considering that KRNH was recertified following anadministrative appeal of its own decertification. The fact, relied on by petitioner, thatDED reviewed all non-manufacturer business enterprises in 2009 as separate entitiesdoes not prove that DED would have rejected petitioner's single enterprise claim and didnot absolve petitioner of its obligation to raise such argument before DED. In addition,because "we have no discretionary authority or interest of justice jurisdiction to review"petitioner's unpreserved claims, we must decline petitioner's request that we do so (Matter of Lopez v Commissionerof N.Y. State Dept. of Health, 42 AD3d 638, 640 [2007]; see Matter ofKhan v New York State Dept. of Health, 96 NY2d 879, 880 [2001]). Thus, we agreewith Supreme Court that petitioner's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies as toits contention that it satisfies the 1:1 benefit-cost test required dismissal of thepetition/complaint on that basis.
Petitioner's argument that this Court should remit the case to the Board fordevelopment of the record is also unpersuasive. Inasmuch as the Board's decision wasproperly based upon the limited arguments raised by petitioner on administrative appealand the basis of its determination [*4]is "readilyapparent," we discern no legal footing for remittal (Matter of Morris Bldrs., LP v Empire Zone Designation Bd., 95AD3d 1381, 1383 [2012], affd sub nom. James Sq. Assoc. LP v Mullen, 21NY3d 233 [2013]; compareMatter of Office Bldg. Assoc., LLC v Empire Zone Designation Bd., 95 AD3d1402 [2012]). To the extent not specifically addressed herein, petitioner's remainingclaims have been considered and found to be lacking in merit.
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs. [Prior Case History: 2012 NY Slip Op 32715(U).]
Footnote 1: KRNH operates thefacility while petitioner "owns, invests in and develops the real estate upon which the[f]acility [is] located."
Footnote 2: A more thoroughdiscussion of the Empire Zones Program and the statutory framework is set forth in Matter of WL, LLC v Departmentof Economic Dev. (97 AD3d 24, 26-29 [2012], affd sub nom. James Sq.Assoc. LP v Mullen, 21 NY3d 233 [2013]).
Footnote 3: An empire zoneenterprise is required to submit a BAR annually, detailing the wages paid by thebusiness, its capital investment and tax credits (see 5 NYCRR 11.7, 11.9 [c] [2];see also Matter of WL, LLC v Department of Economic Dev., 97 AD3d at27-28).
Footnote 4: The 1:1 benefit-cost testrequires a business enterprise to establish that it "provide[d] economic returns to the statein the form of total remuneration to its employees (i.e., wages and benefits) andinvestments in its facility greater in value [than] the tax benefits the business enterpriseused and had refunded to it" (General Municipal Law § 959 [a] [v] [6]). In order todetermine whether an enterprise meets the 1:1 benefit-cost test, DED must examineBARs submitted during the period from 2001 through 2007 (see 5 NYCRR 11.9[c] [2]; see also Matter of WL, LLC v Department of Economic Dev., 97 AD3dat 27-28).
Footnote 5: Petitioner failed toprovide any evidence that it and KRNH constituted a single enterprise for the purposes ofreviewing the BARs and, in fact, only first raised the argument in its reply torespondents' answer to the petition/complaint.