Matter of Hamilton v New York State Div. of Parole
2014 NY Slip Op 05487 [119 AD3d 1268]
July 24, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Monday, October 20, 2014


[*1]
1 In the Matter of Samuel Hamilton, Appellant, v NewYork State Division of Parole et al., Respondents.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP, New York City (ChristopherL. Filburn of counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of counsel),for respondents.

Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), enteredNovember 14, 2013 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Paroledenying petitioner's request for parole release.

Petitioner has served approximately 30 years on an aggregate sentence of 18 years tolife in prison for his conviction of murder in the second degree and robbery in the firstdegree. The convictions stemmed from a February 1982 incident in which an off dutypolice officer was killed by petitioner's accomplice during an attempted robbery.Petitioner made his latest of numerous appearances before the Board of Parole in August2012, and his request for release was denied. He was ordered to be held an additional 24months. After the Division of Parole failed to timely respond to his administrativeappeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Supreme Courtdismissed the petition, and petitioner now appeals.

We affirm. The procedures governing parole are set forth in Executive Law article12-B. Executive Law § 259-i (5) dictates the scope of our review, providingthat "[a]ny action by the [B]oard or by a hearing officer pursuant to this article shall bedeemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law."The Court of Appeals has long [*2]interpreted thatlanguage—in both current and prior statutes—to mean that "so long as theBoard violates no positive statutory requirement, its discretion is absolute and beyondreview in the courts" (Matter of Hines v State Bd. of Parole, 293 NY 254, 257[1944]; see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476-478 [2000]). In NewYork, it is "the . . . Board [that] holds the power to decide whether to releasea sentenced prisoner on parole" (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d at 476). Asthe Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]o require the [Board] to act in accordance withjudicial expectations . . . would substantially undermine the [legislative]decision to entrust release determinations to the [Board] and not the courts" (Matterof Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 76-77 [1980] [internalquotation marks omitted]). Absent failure by the Board to comply with the mandates ofExecutive Law article 12-B, "[j]udicial intervention is warranted only when there is a'showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety' " (Matter of Silmon vTravis, 95 NY2d at 476, quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. ofParole, 50 NY2d at 77; seeMatter of Valderrama v Travis, 19 AD3d 904, 905 [2005]). Thus, as the Courtof Appeals further stated in Silmon, "we review whether the Board's decision todeny parole was arbitrary or capricious" (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d at476).[FN1]

Executive Law article 12-B mandates that "[d]iscretionary release on parole shall notbe granted merely as a reward for good conduct" (Executive Law § 259-i[2] [c] [A]). Rather, the Board must consider whether "there is a reasonable probabilitythat, if such inmate is released, he [or she] will live and remain at liberty withoutviolating the law, and that his [or her] release is not incompatible with the welfare ofsociety and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his [or [*3]her] crime as to undermine respect for law" (Executive Law§ 259-i [2] [c] [A]). The decision to grant parole release is discretionary,but the Board is required to consider certain guidelines in making its determination(see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d at 477). Those guidelines include theinmate's institutional record (goals and accomplishments, academic achievement,vocational education, training and work assignments, therapy and interaction with staff),release plans, statements by the crime victim, the seriousness of the offense consideringtype and length of sentence, recommendations of the sentencing court and districtattorney, the presentence probation report, mitigating or aggravating factors to the crime,activities following arrest prior to confinement, and prior criminal record (Executive Law§ 259-i [2] [c] [A] [i], [iii], [v], [vii], [viii]).

While the Board is required to detail the reasons for a denial of discretionary release(see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [a] [i]), the Court of Appeals hasruled that the "Board need not expressly discuss each of these guidelines in itsdetermination" (Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788,791 [1994]), and we are bound by that ruling. The Court of Appeals has also explainedthat "the statutory scheme is such that no judicial review of the merits in any case ispossible" (Matter of Hines v State Bd. of Parole, 293 NY at 257 [emphasisadded]).[FN2]Theseprinciples, which are derived from the statute itself, underlie our limited and deferentialreview of the Board's decisions. Consistent with them, we have ruled that "our role is notto assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors" in reviewingthe Board's determination that the violent nature of the crimes for which petitioner wasconvicted outweighed his exemplary institutional behavior and extensive evidence ofrehabilitation (Matter ofComfort v New York State Div. of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 [2009]). In thatcase, we explained that, although we review the Board's ultimate determinationon a standard of "irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of Comfort v NewYork State Div. of Parole, 68 AD3d at 1297 [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]), we cannot "effectively review the Board's weighing process, given thatit is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or grantparole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior" (id. at 1296 [emphasisadded]).

In that regard, the Court of Appeals has held that the Board rationally denied parolerelease to a petitioner—who "was a productive citizen and model prisoner [and]who enthusiastically engaged in educational and vocational programs, taught otherprisoners and wrote about prison life"—based upon the brutality of his crime andhis continuing to maintain his innocence of that crime (Matter of Silmon vTravis, 95 NY2d at 477). Similarly, this Court has repeatedly held—bothrecently and historically—that, so long as the Board considers the factorsenumerated in the statute, it is "entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis onthe gravity of [the] crime" (Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 [2014],lv granted 23 NY3d 903 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted];see Matter of Williams v NewYork State Div. of [*4]Parole, 114 AD3d 992,992-993 [2014]; Matter ofLashway v Evans, 110 AD3d 1417, 1418 [2013]; Matter of McCaskell v Evans,108 AD3d 926, 927 [2013]; Matter of Vigliotti v State of N.Y. Exec. Div. of Parole, 98AD3d 789, 790 [2012], lv dismissed 20 NY3d 1034 [2013]; Matter of Gonzalez v Chair, N.Y.State Bd. of Parole, 72 AD3d 1368, 1369 [2010]; Matter of Lue-Shing vPataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [2003], lv denied 99 NY2d 511 [2003];People ex rel. McCormack v New York State Bd. of Parole, 244 AD2d 673, 673[1997]; Matter of Walker v New York State Div. of Parole, 203 AD2d 757,758-759 [1994]; Matter of Ittig v New York State Bd. of Parole, 59 AD2d 972[1977], lv denied 43 NY2d 648 [1978]; but see Matter of King v New YorkState Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 [1993], affd on other grounds 83NY2d 788 [1994] [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, thatthe Board may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the crimewhen the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as notoutweighing the seriousness of the crime]).

Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner's institutionalbehavior and accomplishments are "exemplary," the Board may place "particularemphasis" on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in denying parole, as long as therelevant statutory factors are considered (Matter of Valderrama v Travis, 19AD3d at 905). In so holding, we explained that, despite petitioner's admirableeducational and vocational accomplishments and positive prison disciplinary history,"[o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in accordance with therequirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject to further judicial review unless itis affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety" (id. [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]). We emphasize that this Court has repeatedly reached thesame result, on the same basis, when reviewing denials of parole to petitioners whom werecognized as having exemplary records and as being compelling candidates for release(see Matter of Comfort v New York State Div. of Parole, 68 AD3d at 1296-1297;Matter of Cruz v New YorkState Div. of Parole, 39 AD3d 1060, 1061-1062 [2007]; Matter of Guerin vNew York State Div. of Parole, 276 AD2d 899, 900 [2000]; see also Matter of Garofolo vDennison, 53 AD3d 734, 734-735 [2008]; Matter of Montalvo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 AD3d1438, 1438-1439 [2008]; Matter of Sanchez v Dennison, 21 AD3d 1249, 1249-1250[2005]; Matter of Mandala vDennison, 20 AD3d 757, 757-758 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 714[2005]; Matter of Rivera v Travis, 289 AD2d 829, 830 [2001]).

Evaluating the Board's written determination here in the context of the parole hearingtranscript (see Matter ofSiao-Pao v Dennison, 11 NY3d 777, 778 [2008]; Matter of Montane vEvans, 116 AD3d at 203 n 2), we conclude that the Board properly considered thenecessary factors in denying petitioner's request for parole release and founded itsdetermination upon the facts of this particular case. Indeed, the record is replete withevidence that the Board reviewed, considered and discussed the relevant factors, as wellas the facts of the underlying crime. Specifically, the Board explored in detail petitioner'srehabilitative efforts, educational and institutional achievements, release plans,COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument, lack of criminal history, evidentremorse and insight, numerous letters of support, clean disciplinary record and thesentencing minutes, in addition to the seriousness of the crime and his initial failure tocooperate with law enforcement agents, which allowed his accomplices to escapeconviction. With respect to the seriousness of the crime, it is worth noting that—asthe Board recognized—petitioner was convicted of murder under the felonymurder statute, under which, "[b]y operation of law, the intent necessary to sustain amurder conviction is inferred from the intent to commit a specific, serious, felonious act,even though the defendant, in truth, may not have intended to kill" (People vStokes, 88 NY2d 618, 623 [1996]; see People v Cahill, 2 NY3d [*5]14, 67 [2003]). Thus, while the facts as set forth in therecord strongly support petitioner's claim that he did not shoot the victim or intend tomurder him, "in the eyes of the law, [he] brutally killed [a police officer]" (Matter ofSilmon v Travis, 95 NY2d at 477-478).

In our view, the Board neither failed to comply with the requirements of the statutoryguidelines nor engaged in irrationality bordering on impropriety. This is not a case inwhich, for example, the Board irrationally concluded—in glaring contradictionwith both the facts in the record and the normal limits of human capability, and without asound basis in reason—that a nearly 90-year-old, terminally ill cancer patient withadditional debilitating medical conditions that required continuous medical care had "apropensity for extreme violence" based solely on the nature of the crime (Matter of Friedgood v New YorkState Bd. of Parole, 22 AD3d 950, 951 [2005]). Nor is this a case in which theBoard "considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute," such as penalphilosophy and the historical treatment of murderers (Matter of King v New YorkState Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d at 791) or in which the hearing transcript suggests thatthe Board improperly imposed a "burden [on petitioner] to demonstrate that his releasewould somehow enhance society" (Matter of Prout v Dennison, 26 AD3d 540, 541 [2006]).Rather, the record establishes that the Board acknowledged petitioner's extensiverehabilitative success along with the additional statutory factors, but placed greateremphasis on the seriousness of petitioner's crime in its determination that release wouldbe incompatible with the welfare of society and so deprecate the seriousness of the crimeas to undermine respect for the law, as it is "entitled" to do (Matter of Montane vEvans, 116 AD3d at 203). We are thus constrained to affirm—to do otherwiseis to implicitly overrule the decades of our well-settled jurisprudence set forth above(see e.g. Matter of Comfort v New York State Div. of Parole, 68 AD3d at1296-1297; Matter of Cruz v New York State Div. of Parole, 39 AD3d at1061-1062; Matter of Valderrama v Travis, 19 AD3d at 905; Matter ofGuerin v New York State Div. of Parole, 276 AD2d at 900).

That said, this Court is persuaded that petitioner's achievements during hisincarceration have been extraordinary. Petitioner has, among other things, earned aBachelor's degree from Nyack College and a Master's degree from New YorkTheological Seminary, participated in myriad programs through the prison system, andacted as a teacher and mentor to dozens of current and former inmates. Most notable arethe numerous letters that petitioner submitted advocating for his release, including lettersfrom the former Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, the formerChair of the Division of Parole, and the Assistant District Attorney who prosecutedpetitioner. In addition, the Superintendent of Fishkill Correctional Facility opined that he"would be fine having [petitioner] and his family as [his] neighbors," and 18 correctionofficers and other correction employees submitted letters further supporting petitioner'srelease. As one Board commissioner acknowledged—before voting againstpetitioner's release in a split decision—"anyone would be hard pressed to arguethat [petitioner was not] rehabilitated."[FN3]

[*6] Nevertheless, our view on whether petitioner is a"prime candidate for parole release" is not the relevant question before us (Matter ofCruz v New York State Div. of Parole, 39 AD3d at 1062). Petitioner's record, whilecompelling, provides no basis for overturning our settled precedent and for failing toapply the relevant decisions of the Court of Appeals; nor do the 2011 amendments toExecutive Law article 12-B. As this Court has already concluded, those amendments didnot "transform[ ] or otherwise alter[ ] the obligations of either the Board in articulatingits determinations or this Court in reviewing such determinations" (Matter ofMontane v Evans, 116 AD3d at 203-204 n 2). In short, the statutory language ofExecutive Law § 259-i (5) dictating our limited power of review and theinterpretation of that language by the Court of Appeals remain unchanged. Accordingly,inasmuch as the Board has not violated the statutory mandates and its determination doesnot exhibit irrationality bordering on impropriety under either our precedent or that of theCourt of Appeals, "its discretion is absolute and beyond review in the courts" (Matterof Hines v State Bd. of Parole, 293 NY at 257; see Matter of Silmon vTravis, 95 NY2d at 476-477).

Finally, we have previously considered and rejected petitioner's arguments that the2011 amendments to Executive Law § 259-c (4) required the promulgationof formal rules or regulations (Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 AD3d at202-203). Petitioner's remaining contentions have been either rendered academic by ourdecision or, upon consideration, found to be lacking in merit.

Rose, J., concurs.

Egan Jr., J. (concurring). On February 11, 1982, James Carragher, an off duty policeofficer, was walking home from work when he was accosted, robbed and murdered on astreet in Brooklyn. Upon reviewing the extensive record before this Court, I fully agreewith the majority that the determination rendered by the Board of Parole in this matterwas neither arbitrary and capricious nor constituted [*7]an abuse of discretion, and I am similarly satisfied that,contrary to the view expressed by my dissenting colleagues, the Board's decision was notpremised upon a misunderstanding of the relevant facts or the consideration of improperfactors. Indeed, my analysis of the record leads me to conclude that the Board's decisionto deny parole to petitioner under the circumstances presented here was entirely proper,and I write separately only to comment briefly upon the impact of petitioner'sinstitutional record and the seriousness of the underlying offense.

As the majority aptly observes, parole is not a reward for good behavior in prison(see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]; Matter of Silmon vTravis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; Matter of Robles v Fischer, 117 AD3d 1558, 1559 [2014];Matter of Mentor v New YorkState Div. of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245, 1246 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d803 [2012], cert denied 566 US &mdash, 132 S Ct 2437 [2012]), and althoughpetitioner has made significant strides while incarcerated, his institutional record in noway alters the fact that he stands convicted of society's most heinous crime—thetaking of a fellow human being's life. Similarly, the mere fact that certain of the statutoryfactors and guidelines (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A] [i],[iii], [vii], [viii]) militate in petitioner's favor or that petitioner scored well on theCOMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument neither undermines nor negates theseriousness of his offense. In this regard, the prevailing case law—as extensivelysummarized by the majority—makes clear that, so long as the Board considers therelevant statutory factors, it is free to place "particular emphasis" on the gravity of theunderlying crime (Matter ofValderrama v Travis, 19 AD3d 904, 905 [2005]). As I am satisfied that theBoard indeed gave appropriate consideration to all of the relevant statutory factors and,further, did not abuse its discretion in emphasizing the nature of petitioner's crime indenying his request for parole, I discern no basis upon which to disturb the Board'sdetermination.

Peters, P.J. (dissenting). Over 30 years ago, petitioner was sentenced to 18 years tolife in prison for his role in the crimes that led to the death of an off duty police officer.He remains behind bars, having been denied parole seven times during that period, themost recent of which—decided by a two-to-one vote of the Board ofParole—is now before us. The majority has concluded that the Board's decision todeny parole to petitioner during this latest appearance did not exhibit" 'irrationality bordering on impropriety' " (Matter of Silmon vTravis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v New York StateBd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]). I respectfully disagree.

In my view, the Board's decision was based upon significant errors of fact and theconsideration of improper factors. As the parole hearing minutes reveal, the Board'sdecision was made by the closest of margins (two commissioners voted to deny paroleand one dissented), such that any error should be considered relevant to thedetermination. In that regard, one of the commissioners who voted against petitioner'srelease acknowledged that "anyone would be hard pressed to argue that [petitioner is] not. . . rehabilitated," but professed his belief that petitioner's achievementswere contrasted by his "conduct in shooting this officer." This commissioner furtherarticulated his belief that petitioner might have been the one to pull the trigger by opiningthat it was "difficult for [him] to fathom how if the man with the gun is the one who'sright on top of this officer stealing his property, how [petitioner got] shot and[petitioner's coconspirator did not] get shot." Yet, petitioner was not the shooter.In fact, he was not even armed. The Assistant District Attorney who prosecutedpetitioner wrote a letter in support of petitioner's [*8]release in 2010, stating "with certainty that before the casewent to the jury, I was convinced that [petitioner] was not the shooter. I am also certainthat [Supreme Court] was convinced that he was not the shooter." In a subsequent letterwritten in support of the instant parole application, he wrote that "there was not a scintillaof evidence that [petitioner] was the shooter" and that "no one involved in theinvestigation ever believed that [petitioner] was the shooter or that he was armed."Indeed, during sentencing, Supreme Court stated that "[petitioner] stands before mehaving been found by the jury to have been a participant, but not the active prime mover.It is on that basis that he must be sentenced." Petitioner, who had no prior criminal recordand could have received consecutive sentences amounting to an aggregate prisonsentence of 371/2 years to life, was sentenced to less than half of that.

This same commissioner also relied on his own subjective beliefs and experiences tointerpret the facts in a manner contrary to the record by suggesting that petitioner wasaware at the time of the incident that the victim was a police officer. Petitioner steadfastlymaintained that he was unaware of such fact at any time during the course of events, andthe record supports his assertion. Supreme Court described the victim as "a 55-year-oldman . . . carrying a black gym bag[,] wearing a cap, corduroy pants and acoat," and the prosecuting attorney wrote that the victim was "dressed in clothes thatsuggested he was a middle-aged manual laborer." Yet this commissioner opined that,based upon his own training in the police academy, "when you're pulling out your gun,the first words that are supposed to simultaneously come off your lips is'police.' " The emphasis that this commissioner placed on his belief that thevictim must have identified himself as a police officer can only be viewed as relevant if itwas also his belief that petitioner was the shooter; indeed, he stated that in his 20 years ofexperience in the system, "every single person who is charged with shooting an officersays [the victim] didn't say who he was."

Also troubling are repeated comments made by this same commissioner indicatingthat, because petitioner initially failed to cooperate with police in 1982 and neither of histwo coconspirators were ever charged for their role in the offenses, petitioner put himselfin the "precarious position" of being the only person who could be held accountable forthe crimes. This commissioner implied that someone must continue to be punished forthe unfortunate death of this police officer and, absent the ability to punish the mostculpable party, petitioner must continue to pay that price in his stead. Manifestly, suchpunitive considerations find no support in statute (see Executive Law§ 259-i) and have absolutely no relevance to the decision to grant or denyparole.[FN1]As theBoard's determination was tainted by these factual errors and improper [*9]considerations, it must be annulled (see Matter of Kingv New York State Div. of Parole, 83 NY2d 788, 791 [1994]; Matter of Prout v Dennison, 26AD3d 540, 541 [2006]; Matter of Friedgood v New York State Bd. of Parole, 22 AD3d950, 951 [2005]).

Even had such blatant factual errors and inappropriate considerations not affected theoutcome, I would still find the Board's decision to be irrational. To be sure, pursuant tothe governing statute and early Court of Appeals precedent governing the review ofparole decisions, the courts' role appeared to be limited to discerning errors of fact or law(see Executive Law § 259-i [5]; Matter of Hines v State Bd. ofParole, 293 NY 254, 257 [1944]). However, more recent Court of Appealsjurisprudence, now well settled, propounds a more discerning standard under which suchdecisions should be reviewed for "irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter ofSilmon v Travis, 95 NY2d at 476 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Partee v Evans,117 AD3d 1258, 1259 [2014]). In my view, this language suggeststhat—more than simply ratifying a decision made by the Board so long as itadheres to the statutory mandates—the role of the courts is to make some measureof substantive evaluation to assure that justice is served. As the Court of Appeals taughtin Silmon, "we review whether the Board's decision to deny parole was arbitraryor capricious" (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d at 476).[FN2]

Applying this standard, I fully acknowledge that parole release is not granted merelyas a reward for good conduct, and that the decision to grant or deny parole rests primarilywithin the discretion of the Board. I am also well aware that the showing required to setaside a parole decision is, indeed, a weighty one.[FN3]However, given the lack of anyevidence to support the Board's finding that there is a reasonable probability thatpetitioner would commit further crimes if released, and that his release would beincompatible with the welfare of society and undermine respect for the law, I find theBoard's determination to be patently irrational.

The majority rightly notes that petitioner's achievements while incarcerated are trulyremarkable and extraordinary, but in light of the task at hand, those accomplishments areworthy of iteration. Petitioner, who entered prison at the age of 20 with a high schooldiploma, has since [*10]earned both a Bachelor's degreein organizational management and leadership skills and a Master's degree in professionalstudies. Over the three decades of his incarceration, petitioner has assumed the role ofadjunct instructor and academic assistant through Nyack College and the New YorkTheological Seminary, and has also become the facilitator or coordinator for at least eightdistinct programs within his current and former correctional facilities. Throughout hisincarceration, petitioner has successfully participated in nearly every rehabilitativeprogram available to him, including several years of therapeutic counseling focused inpart on taking responsibility for his crime, services to prepare him for his transition out ofprison and programs addressing, among other areas, marriage, parenting and alternativesto violence. Through these efforts, petitioner has fully accepted responsibility for hisactions and has repeatedly expressed sincere remorse for all of those affected by hiscrime, particularly the family of the victim. In a personal statement in his application forrelease to community supervision, petitioner stated that "[s]ince the pain I have caused. . . remains in my heart, my life and actions will always demonstrateatonement." A practitioner who worked with petitioner stated that he "exemplifies thetransformation toward responsibility, remorse, and making amends that we seek toachieve with all of our participants."

In addition, petitioner has not only maintained employment during his incarceration,serving most recently as the Inmate Director of the Transitional Services Program inwhich he oversees 15 to 20 other inmates, but also continues to work extensively topromote the rehabilitation of other inmates. Petitioner worked to create the Stop theViolence Peace Initiative at Sing Sing Correctional Facility to address violence withinthe prison and helped to raise $10,000 for the prison's Family Center, as well as foractivities and school supplies for the children of inmates. He has established plans foremployment outside of prison and successful integration back into the community in theform of letters of reasonable assurance from three organizations for employment andcounseling, as well as close relationships with two established mentors. If released,petitioner would live with his wife, who he has known for more than 30 years, and enjoythe support of a large network of friends and family.

Petitioner's behavioral record during his approximately 30 years of incarceration isextraordinary. He has incurred only one infraction ticket—and that almost aquarter century ago—for excess/altered clothing.[FN4]Moreover, according to both anindependent psychological evaluation and his COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessmentinstrument, he is at the lowest possible risk level for reoffending. The author of theformer evaluation stated that "[t]here is nothing further [petitioner] could be expected todo while incarcerated that could lower his risk level."

Over the years, petitioner has received an unprecedented outpouring of support andadvocacy for his release by, among others, over 20 correction staff who supervise him ona daily basis, a former parole commissioner, the former Commissioner of Corrections andCommunity Supervision and the Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted his case.The Superintendent of Fishkill Correctional Facility, where petitioner is currentlyincarcerated, also wrote two letters in support of petitioner's release, one stating that he"would be fine having [petitioner] and his family as [his] neighbors" and the other callingpetitioner "the poster child for [the Department of [*11]Corrections and Community Supervision]" and itsprograms.[FN5]Aretired parole commissioner who denied petitioner's release in 2002 and 2006 wrote thathe "strongly feel[s]" that petitioner "does [not] deserve to spend the remainder of his lifeincarcerated." Hundreds of other inmates and members of petitioner's communitysubmitted letters of support or signed petitions in support of his release, prompting onecommissioner to state, "I don't think I've ever seen this many letters by correction officersin anyone's file," and another commissioner to remark that, as "one of the longest servingcurrently on the [B]oard . . ., [he had not] seen the amount of support that[petitioner has]."

Despite this abundance of evidence demonstrating petitioner's extraordinaryrehabilitative achievements that would appear to strongly militate in favor of grantingparole, two commissioners declined to do so, seemingly on the sole basis that a policeofficer was killed during the course of an attempted robbery. As one of thosecommissioners frankly stated to petitioner during the hearing, "if you're held, the reasonyou would be held is because a police officer was murdered in the line of duty." "TheLegislature, however, has not defined 'seriousness of [the] crime' in terms of specificcategories of either crimes or victims" (Matter of King v New York State Div. ofParole, 190 AD2d 423, 433 [1993], affd 83 NY2d 788 [1994]). There can beno dispute that the crimes for which petitioner was convicted are serious and resulted inthe tragic death of a police officer, but a blind eye cannot be turned to the factsunderlying those offenses. Not insignificantly, petitioner was convicted of murder underthe felony murder statute, requiring an intention on the part of petitioner to commit theunderlying felony, but not requiring proof that he fired the weapon or had an intention tokill (see Penal Law § 125.25 [3]). Indeed, upon sentencing,Supreme Court noted that the evidence demonstrated that petitioner "did not go out intothe street with the intention of committing murder." Although "every murder convictionis inherently a matter of the utmost seriousness since it reflects the unjustifiable takingand tragic loss of a human life . . . , the Legislature has determined that amurder conviction per se should not preclude parole" (Matter of King v New YorkState Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d at 433; see also Matter of Costello v New York State Bd. of Parole, 101AD3d 1512, 1517 [2012, Spain, J., dissenting], revd on other grounds 23NY3d 1002 [2014] [noting that "those who opposepetitioner's parole release openly advocate the recurring position that an inmate convictedfor the death of a law enforcement officer—even a nonshooter convicted of felonymurder, as here—should never be released on parole. It bears emphasisthat this was not and is not the law"]).

Upon considering all of the evidence, I am left with the inescapable conclusion thatthe Board's decision to deny parole release to petitioner was irrational. Accordingly, Iwould reverse the judgment, annul the Board's determination and remit the matter to theBoard for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.

Garry, J. (dissenting). I fully agree with the dissent; however, I write separately toraise an additional issue. As previously stated in my concurring opinion in Matter of Montane v Evans(116 AD3d 197, 205[*12][2014], lv granted23 NY3d 903 [2014]), I believe that our own Court has established an overbroad rule inappeals from denials of parole. The majority asserts that this clearly extraordinary case isnot susceptible to reversal upon judicial review; we have then wholly abdicated ourcritical judicial function, and the courthouse doors are closed. For all the reasons statedin the thorough analysis of the Presiding Justice, this determination was irrational. Nosound basis supports this individual's continuing incarceration. While our review powersare limited, they should not be applied in a manner that is so inordinately deferential as torender the appellate review process a mere sham.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:In all CPLRarticle 78 proceedings to review determinations that are not made after a quasi-judicialhearing mandated by law, including this one, "the proper standard for judicial review. . . is whether the Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious or anabuse of discretion (see CPLR 7803 [3])" (Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco, 20 NY3d 540, 559[2013]; see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 ofTowns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231[1974]). "Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken withoutregard to the facts"; or, put differently, "[r]ationality is what is reviewed under. . . the arbitrary and capricious standard" (Matter of Pell v Board ofEduc. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck,Westchester County, 34 NY2d at 231 [emphasis added]). Contrary to the dissenters'views, our application of the arbitrary and capricious—that is,rationality—standard of judicial review amounts to neither an "assert[ion] that thisclearly extraordinary case is not susceptible to reversal upon judicial review"(infra at 18 [Garry, J., dissenting]) or "simply ratifying a decision made by theBoard so long as it adheres to the statutory mandates" (infra at 14 [Peters, P.J.,dissenting]). Rather, in our view, the Board's determination evinces a clearly reasonedbasis that finds foundation in the facts of this matter and, therefore, is not irrationalbordering on impropriety, as explained below.

Footnote 2:Again, ouracknowledgment that this case is not subject to review on the merits does not imply thatwe are "abdicat[ing] our critical judicial function" (infra at 18 [Garry, J.,dissenting]). Rather, it is a recognition of the distinction between de novo review on themerits, and the "extremely deferential[, . . .] proper standard for judicialreview in these cases"—whether the Board's determination was arbitrary andcapricious (Matter of Beck-Nichols v Bianco, 20 NY3d at 559).

Footnote 3:We interpret the samecommissioner's frank acknowledgment that if petitioner was denied release, "the reason[he] would be held is because a police officer was murdered in the line of duty," as arecognition that petitioner would be released unless the Board determined that theseriousness of the crime outweighed the remaining statutory factors. Similarly, thatcommissioner's explanation that he found petitioner's description of the crime "difficult. . . to fathom" based upon his own experience does not amount to amisunderstanding of the facts of the crime or consideration of improper factors, as thedissenters assert. That commissioner's discussion of the facts of the crime as set forth inthe record was accurate, and he conceded that "maybe [petitioner was] telling the truth,"but nevertheless expressed his doubts about petitioner's "credibility," given that petitioner"could have resolved all of this" at the time of the incident, but instead "engaged in apattern of lies from the outset about what happened." A petitioner's willingness to admitto the facts of the crime and a consideration of the petitioner's activities following arrestand prior to confinement—here, the "pattern of lies" and petitioner's refusal tocooperate with law enforcement—are factors within the scope of the statute(see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A] [vii]; Matter of Silmon vTravis, 95 NY2d at 477-478).

Footnote 1:To be clear, by no meansam I suggesting that the consideration of petitioner's conduct after arrest and prior toconfinement are irrelevant; rather, I am asserting only that it was improper for the Boardto attribute relevance to the fact that petitioner was the only culprit who could continue tobe held accountable for the crime. In any event, the commissioner's statement that it waspetitioner's "pattern of lies" and deceit that allowed the other perpetrators to escapeprosecution, and which left petitioner in the "precarious position" of being the only onethat could be held accountable for the crime, is contrary to the facts. The AssistantDistrict Attorney who prosecuted petitioner unequivocally stated in his letter in supportof petitioner's release application that the police were already aware of the otherperpetrators' involvement in the crime, and that there was no other information petitionercould have provided that would have aided in the investigation and prosecution of thoseother individuals. In fact, noticeably absent from the record is any explanation as to whythe other perpetrators were not prosecuted. Certainly, petitioner should not be penalizedfor law enforcement activities and/or decisions over which he had no control.

Footnote 2:I am not challenging therationality standard governing our review of parole decisions, as the majority suggests.Rather, I take issue with the majority's application of that standard to the facts of thiscase.

Footnote 3:Such awareness isevinced by this dissent—the first dissent that I have penned from a decision of theBoard in my over two decades on this Court.

Footnote 4:It bears repeating thatpetitioner had never been convicted of a crime prior to that which resulted in hisincarceration.

Footnote 5:Notably, SuperintendentWilliam J. Connolly shared that, in his 34 years in the corrections field, he authored onlyseven letters of this nature.


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