| People v Hadfield |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05461 [119 AD3d 1217] |
| July 24, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| 1 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vAdam M. Hadfield, Appellant. |
John A. Cirando, Syracuse, for appellant.
Alexander Lesyk, Special Prosecutor, Norwood, for respondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County(Richards, J.), rendered October 7, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of thecrimes of criminal sexual act in the first degree (five counts), unlawful imprisonment inthe first degree, menacing in the second degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree,kidnapping in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the first degreeand driving while intoxicated.
Defendant was charged in a 13-count indictment with criminal sexual act in the firstdegree (five counts), unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, menacing in the seconddegree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree,kidnapping in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the first degreeand driving while intoxicated. Count 1 of the indictment—charging criminalsexual act in the first degree—pertained to defendant's sexual contact with victimA in March 2008; the remaining counts of the indictment related to defendant's conductwith respect to victim B in July 2009. The matter proceeded to trial in July 2011 and,during the course thereof, defendant tendered proof in support of his affirmative defenseof not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Upon defense counsel's motion at theclose of the People's case, County Court dismissed the reckless endangerment count and,at the close of all proof, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of theremaining charges. Defendant thereafter was sentenced to an aggregate prison term [*2]of 53 years to be followed by a lengthy period ofpostrelease supervision.[FN1] This appeal ensued.[FN2]
We affirm. Initially, we reject defendant's assertion that County Court erred infinding that he was competent to stand trial. "The key inquiry in determining whether acriminal defendant is fit for trial is 'whether he [or she] has sufficient present ability toconsult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rationalunderstanding—and whether he [or she] has a rational as well as factualunderstanding of the proceedings against him [or her]' " (People v Phillips, 16 NY3d510, 516 [2011], quoting Dusky v United States, 362 US 402, 402 [1960];see CPL 730.10 [1]). The People bear the burden of proving a defendant'scompetency by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Surdis, 77 AD3d 1018, 1018 [2010], lvdenied 16 NY3d 800 [2011]), and the trial court's determination in this regard "isaccorded considerable deference" (People v Kendall, 91 AD3d 1191, 1192 [2012]; seePeople v Phillips, 16 NY3d at 517; People v Brown, 110 AD3d 481, 482 [2013], lvdenied 22 NY3d 1039 [2013]). Notably, the mere fact that a defendant may suffer amemory loss does not automatically trigger a finding of incompetency (see People v Bates, 83 AD3d1110, 1112 [2011], lv denied 21 NY3d 1072 [2013]; People vSurdis, 77 AD3d at 1018 n 1).
Here, defendant was evaluated by two psychiatrists (testifying on behalf of thePeople) and one psychologist (testifying on behalf of defendant). All three evaluatorsfound that defendant appreciated the nature and severity of the charges against him andunderstood the roles of the trial judge, the jury, the prosecutor and defense counsel. Asfor defendant's ability to consult with his attorney, one of the People's expertsacknowledged that defendant's claimed memory lapses "would make [assisting in hisown defense] more difficult," and the psychologist who testified on behalf of defendantopined that defendant's asserted "lack of recollection [might] compromise his ability totestify relevantly or realistically challenge prosecution witnesses."[FN3] Despite these concerns,two of the three experts found defendant to be competent to stand trial, and havingreviewed the evaluators' respective reports and conflicting testimony, we discern no basisupon which to disturb County Court's finding that defendant indeed was fit for trial.
Defendant next contends that his convictions are not supported by legally sufficientevidence and, further, are against the weight of the evidence. Again, we disagree. Insofaras is relevant here, count 1 of the indictment required the People to establish thatdefendant engaged in anal sexual conduct with victim A by forcible compulsion(see Penal Law § 130.50 [1]). Victim A, who had been datingdefendant for three or four months at the time the incident occurred in March 2008,testified that she awoke on the morning in question to find defendant [*3]attempting to have sex with her. When victim A refused hisadvances, defendant pinned her arms above her head, removed her underwear and,despite her continued protests, engaged in anal sex with her. Victim A further testifiedthat, during this encounter, defendant's hand or body pushed her head into her pillow,making it difficult for her to breathe. Such testimony, in our view, was sufficient toestablish the element of forcible compulsion (see Penal Law§ 130.00 [8] [a], [b]), as well as the remaining elements of the crime. To theextent that defendant now deems victim A's account of this incident to bedubious—citing, among other things, her delay in reporting thecrime—these issues were fully explored at trial, and we defer to the jury'sresolution of the underlying credibility issues (see People v Littebrant, 55 AD3d 1151, 1154-1155 [2008],lv denied 12 NY3d 818 [2009]).
With respect to the counts pertaining to victim B (counts 2-3 and 5-13), victim Btestified that she and defendant began dating in May 2009. On the evening of July 14,2009, she and defendant went to a local bar—known as theTrackside—around 10:00 p.m., where they remained for approximately 90minutes. During this time period, defendant consumed "quite a few" beers and/or mixeddrinks and "a lot of shots" of alcohol. Defendant and victim B then left the Trackside,purchased a quantity of beer and went to a birthday party for her ex-boyfriend. Duringthe early morning hours of July 15, 2009, defendant and victim B, both of whom hadcontinued to drink at the birthday party, returned to the Trackside, where they remaineduntil closing.
Although defendant and victim B apparently had enjoyed a cordial evening up untilthis point, the two began to argue upon returning to victim B's residence in the Town ofPitcairn, St. Lawrence County. When victim B indicated that she was going to sleep onthe couch, defendant became upset, prompting victim B to decide to leave the premises.Defendant, however, would not allow victim B to leave; after blocking her exit, takingher cell phone and shoving her, defendant pinned victim B to the ground with his kneesagainst her shoulders, took out a pocket knife and dragged the blade across herface—all before pressing the blade to her throat and informing her that she "[had]to die" and that "he was going to kill [her]." Eventually, victim B persuaded defendant torelease her so that she could let her animals outside to relieve themselves. Afterexpressing concern over the welfare of one of her dogs, victim B convinced defendant toallow her to venture outside as well, whereupon she managed to get to her vehicle andflee. Defendant gave chase, however, and—once he caught up with victimB—rammed her vehicle with his truck and forced her off the road. Defendant thenpunched out the driver's side window of victim B's vehicle, pulled her out of the car and"[t]ossed" her into the front passenger seat of his truck.
After reentering the truck, defendant reclined the front seat and pinned victim Bdown by placing his elbow to her collarbone. Following a brief struggle over the knife,which victim B succeeded in tossing out of the window of the truck, defendant begandriving. Approximately 10 minutes later, victim B was allowed to sit up, at which pointshe recognized landmarks that placed her whereabouts in St. Lawrence County. Asdefendant continued to drive, they passed another motorist, who victim B recognized as afriend, prompting her to launch her hands and face out of the driver's side window andyell for help; defendant responded, "Great, now the cops are going to be called."Although victim B's friend turned around and began to follow defendant's truck,defendant "started driving faster" and the other vehicle faded from sight. As victim Bpleaded for defendant to take her home, they approached an intersection with a stop sign,and victim B used this opportunity to "kick the shifter [lever] out of gear," exit thevehicle and begin running. After only "two or three steps," however, defendant caught upwith victim B, [*4]informing her that "now [she was]really going to have to die." Defendant then dragged victim B back the truck and againbegan driving.
Eventually, defendant pulled over and announced that he wanted to get some sleep.Despite his stated intention, defendant thereafter grabbed victim B's breast beforestraddling her, pinning her down to the passenger seat and attempting to persuade her toperform oral sex. When victim B refused, defendant—on three separateoccasions—placed his hands around victim B's throat and choked her; each timethat victim B would gasp for air, defendant would force his penis into her mouth.Defendant then removed victim B's pants and forcibly engaged in vaginal and anal sexwith her.[FN4]
In the interim, victim B gained access to her cell phone and surreptitiously placed acall to 911. Eventually, victim B was able to provide clues as to her location, anddefendant was successfully pulled over and apprehended by State Trooper ChristopherSharpe between the Towns of Fowler and Gouverneur in St. Lawrence County. Sharpetestified that he smelled alcohol "[a]s soon as [he] opened the door" to defendant's truck,State Trooper Michael Tyler testified that he observed two empty beerbottles—one next to and one inside of defendant's truck—and State TrooperScott Freeman observed that defendant had "glassy eyes," a red face, impaired motorcoordination and "a strong odor of alcohol emanating from him." Once back at thestation, defendant did not respond to a request to submit to a chemical test. According tothe experts who testified on defendant's behalf, defendant had a well-documented historyof both alcohol abuse and alcohol-induced blackouts.
The foregoing proof, in our view, is legally sufficient to sustain defendant'sconviction of each of the charged crimes. Although defendant specifically takes issuewith the jurisdictional element of counts 7 through 12—contending that there isinsufficient proof to establish that the subject crimes occurred in St. LawrenceCounty—we disagree. CPL 20.40 (4) (g) provides that "[a]n offense committed ina private vehicle during a trip thereof extending through more than one county may beprosecuted in any county through which such vehicle passed in the course of such trip."Inasmuch as the record establishes that the events in question began and ended in St.Lawrence County, venue was properly established by a preponderance of the evidence(see People v MacDonald,63 AD3d 1520, 1521-1522 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 746 [2009]; People v Buccina, 62 AD3d1252, 1253-1254 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 913 [2009]; People vCurtis, 286 AD2d 901, 902 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 728 [2002]).
As for defendant's weight of the evidence claim, although defendant contends that hecarried his burden of establishing that he was not guilty by reason of mental disease ordefect (see Penal Law §§ 25.00 [2]; 40.15), the case law makesclear that "[w]here conflicting expert testimony is presented, the question [of] whetherthe defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the commission ofthe crime is for the fact finder, who may accept or reject the opinion of any expert" (People v Capela, 97 AD3d760, 761 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1024 [2012] [internal quotation marksand citation omitted]; see Peoplev Demagall, 114 AD3d 189, 192 [2014]). Here, the People and defendant eachpresented experts who, in turn, offered conflicting testimony as to defendant's mentalhealth status and his capacity to comprehend the [*5]nature and consequences of his actions with respect to theincident involving victim B. In this regard, defendant's expert opined that defendantsuffers from a borderline personality disorder and, when confronted with intense stress,will experience disassociative episodes, i.e., he will become "more than one person,"during which time "[h]e doesn't know what he's doing." According to defendant's expert,defendant was experiencing such an episode during the early morning hours of July 15,2009 when he abducted and brutalized victim B and, therefore, defendant "did not havethe ability to comprehend the nature and consequences of his behavior or [to know] thatit was wrong."
The People's expert, however, although acknowledging that defendant has certainmental health issues, primarily focused upon defendant's well-documented history ofalcohol and/or substance abuse, noting that defendant's underlying anger managementand impulse control issues are exacerbated by his drinking. Based upon his interviewwith defendant, the People's expert concluded that defendant did not experiencedisassociative episodes except in relationship to alcohol-induced blackouts. Thus, evenassuming that defendant's professed memory loss on the morning in question wasgenuine, the People's expert attributed such memory impairment to defendant's level ofintoxication—as opposed to a true disassociative episode. Further, defendant'sunderlying history, coupled with his conduct immediately preceding and following hisapprehension,[FN5]led the People's expert to conclude that defendant "had substantial capacity to know whathe was doing[,] . . . knew the nature and consequences of his action[s]. . . [and] also had substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of hisaction[s]." As we discern no "serious flaw" in the opinion offered by the People's expert,we are unable to conclude that the jury, in crediting such testimony, "failed to give theevidence the weight it should be accorded" (People v Tillman, 260 AD2d 656,657 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Defendant's remaining contentions do not warrant extended discussion. Althoughdefendant asserts that County Court erred in allowing two of the troopers to testify as totheir prior law enforcement encounters with defendant, we note that the testimonyattributable to State Trooper Dean White was elicited by defense counsel oncross-examination. As to the testimony given by Sharpe, defense counsel promptlyobjected and County Court, in turn, sustained the objection and issued an appropriatecurative instruction. Under these circumstances, we do not find that the claimedevidentiary errors deprived defendant of a fair trial.
Nor are we persuaded that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.The claimed error with respect to eliciting White's testimony is insufficient todemonstrate that counsel was ineffective and, to our analysis, the record discloses validstrategic reasons for not requesting a severance of the counts set forth in the indictment.Not only would such a motion likely have been futile but, by trying the offenses as tovictims A and B together, defendant was able to assert his affirmative defense of notguilty by mental disease or defect as to both the 2008 and 2009offenses—notwithstanding the virtual absence of testimony regarding his mentalstate at the time he committed the crime against victim A in 2008. Defendant's remainingarguments [*6]on this point, as well as his claim that thesentence imposed was harsh and excessive, have been examined and found to be lackingin merit.
Stein, J.P., McCarthy, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote 1:Defendant's maximumterm of imprisonment was reduced by operation of law to 50 years.
Footnote 2:While incarcerated at theSt. Lawrence County Correctional Facility awaiting trial in this matter, defendantassaulted another inmate. Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of assaultin the second degree and, upon appeal, this Court has affirmed the judgment ofconviction (People v Hadfield, 119 AD3d 1224 [2014] [appeal No. 104645, [decided herewith]).
Footnote 3:The psychologistconceded, however, that there were "other ways in which [defendant] could assistcounsel in challenging statements made by a witness."
Footnote 4:Subsequent DNA testingfound evidence of defendant's sperm in victim B's anus and vagina.
Footnote 5:After defendant wasapprehended, defendant was observed banging his head against the side of his truck andattempting to bite a dog. According to the People's expert, this "overly dramatic"behavior was defendant's attempt at "trying to look crazy."