| Matter of Launer v Euro Brokers |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02116 [115 AD3d 1130] |
| March 27, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Robert B. Launer, Appellant,v Euro Brokers et al., Respondents. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent. |
—[*1] Stewart, Greenblatt, Manning & Baez, Syosett (Peter M. DeCurtis of counsel), forEuro Brokers and another, respondents.
Stein, J. Appeals (1) from a decision of a panel of the Workers' Compensation Board,filed November 21, 2011, which ruled, among other things, that claimant was not entitledto an award of reduced earnings subsequent to January 1, 2007, and (2) from a decisionof the full Board, filed January 10, 2013, which adhered to the Board panel's decision.
Claimant worked as a corporate bond broker for the employer on the 84th floor ofthe World Trade Center South Tower and escaped when the events of September 11,2001 transpired. After a brief absence from the work force, claimant worked for severaldifferent companies in the same capacity and was a principal in several companiescreated for the purpose of engaging in bond trading. Thereafter, commensurate with atransition into the financial services field and a corresponding reduction in income,claimant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in December 2008. A claimwas established for work-related posttraumatic stress disorder (hereinafter PTSD) and, inMarch 2011, a Workers' Compensation Law Judge classified claimant with a permanentpartial disability and granted reduced earnings benefits beginning January 1, 2007 andcontinuing. The employer and its workers' compensation carrier appealed and a panel ofthe Workers' Compensation Board modified, in a split decision, [*2]finding that claimant's reduction in earnings was not aconsequence of his compensable disability. Claimant appealed from that decision andalso sought reconsideration and/or full Board review. Thereafter, the full Board alsodetermined that claimant's reduction in earnings was not attributable to his PTSD andclaimant also appeals from that decision.[FN*]
We affirm. In a non-schedule permanent partial disability case where an involuntarywithdrawal has not been established, the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating thathis or her reduced earning capacity is due to the disability and not to unrelated factorssuch as age or general economic conditions (see Matter of Zamora v New York Neurologic Assoc., 19NY3d 186, 191-192 [2012]; Burns v Varriale, 9 NY3d 207, 216 [2007]; Matter of Tawil v Fallsburg Cent.Sch. Dist., 106 AD3d 1314, 1315 [2013]; Matter of Smith v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 68AD3d 1299, 1301 [2009]). Whether reduced earnings are causally related to thecompensable injury is a question of fact for the Board to resolve and its determinationwill not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Tawil vFallsburg Cent. Sch. Dist., 106 AD3d at 1315; Matter of Fisher v Bothar Constr., 49 AD3d 1042, 1043[2008]). Furthermore, the Board has broad authority to resolve questions of credibilityand to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record (see Matter of Rolleri v MasticBeach Ambulance Co., Inc., 106 AD3d 1292, 1293 [2013], lv denied 21NY3d 865 [2013]; Matter ofKlamka v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 84 AD3d 1527, 1528 [2011]).
Here, claimant seeks causally related reduced benefits premised on the allegation thathe is no longer able to engage in his former profession as a corporate bond broker.However, the record demonstrates that, shortly after the events that gave rise toclaimant's compensable condition, he acquired employment as a corporate bonds brokerwith a company based in New Jersey, but left employment with that company after sevenmonths because he no longer wished to commute from his home on Long Island.Claimant then went to work in the same capacity for a Long Island-based securities firm,where he was employed for approximately four years, and the record does not reveal hisreason for leaving. Subsequently, claimant gained employment overseeing corporatebond trading for a North Carolina-based company, but left because he was unhappy withhis salary. He and several partners then started a Florida-based corporation engaged inbrokering bonds and, when that venture failed in less than a year, claimant opened hisown consulting firm to broker bonds. Finally, claimant made the decision to changecareers and began working as a financial advisor in March 2009. Accordingly, the recorddoes not demonstrate that claimant's withdrawal from his former profession wasinvoluntary, particularly in light of the fact that he engaged in the profession for morethan seven years following the events that precipitated his condition and does not claimlost wages for most of that period.
Furthermore, although claimant testified that he was no longer able to perform thetasks necessary for success as a bond broker because, following the events of 9/11, hesuffered from a lack of concentration, that complaint was never recorded in the notes ofhis treating psychologist—who he began seeing in December 2001—untilafter his claim was filed. To the contrary, a psychiatrist who performed an independentmedical examination opined that PTSD has no significant cognitive component and,therefore, should not create problems with concentration [*3]and focus at work. Notably, despite the fact that all of themedical experts agreed that claimant suffered from causally related PTSD, there was nomedical opinion that he was incapable of engaging in his former profession. Thus, wefind that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision that claimant's reduction inearnings was not causally related to his compensable disability (see Matter of Tawil vFallsburg Cent. Sch. Dist., 106 AD3d at 1316; see generally Matter of Balint v NYS Dept. of Corrections, 79AD3d 1570, 1570-1571 [2010]).
Peters, P.J., McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal from theNovember 21, 2011 decision is dismissed, without costs. Ordered that the January 10,2013 decision is affirmed, without costs.
Footnote *: The right to appeal fromthe Board panel's decision terminates upon the superceding decision of the full Boardand, as a result, claimant's appeal therefrom must be dismissed (see generallyWorkers' Compensation Law § 23).