| Matter of Katie I. (Jonathan I.) |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02821 [116 AD3d 1309] |
| April 24, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Katie I. and Others, Children Alleged to bePermanently Neglected. Madison County Department of Social Services, Respondent;Jonathan I., Appellant. (And Another Related Proceeding.) |
—[*1] Julie Jones, Madison County Department of Social Services, Wampsville, forrespondent. Paul M. Deep, Utica, attorney for the children.
Peters, P.J. Appeals from a decision and an order of the Family Court of MadisonCounty (McDermott, J.), entered February 6, 2013 and March 8, 2013, which, amongother things, granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Social ServicesLaw § 384-b, to adjudicate the subject children to be permanently neglected, andterminated respondent's parental rights.
Respondent (hereinafter the father) and Cathy I. (hereinafter the mother) are theparents of Katie I., Skylar I. and Jamie I. (born in 2004, 2006 and 2008, respectively).The children were removed from the parents' custody in June 2010 as a result of physicalabuse perpetrated on Skylar by the mother and the father's failure to seek medicalattention for the child's injuries. In December 2010, the mother and the father wereadjudicated to have neglected Skylar and to have derivatively neglected the two otherchildren, and were ordered to participate in various services. [*2]Approximately 18 months later, petitioner commenced aproceeding against each parent seeking to terminate their parental rights on the ground ofpermanent neglect. Following testimony from petitioner's caseworker at the ensuingfact-finding hearing, the mother and the father made admissions to substantial portions ofthe allegations in the petitions and Family Court found the children to be permanentlyneglected. A dispositional hearing was held approximately six months later, at theconclusion of which Family Court terminated their parental rights and freed the childrenfor adoption. Only the father appeals.[FN*]
The father first argues that petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincingevidence that he permanently neglected the children. However, his knowing, voluntaryand intelligent admissions—made in open court and with the assistance ofcounsel—satisfied petitioner's burden and dispensed with the need for petitioner toput forth any further evidence on that issue (see Matter of Abbigail EE. [Elizabeth EE.], 106 AD3d1205, 1206-1207 [2013]; Matter of Aidan D., 58 AD3d 906, 908 [2009];Matter of Rita XX., 279 AD2d 901, 902 [2001]; Matter of William PP.,185 AD2d 397, 398 [1992]).
As for Family Court's disposition, we are unpersuaded that it should have granted asuspended judgment in lieu of terminating the father's parental rights (see FamilyCt Act § 631). "The purpose of a suspended judgment is to provide a parent whohas been found to have permanently neglected his or her child[ren] with a brief graceperiod within which to become a fit parent with whom the child[ren] can be safelyreunited" (Matter of Clifton ZZ.[Latrice ZZ.], 75 AD3d 683, 683-684 [2010] [internal quotation marks andcitations omitted]; see Matter ofMadalynn I. [Katelynn J.], 111 AD3d 1205, 1206 [2013]; Matter of Elias QQ. [StephanieQQ.], 72 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2010]). The sole criterion for the granting of asuspended judgment is the best interests of the children and there is no presumption thatany particular disposition, including a return of the children to a parent, will promotesuch interests (see Matter ofJohanna M. [John L.], 103 AD3d 949, 951 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d855 [2013]; Matter of KellcieNN. [Sarah NN.], 85 AD3d 1251, 1252 [2011]; Matter of Carlos R., 63 AD3d1243, 1246 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 704 [2009]).
In postponing the dispositional hearing for nearly six months, Family Court made itabundantly clear to the mother and the father that, during that time period, it was theirresponsibility to make "one last ditch opportunity" to prove that they could safely parentthe children before their parental rights were terminated. Nevertheless, the fatherconsistently refused to engage in recommended parenting classes and court-orderedmental health treatment, despite referrals by petitioner's caseworkers. Furthermore,although repeatedly encouraged to do so, he failed to maintain any contact with thechildren outside of the one-hour weekly supervised visits and made no effort tocommunicate with the children's foster parents or service providers so as to stay informedas to their day-to-day lives. Testimony established that each of the three children hadbeen diagnosed with various psychological disorders, yet the parents failed to make anyinquiry as to their mental health needs and progress, nor did they seek any furtherinformation after being informed that Skylar was hospitalized for a time and diagnosedwith a [*3]seizure disorder. Concerns were alsoexpressed that the father was not engaged with the children during visits and actedinappropriately in their presence, on one occasion necessitating his removal from a visit.Due to the father's lack of involvement, the children's relationship with him was observedto be distant, confused and disengaged. The children's counselors expressed strong viewsthat the current status quo was not in the children's best interests and that, in fact, thevisits were having negative effects on the children. Moreover, the father's failure totestify permitted Family Court to draw the strongest inference against him that theopposing evidence would allow (see Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs.v Denise J., 87 NY2d 73, 79 [1995]; Matter of Arianna BB. [Tracy DD.], 110 AD3d 1194, 1197[2013], lvs denied 22 NY3d 858 [2014]; Matter of Shawna U., 277AD2d 731, 733 [2000]).
Significantly, all three children are together in the same preadoptive foster homewhere they have resided since early 2012. They have formed a strong bond with and arethriving in the care of their foster parents, who wish to adopt them and are able toprovide them with a loving and safe home. Considering all of the circumstances andaccording deference to Family Court's choice among dispositional alternatives, we findno basis upon which to disturb its determination that termination of the father's parentalrights was in the children's best interests (see Matter of Kayden E. [Luis E.], 111 AD3d 1094, 1098[2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]; Matter of Syles DD. [Felicia DD.], 91 AD3d 1054, 1057[2012], lv denied 18 NY3d 810 [2012]; Matter of Kellcie NN. [SarahNN.], 85 AD3d at 1252).
Lahtinen, Rose and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal from the decisionentered February 6, 2013 is dismissed, without costs. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: As Family Court'sdecisions are not appealable papers (see CPLR 5512 [a]), the father's appeal fromthe February 6, 2013 decision underlying the dispositional order must be dismissed (see Matter of Darrow vDarrow, 106 AD3d 1388, 1390 n 5 [2013]).